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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi
Faculty Scholarship
The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …
Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce …
Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic. The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent every failure. This paper, which formed my Chapman Dialogue Address at Chapman University School of Law and the keynote speech at Chapman Law Review’s 2011 Symposium on the Future of Financial Regulation, attempts to contrast fundamental differences between ex ante …
Keynote Address: Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This short address attempts to provide a succinct overview, critiquing how well the Dodd-Frank Act identifies and manages systemic risk.
Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Faculty Scholarship
In the wake of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the European financial authorities announced last November that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after mid-2013 must contain an identical collective action clause (CAC) in order, if necessary, to facilitate a restructuring of those
instruments.
CACs in sovereign bonds have been the subject of considerable attention over the last ten years. They were introduced into sovereign bonds governed by U.S. law only in early 2003. Yet a surprising number of versions of the clause can be found in modern sovereign bonds.
The history of the research and development of this contractual provision …
Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …
Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell
Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell
Faculty Scholarship
Inadequate civil regulatory liability can be an incentive for public enforcers to pursue criminal cases against firms. This incentive is undesirable in a scheme with overlapping forms of liability that is meant to treat most cases of wrongdoing civilly and to reserve the criminal remedy for the few most serious institutional delicts. This effect appears to exist in the current scheme of liability for securities law violations, and may be present in other regulatory structures as well. In this chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom," the author argues that enhancements of the SEC's enforcement processes likely would …
The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox
Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox
Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …