Securities Law Commons^™

Disruptive Technology And Securities Regulation, Chris Brummer

Fordham Law Review

Nowhere has disruptive technology had a more profound impact than in financial services—and yet nowhere do academics and policymakers lack a coherent theory of the phenomenon more, much less a coherent set of regulatory prescriptions. Part of the challenge lies in the varied channels through which innovation upends market practices. Problems also lurk in the popular assumption that securities regulation operates against the backdrop of stable market gatekeepers like exchanges, broker-dealers, and clearing systems—a fact scenario increasingly out of sync in twenty-first-century capital markets.

This Article explains how technological innovation “disrupts” not only capital markets but also the exercise of …

Behind Enemy Phone Lines: Insider Trading, Parallel Enforcement, And Sharing The Fruits Of Wiretaps, Alexandra N. Mogul

Fordham Law Review

Two key trends were present in the successful prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam and his coconspirators in one of the largest insider-trading conspiracies in history: the use of wiretaps to investigate and prosecute insider trading and a joint effort between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct the investigation. Despite the close working relationship between the DOJ and the SEC, the DOJ never disclosed the fruits of the wiretaps to the SEC, presumably due to its belief that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (as amended, the …

The Sum Of Its Parts: The Lawyer-Client Relationship In Initial Public Offerings, Jeremy R. Mcclane

Fordham Law Review

This Article examines the impact of the quality of a lawyer's working relationship with his or her client on one of the most important types of capital markets deal in a company's existence: its initial public offering (IPO). Drawing on data from interviews with equity capital markets lawyers at major law firms, and analyzing data from IPOs in the United States registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission between June 1996 and December 2010, this study finds a strong association between several measures of IPO performance and the familiarity between the lead underwriter and its counsel, as measured by the …

Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The current controversy in corporate law concerns whether firms can discourage litigation by shifting its cost to shareholders. But corporate law courts have long engaged in fee-shifting—from shareholder plaintiffs to the corporation—under the “corporate benefit” doctrine. This Article examines fee-shifting in share-holder litigation, arguing that current practices are unsound from the perspective of both doctrine and public policy. Unfortunately, the fee-shifting bylaws recently enacted in response to the problem of excessive shareholder litigation fare no better. The Article therefore offers a different approach to fee-shifting, articulating three specific reforms of the corporate benefit doctrine to quell the current crisis in …

Lift Not The Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, Martin Gelter, Geneviève Helleringer

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, we identify a fundamental contradiction in the law of fiduciary duty of corporate directors across jurisdictions, namely the tension between the uniformity of directors’ duties and the heterogeneity of directors themselves. American scholars tend to think of the board as a group of individuals elected by shareholders, even though it is widely acknowledged (and criticized) that the board is often a largely self-perpetuating body whose inside members dominate the selection of their future colleagues and eventual successors. However, this characterization is far from universally true internationally, and it tends to be increasingly less true even in the …

Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon

Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …