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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim
Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim
Law & Economics Working Papers
This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland, where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the regulation of …
Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten
Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potential for agency conflicts in mutual funds, whose advisors have the de facto power to award themselves high fees. While the surrounding debate has focused on the extent to which market competition replaces the need for fee litigation, there appears to be a growing consensus that fund governance, through the use of voice, is unlikely to be effective. The use of voice is commonly said to be hampered by collective action problems. More recently, scholars have argued that it is further weakened by the easy availability …
Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard
Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
Articles
We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …
Revitalizing Motive And Opportunity Pleading After Tellabs, Marvin Lowenthal
Revitalizing Motive And Opportunity Pleading After Tellabs, Marvin Lowenthal
Michigan Law Review
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") to prevent frivolous lawsuits that had been draining resources from businesses. This legislation included provisions for heightening the pleading requirements for the scienter, or state of mind, requirement for securities law violations. Many circuit courts debated whether the motive and opportunity test for scienter, applied initially by the Second and Third Circuits, survived the passage of the PSLRA. This Note argues that while the motive and opportunity test has been discounted by numerous circuits, it not only remains viable for pleading scienter under the PSLRA, but it accomplishes the …