Securities Law Commons^™

Why The Law Hates Speculators: Regulation And Private Ordering In The Market For Otc Derivatives, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A wide variety of statutory and common law doctrines in American law evidence hostility towards speculation. Conventional economic theory, however, generally views speculation as an efficient form of trading that shifts risk to those who can bear it most easily and improves the accuracy of market prices. This Article reconciles the apparent conflict between legal tradition and economic theory by explaining why some forms of speculative trading may be inefficient. It presents a heterogeneous expectations model of speculative trading that offers important insights into antispeculation laws in general, and the ongoing debate concerning over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in particular.

Although trading …

Impact Of The Capital Markets On Real Estate Law And Practice, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 269 (1999), Michael H. Schill

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Efficient Norm For Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation Of Fiduciary Duty, Thomas A. Smith

Michigan Law Review

To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corporation1 itself smacks of reification - treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a real thing. Now the orthodox view among corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm that requires firm managers to "maximize shareholder value." Giving the corporation itself any serious role in the analysis of fiduciary duty, the thinking goes, obscures scientific insight with bad legal metaphysics. Some recent scholarship and legislation, such as constituency statutes, have challenged this "shareholder primacy" view. Contestants …

The Scope Of Private Securities Litigation: In Search Of Liability Standards For Secondary Defendants, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent federal court decisions have struggled to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate to determine when outside professionals should be held liable as primary violators under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. In keeping with the Court's current interpretive methodology, Central Bank and its progeny employ a textualist approach. In this Article, Professor Fisch argues that literal textualism is an inappropriate approach for interpreting the federal securities laws generally and misguided in light of legislative developments post-dating the Central Bank decision. Instead, Professor Fisch advocates an approach that weighs Congress 's recent endorsement of …

The Shareholder Derivative Suit In Arkansas, Mary E. Matthews

Mary E Matthews

The Arkansas authorities governing derivative claims deviate from the authorities governing direct claims to a greater extent than is necessary. Three statutes govern shareholder derivative suits in Arkansas: the 1965 Arkansas Business Corporation Act (the 1965 ABCA); Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 (Rule 23.1); and the 1987 Arkansas Business Corporation Act (1987 ABCA). While the statutes occasionally conflict with Rule 23.1, the general goal is to prevent “strike suits.” Further, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of the authorities suggests conflicts will be resolved in favor of the Rule. These statutes provide procedural restrictions for shareholder derivative suits. There are …