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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families And The Diffusion Of (Corporate) Law, Holger Spamann Spamann
Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families And The Diffusion Of (Corporate) Law, Holger Spamann Spamann
BYU Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Decisions Of The Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical Investigation, Minor Myers
The Decisions Of The Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical Investigation, Minor Myers
Indiana Law Journal
Using an original data set gathered from filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, this Article tests the prevailing view in corporate law that special litigation committees invariably decide to dismiss shareholder derivative litigation. It demonstrates that (1) special litigation committees decide to pursue or settle claims much more frequently than heretofore recognized; (2) special litigation committees do not otherwise let defendants off the hook when pursuing or settling claims, in view of the financial recovery to the company in either scenario; (3) most shareholder claims subject to the authority of special litigation committees end up settled, not dismissed,- …
Give Smaller Companies A Choice: Solving Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Inefficiency, Paul P. Arnold
Give Smaller Companies A Choice: Solving Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Inefficiency, Paul P. Arnold
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note argues that smaller public companies should have the option to opt out of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Optional compliance is economically preferable to the current approach of mandatory compliance. Companies that choose to comply with Section 404 will send a signal to the financial markets that their internal controls meet the high standards Section 404 demands, and investors will reward such companies if they actually value the benefit of that company's additional controls. Similarly, companies that benefit less from additional internal accounting will be able to avoid Section 404's high costs. To clarify the …
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this Review discusses the modem "nexus of contracts" approach to corporations and highlights how Greenfield's views differ. Part II examines corporate goals and purposes, suggesting that Greenfield overstates the impact of the shareholder-primacy norm and does not offer a preferable alternative. Part III critiques the means to the ends--Greenfield's proposals for changing the mechanics of corporate governance. Although several of his proposals are intriguing, they seem unlikely to achieve their pro-social aims. This Review remains skeptical, in part because-even given its problems-the U.S. "director-centric governance structure has created the most successful economy the world has ever seen." …
Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano
Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Note argues that during the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000) Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase. The author focuses on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short, the thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate governance.
The Unaccountability Of The Accounting Regulators: Analyzing The Constitutionality Of The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1019 (2009), Whitney Innes
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.