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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
The Structure Of Corporate Law Revolutions, William Savitt
The Structure Of Corporate Law Revolutions, William Savitt
Seattle University Law Review
Since, call it 1970, corporate law has operated under a dominant conception of governance that identifies profit-maximization for stockholder benefit as the purpose of the corporation. Milton Friedman’s essay The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, published in September of that year, provides a handy, if admittedly imprecise, marker for the coronation of the shareholder-primacy paradigm. In the decades that followed, corporate law scholars pursued an ever-narrowing research agenda with the purpose and effect of confirming the shareholder-primacy paradigm. Corporate jurisprudence followed a similar path, slowly at first and later accelerating, to discover in the precedents and …
A History Of Corporate Law Federalism In The Twentieth Century, William W. Bratton
A History Of Corporate Law Federalism In The Twentieth Century, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
This Article describes the emergence of corporate law federalism across a long twentieth century. The period begins with New Jersey’s successful initiation of charter competition in 1888 and ends with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The federalism in question describes the interrelation of state and federal regulation of corporate internal affairs. This Article takes a positive approach, pursuing no normative bottom line. It makes six observations: (1) the federalism describes a division of subject matter, with internal affairs regulated by the states and securities issuance and trading regulated by the federal government; (2) the federalism is an …
Do Esg Funds Deliver On Their Promises?, Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch, Adriana Z. Robertson
Do Esg Funds Deliver On Their Promises?, Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch, Adriana Z. Robertson
Michigan Law Review
Corporations have received growing criticism for contributing to climate change, perpetuating racial and gender inequality, and failing to address other pressing social issues. In response to these concerns, shareholders are increasingly focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria in selecting investments, and asset managers are responding by offering a growing number of ESG mutual funds. The flow of assets into ESG is one of the most dramatic trends in asset management.
But are these funds giving investors what they promise? This question has attracted the attention of regulators, with the Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange …
Inequities In Corporate And Securities Law: Disabling The Exploitative Chinese Corporation And Charting A Path To International Commercial Accountability, Jonathan P. Schmidt
Inequities In Corporate And Securities Law: Disabling The Exploitative Chinese Corporation And Charting A Path To International Commercial Accountability, Jonathan P. Schmidt
San Diego International Law Journal
This article seeks to illuminate these issues and provide a roadmap for the U.S. federal and state legislatures to come together to protect the U.S. investor from the type of accounting fraud and stock misinformation that was the impetus behind enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. First, this article will discuss the legal backdrop and legislative policy behind U.S. laws such as SOX and its enforcement mechanisms, and the ability for shareholders to bring securities class action derivative actions for financial fraud. This article will also discuss trade secrets laws, criminal extradition treaties, international enforcement of judgments, and elucidate the …
The Efficient Norm For Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation Of Fiduciary Duty, Thomas A. Smith
The Efficient Norm For Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation Of Fiduciary Duty, Thomas A. Smith
Michigan Law Review
To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corporation1 itself smacks of reification - treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a real thing. Now the orthodox view among corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm that requires firm managers to "maximize shareholder value." Giving the corporation itself any serious role in the analysis of fiduciary duty, the thinking goes, obscures scientific insight with bad legal metaphysics. Some recent scholarship and legislation, such as constituency statutes, have challenged this "shareholder primacy" view. Contestants …