Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication Year
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 28 of 28
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar
The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder proposals attract attention from scholars in finance and economics because they present an opportunity to study both quasidemocratic decision-making at the corporate level and the impact of this decision-making on firm outcomes. These studies capture the effect of various proposals but rarely address whether regulations should allow many of them in the first place due to the possibility of stock price manipulation. Recent changes to shareholder proposal rules, adopted in September 2020, sought to address the potential for exploitation that some proposals create (but ultimately failed to do so). This Article shows the potential for apparently legal stock price …
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
A collection of eighteen speeches and lectures, from 2003 to 2018, discussing and expanding on the writings and theories of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.
On The Origins Of The Modern Corporation And Private Property, Bernard C. Beaudreau
On The Origins Of The Modern Corporation And Private Property, Bernard C. Beaudreau
Seattle University Law Review
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP) by Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, published in 1932, is undisputedly the most influential work ever written in the field of corporate governance. In a nutshell, Berle and Means argued that corporate control had been usurped by a new class of managers, the result of which included (1) shareholder loss of control (a basic property right), (2) questionable corporate objectives and behavior, and (3) the potential breakdown of the market mechanism. In this paper, I examine the origins of MCPP, paying particular attention to the authors’ underlying motives. I argue that …
“All Lawyers Are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle And The Modern Legal Profession, Harwell Wells
“All Lawyers Are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle And The Modern Legal Profession, Harwell Wells
Seattle University Law Review
Adolf A. Berle was perhaps the preeminent scholar of the modern corporation. He was also an occasional scholar of the modern legal profession. This Article surveys his writings on the legal profession from the 1930s to the 1960s, from the sharp criticisms he leveled at lawyers, particularly corporate lawyers, during the Great Depression, to his sunnier account of the lawyer’s role in the postwar era. I argue that Berle’s views were shaped both by the reformist tradition he inherited from Louis Brandeis and his writings on the corporation, which left him convinced that the fate of the legal profession would …
Berle X: Berle And His World: An Homage To William W. Bratton, Charles R. T. O'Kelley
Berle X: Berle And His World: An Homage To William W. Bratton, Charles R. T. O'Kelley
Seattle University Law Review
An introduction to the Berle X symposium, honoring William W. (Bill) Bratton.
Technological And Institutional Crossroads: The Life And Times Of Adolf A. Berle Jr., Bernard C. Beaudreau
Technological And Institutional Crossroads: The Life And Times Of Adolf A. Berle Jr., Bernard C. Beaudreau
Seattle University Law Review
In this paper, I examine the life and times of Adolf A. Berle Jr., perhaps the most influential scholar in the field of corporate governance. Specifically, I examine his contribution in light of the technological and institutional changes that occurred in the late nineteenth century—changes that were germane to his thinking and understanding of corporate governance. I argue that, despite his perspicacity, he failed to appreciate the changing role of corporate officers—that is, from that of fiduciary agent to that of visionary, founder, and essential element in corporate success. Put differently, in the early twentieth century, the key asset in …
The ‘Berle And Means Corporation’ In Historical Perspective, Eric Hilt
The ‘Berle And Means Corporation’ In Historical Perspective, Eric Hilt
Seattle University Law Review
This Article presents new evidence on the evolution of the business corporation in America and on the emergence of what is commonly termed the “Berle and Means corporation.” Drawing on a wide range of sources, I investigate three major historical claims of The Modern Corporation: that large corporations had displaced small ones by the early twentieth century; that the quasi-public corporations of the 1930s were much larger than the public corporations of the nineteenth century; and that ownership was separated from control to a much greater extent in the 1930s compared to the nineteenth century. I address each of these …
Berle And Corporation Finance: Everything Old Is New Again, Frank Partnoy
Berle And Corporation Finance: Everything Old Is New Again, Frank Partnoy
Seattle University Law Review
In this essay, I want to illustrate how Adolf A. Berle Jr.’s Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance1 was prescient about the kinds of financial innovation that are central to today’s markets. For scholars who are not familiar with this publication, Corporation Finance is a compilation of edited versions of several of Berle’s articles, along with some new material, most of which is focused on 1920s corporate practice. My primary goal here is simply to shine a light on this work and to memorialize for scholars the key passages that echo many of today’s challenges. The punch line of …
Corporate Lessons For Public Governance: The Origins And Activities Of The National Budget Committee, 1919–1923, Jesse Tarbert
Corporate Lessons For Public Governance: The Origins And Activities Of The National Budget Committee, 1919–1923, Jesse Tarbert
Seattle University Law Review
There is a peculiar disconnect between the way specialists view the 1920s and the way the decade is understood by non-specialists and the general public. Casual observers tend to view the 1920s as a conservative or reactionary interlude between the watershed reform periods of the Progressive Era and New Deal. Although many scholars have abandoned the traditional view of the 1920s, their work has not yet penetrated the generalizations of non-specialists. Even readers familiar with specialist accounts portraying the New Era as the age of “corporate liberalism” or the “Associative State” tend to view these concepts as just another way …
Adolf Berle During The New Deal: The Brain Truster As An Intellectual Jobber, Robert B. Thompson
Adolf Berle During The New Deal: The Brain Truster As An Intellectual Jobber, Robert B. Thompson
Seattle University Law Review
Adolf Berle’s ideas have attained a remarkable longevity in corporate law with an influence exceeding that of any other twentieth century law professor. Participants in the now ten Berle symposia often have framed the discussion of his career as an intellectual history, usually built around the powerful transformative effect of The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP). Yet this approach is insufficient to explain large parts of Berle’s professional career, including what Berle did during the twelve years of the Roosevelt Administration that immediately followed MCPP. This Article offers an alternative focus that better accounts for the career of an …
Berle And Means’S The Modern Corporation And Private Property: The Military Roots Of A Stakeholder Model Of Corporate Governance, Andrew Smith, Kevin D. Tennent, Jason Russell
Berle And Means’S The Modern Corporation And Private Property: The Military Roots Of A Stakeholder Model Of Corporate Governance, Andrew Smith, Kevin D. Tennent, Jason Russell
Seattle University Law Review
The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932) remains one of the most cited works in management studies. Our paper shows that Berle and Means espoused a stakeholder theory of corporate governance that challenged the then-hegemonic idea that the sole purpose of a corporation is to create value for the shareholders. We argue that Berle and Means’s support for stakeholder theory can be associated with their earlier service in the U.S. military, an organization which then inculcated an ethos of public service in its members. Our paper, which is based on archival research in the …
Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh
Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
While theories of regulation abound, woefully inadequate attention has been given to growing patterns of "intersystemic" and "dialectical" regulation in the world today. In this rapidly expanding universe of interactions, independent regulatory agencies, born of autonomous jurisdictions, nonetheless face a combination of jurisdictional overlap with, and regulatory dependence on, one another. Here, the cross-jurisdictional interaction of regulators is no longer the voluntary interaction embraced by transnationalists; it is, instead, an unavoidable reality of acknowledgement and engagement, potentially culminating in the integration of discrete sets of regulatory rules into a collective whole.
Such patterns of regulatory engagement are increasingly evident, across …
Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo
Marco Ventoruzzo
The article addresses a sweeping Reform of corporate law which was enacted by the Italian government in 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The new statutory regulation significantly increases freedom of contract in corporate law, relying on the idea that the development of an efficient market for rules will allow the "natural selection" of the rules that better suit the need of the different stakeholders. Together - and to some extent to compensate for - this greater freedom of contract, new protections for minority shareholders have also been implemented. The reform also imports into the Italian legal …
Reves Revisited, Janet Kerr, Karen M. Eisenhauer
Reves Revisited, Janet Kerr, Karen M. Eisenhauer
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Revising Federal Securityholder Communication Rules To Respond To Pension Funds' Increasing Market Presence, Kenneth R. Lehman
Revising Federal Securityholder Communication Rules To Respond To Pension Funds' Increasing Market Presence, Kenneth R. Lehman
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, Douglas M. Branson
Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, Douglas M. Branson
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, Stephen M. Bainbridge
Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, Stephen M. Bainbridge
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The New Uniform Statute Of Limitations For Federal Securities Fraud Actions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, And A Call For Reform, Anthony Michael Sabino
The New Uniform Statute Of Limitations For Federal Securities Fraud Actions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, And A Call For Reform, Anthony Michael Sabino
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Striking The Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes And Corporate Governance , Edward D. Rogers
Striking The Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes And Corporate Governance , Edward D. Rogers
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
How Long Can This Go On? The Controversy Over The Application Of The Statute Of Limitations To S Corporations And Their Shareholders, J. Marcus Sommers
How Long Can This Go On? The Controversy Over The Application Of The Statute Of Limitations To S Corporations And Their Shareholders, J. Marcus Sommers
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Shareholders In The Jury Box: A Populist Check Against Corporate Mismanagement, Ann M. Scarlett
Shareholders In The Jury Box: A Populist Check Against Corporate Mismanagement, Ann M. Scarlett
All Faculty Scholarship
The recent subprime mortgage disaster exposed corporate officers and directors who mismanaged their corporations, failed to exercise proper oversight, and acted in their self-interest. Two previous waves of corporate scandals in this decade revealed similar misconduct. After the initial scandals, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to prevent the next crisis in corporate governance through legislative and regulatory actions such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those attempts failed. Shareholder derivative litigation has also failed because judges accord corporate executives great deference and thus rarely impose liability for breaches of fiduciary duties.
To prevent the next crisis in …
The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely under theorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found …
Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh
Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
While theories of regulation abound, woefully inadequate attention has been given to growing patterns of "intersystemic" and "dialectical" regulation in the world today. In this rapidly expanding universe of interactions, independent regulatory agencies, born of autonomous jurisdictions, nonetheless face a combination of jurisdictional overlap with, and regulatory dependence on, one another. Here, the cross-jurisdictional interaction of regulators is no longer the voluntary interaction embraced by transnationalists; it is, instead, an unavoidable reality of acknowledgement and engagement, potentially culminating in the integration of discrete sets of regulatory rules into a collective whole.
Such patterns of regulatory engagement are increasingly evident, across …
Voluntary Vs Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards An Optimal Regulatory Framework, Anita I. Anand
Voluntary Vs Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards An Optimal Regulatory Framework, Anita I. Anand
ExpressO
This article fills a gap in the legal literature by comparing mandatory corporate governance regimes to voluntary corporate governance regimes. It encourages market participants, including regulators, to acknowledge that firms have incentives to adopt enhanced governance practices voluntarily and to make disclosure about the same. The article argues that an optimal governance regime is a hybrid one in which adoption of best practice guidelines is voluntary but disclosure of corporate governance practices is mandatory. Such a regime is optimal because it balances the benefits and costs to all stakeholders, particularly issuers and investors. The cost analysis should be completed by …
The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang
The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang
Publications
With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …
Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo
Journal Articles
The article addresses a sweeping Reform of corporate law which was enacted by the Italian government in 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The new statutory regulation significantly increases freedom of contract in corporate law, relying on the idea that the development of an efficient market for rules will allow the "natural selection" of the rules that better suit the need of the different stakeholders. Together - and to some extent to compensate for - this greater freedom of contract, new protections for minority shareholders have also been implemented. The reform also imports into the Italian legal …
Definition Of Control In Secondary Distributions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
Definition Of Control In Secondary Distributions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Act) generally subjects the sale of securities by a person "controlling an issuer" to the same rules that govern the sale of securities by an issuer. Accordingly, before a "control" person may sell the securities he holds in the controlled corporation he must either register them with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) or qualify for an exemption from the registration requirement. While the Act clearly requires that a "control" person either register or qualify for an exemption, it fails to define "control." Thus, the task of defining has fallen to the …
Known Generally As Corporate Securities, Albert S. Abel
Known Generally As Corporate Securities, Albert S. Abel
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.