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- Computer; fiduciary; hacking; insider trading; securities; Securities Exchange Act; hacker-seller; 10b-5 (1)
- Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank); Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); Rulemaking; Dodd-Frank Section 953(b); Administrative Procedure Act (APA); D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals; Pay Ratio disclosure; CEO Compensation; Congress; Soft Pay Cap; Median Compensation; Chevron Deference; Independent Compensation Committee; "Median Employee"; Item 402 of Regulation S-K; Say-on-Pay Votes; Cost of Compliance; De Minimis Exception; Congress; "Name and Blame"; Business Roundtable v. SEC; Chamber of Commerce v. SEC; American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC; "Uncertain Legal Status"; National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC; Arbitrary and Capricious Standard; Amending 953(B) (1)
- Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; Fraud; Hedge Funds; Misappropriation of Assets; Systemic Risk; Financial Systems; Securities Regulation; Institutional Investors; Risk Prevention; Systemic Failure; Long Term Capital Management (LTCM); Retailization; Leveraged Assets; Depository-Custodian; External Independent Valuer; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); Defining Hedge Funds; The Alpha; The Securities Act of 1933; The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; The Investment Company Act of 1940; The Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Bank Runs; Derivatives; Short Selling; Trading Volume; Repo Agreements; Like-Banks Activities; Investor Protection; Scandals; The Sophisticated Investor Doctrine; Pension Funds; Compliance; SEC's Anti-Fraud Rule; SEC's Custody Rule; The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (1)
- Mutual fund; derivate suit; direct suit; demand; Northstar Financial Advisors Inc. (1)
- Regulation A; Reg. A; Regulation A-Plus; Regulation A+; JOBS Act; financial crisis; Blue Sky (1)
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- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; Equity Market Regulation; Epistemological Foundations; Operative Paradigms; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); Thomas S. Kuhn; Self-Regulatory Paradigml Micro-Intervention Paradigm; Equity Structure Advisory Committee; Modern Securities Trading; Financial Regulation; New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); Securities Act of 1933; Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; "Paperwork Crisis"; 1995 Order of investigation against the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD); Order Handling Rules; New Deal Legislation; Arsene Pujo; Louis Brandeis; Charles Evan Hughes Report; The Pecora Committee; Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It; Disclosure Rules; Secondary Market Trading; Maloney Act of 1938; Over-the-Counter Market; Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs); National Market System (NMS); Subpoena Power; NASD 21(a) Report; Regulation of Electronic Trading Systems; Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems; Exchange Registration; Fair and Orderly Markets; NASDAQ; Universal Industry Self-Regulator; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) (1)
- V. Schwab Investments; independent directors (1)
- Publication
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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Reconceptualizing The Whistleblower's Dilemma, Miriam Baer
Reconceptualizing The Whistleblower's Dilemma, Miriam Baer
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Clicks And Tricks: How Computer Hackers Avoid 10b-5 Liability, Ryan H. Gilinson
Clicks And Tricks: How Computer Hackers Avoid 10b-5 Liability, Ryan H. Gilinson
Brooklyn Law Review
This note argues that computer hackers who sell inside information instead of trading on it themselves, referred to in the note as hacker-sellers, avoid liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 criminalizes the use of a manipulative or deceptive device “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” Hacker-sellers fall outside the scope of this rule for two reasons. First, the type of hacking employed by hacker-sellers is not always “deceptive,” and only the forms of hacking which deceive the computer into thinking an authorized user is seeking access are …
Regulation A-Plus’S Identity Crisis: A One-Size-Fits-None Approach To Capital Formation, Zachary Naidich
Regulation A-Plus’S Identity Crisis: A One-Size-Fits-None Approach To Capital Formation, Zachary Naidich
Brooklyn Law Review
This note considers whether, and in what ways, Regulation A-Plus will change how businesses access growth capital. It concludes that Regulation A-Plus is a largely unnecessary addition to the already existing range of funding options. The Regulation is poised to change how firms access capital but is unlikely to increase total access or fundraising. Further, this change is unlikely to promote financial health. The note ultimately concludes that regulators should focus on improving existing mechanisms and not attempt to introduce a new and unnecessary one.
An Exception To The Derivative Rule: Allowing Mutual Fund Investors To Bring Suits Directly, Jamie D. Kurtz
An Exception To The Derivative Rule: Allowing Mutual Fund Investors To Bring Suits Directly, Jamie D. Kurtz
Brooklyn Law Review
Mutual funds differ greatly from traditional corporations in the way they are formed and operated. Despite these differences, courts apply the same rules for derivative shareholder litigation to both types of entities. While these rules make sense and were mostly created with corporations in mind, courts have generally been unwilling to consider mutual funds’ unique characteristics in determining whether to allow direct litigation from shareholders. This note explores those unique characteristics and the usual policy reasons for requiring derivative litigation. It concludes that in most cases these unique characteristics make a derivative suit nearly impossible to sustain. Further, the normal …
A Bridge Too Far: A Critical Analysis Of The Securities And Exchange Commission's Approach To Equity Market Regulation, John Polise
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Using the framework articulated by Thomas S. Kuhn in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, this Article traces the evolution of equity market regulation in terms of its epistemological foundations and operative paradigms. It examines the SEC’s growth from a more passive partner with the securities industry to being an aggressive and perhaps overly intrusive arbiter of equity market operations. This Article identifies two distinct paradigms of securities regulation—the “Self-Regulatory Paradigm” and the “Micro-Intervention Paradigm.” The Self-Regulatory Paradigm and the Micro-Intervention Paradigm are not compatible, and this Article explains how the intellectual dissonance between them ultimately allowed the Micro-Intervention …
From Systemic Risk To Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings Of U.S. Hedge Fund Regulation, Marco Bodellini
From Systemic Risk To Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings Of U.S. Hedge Fund Regulation, Marco Bodellini
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
In the recent past, hedge funds have demonstrated that they can pose and spread systemic risk across the financial markets, and that their managers can use them to commit fraud and misappropriation of fund assets. Even if the first issue now seems to be considered a serious one by the U.S. legislature, which in 2010, as a legislative response to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, enacted the Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), the current regulation still appears inconsistent and inappropriate to prevent and face it. By contrast, the second issue is not always considered …
Full Disclosure: Moving Beyond Disclosure Regulations To Affirmative Regulation Of Executive Compensation, Christopher Saverino
Full Disclosure: Moving Beyond Disclosure Regulations To Affirmative Regulation Of Executive Compensation, Christopher Saverino
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
In the period following the financial crisis of 2008, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), which compelled the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in substantial rulemaking. The Dodd-Frank mandate in Section 953(b) required the SEC to promulgate a rule, which it eventually finalized and is currently known as Pay Ratio Disclosure. Historically, SEC rulemaking has received great deference when rules are judicially challenged. However, following the passage of Dodd-Frank, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has begun to grant less deference to SEC rulemaking where it has found that the SEC has …