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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Bypassing Congress On Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options To Avoid Default, Steven L. Schwarcz
Bypassing Congress On Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options To Avoid Default, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Even a “technical” default by the United States on its debt, such as a delay in paying principal or interest due to Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt ceiling, could have serious systemic consequences, destroying financial markets and undermining job creation, consumer spending, and economic growth. The ongoing political gamesmanship between Congress and the Executive Branch has been threatening — and even if temporarily resolved, almost certainly will continue to threaten — such a default. The various options discussed in the media for averting a default have not been legally and pragmatically viable. This article proposes new options for …
Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox
Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …
Too Big To Fail?: Recasting The Financial Safety Net, Steven L. Schwarcz
Too Big To Fail?: Recasting The Financial Safety Net, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Government safety nets in the United States and abroad focus, anachronistically, on problems of banks and other financial institutions, largely ignoring financial markets which have become major credit sources for consumers and companies. Besides failing to protect these markets, this narrow focus encourages morally hazardous behavior by large institutions, like AIG and Citigroup, that are "too big to fail." This paper examines how a safety net should be recast to protect financial markets and also explains why that safety net would mitigate moral hazard and help resolve the too-big-to-fail dilemma.
Keynote Address: Understanding The ‘Subprime’ Financial Crisis, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: Understanding The ‘Subprime’ Financial Crisis, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Markets, Systemic Risk, And The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Steven L. Schwarcz
Markets, Systemic Risk, And The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
The recent subprime mortgage meltdown is undermining financial market stability and has the potential to cause a true systemic breakdown, collapsing the world's financial systems like a row of dominoes. This essay uses the subprime crisis to demonstrate that existing protections against systemic risk, which focus on banks and largely ignore financial markets, are anachronistic and misguided. Because companies increasingly access financial markets without going through banks, an effective framework for containing systemic risk must focus on markets.
There Are Plaintiffs And … There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lynn Bai
There Are Plaintiffs And … There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lynn Bai
Faculty Scholarship
In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums - small relative to the "provable losses" suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendant-company, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears …
Business Associations—1959 Tennessee Survey, F. Hodge O'Neal
Business Associations—1959 Tennessee Survey, F. Hodge O'Neal
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.