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Articles 1 - 24 of 24
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
The Great Etf Tax Swindle: The Taxation Of In-Kind Redemptions, Jeffrey M. Colon
The Great Etf Tax Swindle: The Taxation Of In-Kind Redemptions, Jeffrey M. Colon
Faculty Scholarship
Since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine over 30 years ago, corporations must recognize gain when distributing appreciated property to their shareholders. Regulated investment companies (RICs), which generally must be organized as domestic corporations, are exempt from this rule when distributing property in kind to a redeeming shareholder.
In-kind redemptions, while rare for mutual funds, are a fundamental feature of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Because fund managers decide which securities to distribute, they distribute assets with unrealized gains and thereby significantly reduce the future tax burdens of their current and future shareholders. Many ETFs have morphed into investment vehicles that …
Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith
Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
The current controversy in corporate law concerns whether firms can discourage litigation by shifting its cost to shareholders. But corporate law courts have long engaged in fee-shifting—from shareholder plaintiffs to the corporation—under the “corporate benefit” doctrine. This Article examines fee-shifting in share-holder litigation, arguing that current practices are unsound from the perspective of both doctrine and public policy. Unfortunately, the fee-shifting bylaws recently enacted in response to the problem of excessive shareholder litigation fare no better. The Article therefore offers a different approach to fee-shifting, articulating three specific reforms of the corporate benefit doctrine to quell the current crisis in …
Lift Not The Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, Martin Gelter, Geneviève Helleringer
Lift Not The Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, Martin Gelter, Geneviève Helleringer
Faculty Scholarship
In this article, we identify a fundamental contradiction in the law of fiduciary duty of corporate directors across jurisdictions, namely the tension between the uniformity of directors’ duties and the heterogeneity of directors themselves. American scholars tend to think of the board as a group of individuals elected by shareholders, even though it is widely acknowledged (and criticized) that the board is often a largely self-perpetuating body whose inside members dominate the selection of their future colleagues and eventual successors. However, this characterization is far from universally true internationally, and it tends to be increasingly less true even in the …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon
Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …
Substituted Compliance And Systemic Risk: How To Make A Global Market In Derivatives Regulation, Sean J. Griffith
Substituted Compliance And Systemic Risk: How To Make A Global Market In Derivatives Regulation, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional wisdom is that the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed faults in the ability of international financial regulation to contain the problem of systemic risk. Further conventional wisdom suggests that the failure to regulate comple
The Sec Adds A New Weapon: How Does The New Admission Requirement Change The Landscape?, Paul Radvany
The Sec Adds A New Weapon: How Does The New Admission Requirement Change The Landscape?, Paul Radvany
Faculty Scholarship
Over the past several years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has settled the vast majority of the cases it has brought. Some people have suggested, however, that settlements by public agencies such as the SEC should be scrutinized more closely. For instance, in a series of recent opinions, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York has “question[ed] the wisdom” of the SEC’s well-established practice of permitting defendants to enter into consent judgments while neither admitting nor denying the allegations. During the past two years, the SEC has implemented new policies that have altered its …
Taking Section 10(B) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement Of Sec Rules, Steve Thel
Taking Section 10(B) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement Of Sec Rules, Steve Thel
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has determined the scope of federal securities laws in a series of cases in which it has read section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as either prohibiting certain misconduct or authorizing the SEC to regulate that conduct and only that conduct. Judging by the language, structure and history of the Exchange Act, the Court’s reading is wrong. Section 10(b) does not prohibit anything, and it neither grants the SEC rulemaking power nor limits the rulemaking power granted to the SEC elsewhere in the Exchange Act. Instead, section 10(b) simply triggers criminal sanctions for certain rule violations. …
Nationalization And Necessity: Takings And A Doctrine Of Economic Emergency, Nestor M. Davidson
Nationalization And Necessity: Takings And A Doctrine Of Economic Emergency, Nestor M. Davidson
Faculty Scholarship
Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently, shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the obligation to pay just …
Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu
Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu
Faculty Scholarship
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …
How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Richard Squire
How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Richard Squire
Faculty Scholarship
Corporations insure against liability in shareholder lawsuits by buying tiered coverage from multiple insurers who each cover a distinct segment of the potential damages range. Rather than negotiating to settle individually with the plaintiff, the insurers seek to reach a single, collectively binding settlement agreement. This combination of segmented coverage and collective settlements produces a conflict of interests: the corporation’s managers and some insurers are better off if the case settles pre-trial for the expected damages, while other insurers are better off going to trial. To force reluctant insurers to settle, courts have created a duty that can require an …
What Happened To The "Up-Tick" Rule?, Constantine N. Katsoris
What Happened To The "Up-Tick" Rule?, Constantine N. Katsoris
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines how liability insurers transmit and transform the content of corporate and securities law. Directors' & Officers' (D&O) liability insurers are the financiers of shareholder litigation in the American legal system, paying on behalf of the corporation and its directors and officers when shareholders sue. The ability of the law to deter corporate actors thus depends upon the insurance intermediary. How, then, do insurers transmit and transform the content of corporate and securities law in underwriting D& 0 coverage?In this Article, we report the results of an empirical study of the D&O underwriting process. Drawing upon in-depth interviews …
Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework In France, Germany, And Italy , Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter
Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework In France, Germany, And Italy , Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter
Faculty Scholarship
All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies are far from uniform across jurisdictions, possibly leading to significant differences in the degree of investor protection they provide. Comparative research in this field is wrought with difficulty. It is tempting to compare corporate laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality of other corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features. We take a different …
Free Writing, Steve Thel
The Missing Monitor In Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
The Missing Monitor In Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the "bonding" provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance …
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …
Double Dipping: The Cross-Border Taxation Of Stock Options, Jeffrey M. Colon
Double Dipping: The Cross-Border Taxation Of Stock Options, Jeffrey M. Colon
Faculty Scholarship
Once awarded exclusively to upper management, stock options are now granted increasingly to rank-and-file employees and are becoming a greater component of employee compensation. The expanding use of stock options is undoubtedly due in part to the large increase in equity prices over the last twenty years. Further fueling the demand was the Internet start-up boom of the late 1990s, the spectacular financial success of many technology and computer companies, notably Microsoft and Oracle, and the well- publicized lucre acquired by their employees. The collapse of the initial public offerings market for Internet start-up companies at the dawn of the …
Spinning And Underpricing: A Legal And Economic Analysis Of The Preferential Allocation Of Shares In Initial Public Offerings , Sean J. Griffith
Spinning And Underpricing: A Legal And Economic Analysis Of The Preferential Allocation Of Shares In Initial Public Offerings , Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This Article investigates the preferential allocation, or “spinning,” of shares in initial public offerings. It begins by examining the offering process and the incentives of underwriters, issuers, and investors. Through this examination of the participants and the process, it locates the harm of spinning in the underpricing of initial public offerings. The Article then seeks to identify precisely which participants in the offering process are harmed by the practice and finally evaluates the most appropriate means of addressing this harm.
Investment Management Arrangements And The Federal Securities Laws, Harvey E. Bines, Steve Thel
Investment Management Arrangements And The Federal Securities Laws, Harvey E. Bines, Steve Thel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Is Unlimited Liability Really Unattainable: Of Long Arms And Short Sales, Mark R. Patterson
Is Unlimited Liability Really Unattainable: Of Long Arms And Short Sales, Mark R. Patterson
Faculty Scholarship
Unlimited shareholder liability would radically change the way we look at corporations. In an unlimited-liability world, one part at least of the veil between corporation and shareholder would no longer exist. As a result, the relationship between corporation and shareholder would be, both in law and in fact,much closer than it is currently. The two parts of this change-the legal and the factual-would reinforce each other. The legal change would be reflected in court decisions enforcing unlimited liability Regardless of the exact contours that decisions in this area took initially, there would be at least some shareholders-mutual funds, for example--whom …
$850,000 In Six Minutes-The Mechanics Of Securities Manipulation, Steve Thel
$850,000 In Six Minutes-The Mechanics Of Securities Manipulation, Steve Thel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Genius Of Section 16: Regulating The Management Of Publicly Held Companies, Steve Thel
The Genius Of Section 16: Regulating The Management Of Publicly Held Companies, Steve Thel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Securities Law Fifth Circuit Symposium, Steve Thel
Securities Law Fifth Circuit Symposium, Steve Thel
Faculty Scholarship
The Fifth Circuit decided some important securities cases during the survey period and issued some interesting opinions. Although the court consistently claimed a conservative reliance on precedent and seldom acknowledged making new law, it interpreted some well-established doctrine in surprising ways. The past year's opinions in fraud cases provide guidance in the related areas of reliance, damages, and plaintiff's due diligence. The year also witnessed important developments in the law governing the relationship between brokerage firms and their clients. The most spectacular development in this area during the survey year was the October collapse in security prices. In light of …
Regulation Of Manipulation Under Section 10(B): Security Prices And The Text Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, Steve Thel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.