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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Conscripting Attorneys To Battle Corporate Fraud Without Shields Or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge In Light Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Kim T. Vu Oct 2006

Conscripting Attorneys To Battle Corporate Fraud Without Shields Or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge In Light Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Kim T. Vu

Michigan Law Review

This Note advocates that federal courts should allow attorneys to bring retaliatory discharge claims under SOX. Traditional rationales prohibiting the claims of retaliatory discharge by attorneys do not apply in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley. This Note contends that the Department of Labor and the federal courts should interpret the whistleblower provisions of § 806 as protecting attorneys who report under § 307. Assuring reporting attorneys that they have protection from retaliation will encourage them to whistleblow and thereby advance SOX's policy goal of ferreting out corporate fraud. Part I explores the legal landscape of retaliatory discharge suits by attorneys. This …


Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer Jun 2006

Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer

Michigan Law Review

Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals: When Google went public in 2004, it used an Internet auction to sell its stock to shareholders. When Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984, it sold its stock only to Vermont residents. Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of exactly one dollar. Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut. What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastructure of …


Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy Jun 2006

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …


Well-Known Seasoned Issuers In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2006

Well-Known Seasoned Issuers In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently adopted a series of rules relaxing the restrictions imposed on public offerings. The largest public companies - defined as “well-known seasoned issuers” (WKSIs) - received the most extensive regulatory relief. Canada could adopt a version of WKSI status for the top tier of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) issuers as part of a streamlined POP system.

Careful consideration must be given, however, as to the appropriate standards for WKSI status in Canada. The standards adopted in the U.S. – US$700 million in market capitalization or US$1 billion in nonconvertible debt issued over …


The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2006

The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession …