Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Other Law
#Metoo And The Corporation In Popular Culture, Brenda Cossman
#Metoo And The Corporation In Popular Culture, Brenda Cossman
Seattle University Law Review
#MeToo’s initial virtual explosion in the fall of 2017 was very much about Hollywood, with famous actresses speaking out against famous producers, media moguls and celebrities, exposing the ubiquity of sexual harassment and sexual violence in and around the entertainment industry. Since then, #MeToo has made its way into Hollywood representations without much irony. Films and television shows have explicitly taken up the #MeToo themes, exploring issues of sexual harassment and violence and its afterlives. Many television shows, from the relaunched version of Murphy Brown to Brooklyn Nine-Nine to The Good Fight have incorporated #MeToo themes into episodes exploring the …
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Robert Bartlett
In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …
Another Bite At The Apple For Trade Secret Protection: Why Stronger Federal Laws Are Needed To Protect A Corporation's Most Valuable Property, Alissa Cardillo
Another Bite At The Apple For Trade Secret Protection: Why Stronger Federal Laws Are Needed To Protect A Corporation's Most Valuable Property, Alissa Cardillo
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Trade secrets are one of a corporation’s most valuable assets. However, they lack adequate protection under federal law, leaving them vulnerable to theft and misappropriation. As technology advances, it becomes easier and less time consuming for individuals and entities to access and steal trade secrets to a corporation’s detriment. Most often these thefts involve stealing trade secrets in an intangible form. Current legislation fails to adequately protect intangible trade secrets, leaving them vulnerable to theft. An amendment to the National Stolen Property Act that encompasses intangible trade secrets would close a loophole that currently exists relating to intangible assets, allowing …
The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris
The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris
Seattle University Law Review
In this short Essay, the author consider the team production theory developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout1 from a historical perspective, in three senses. First, does the theory fit the historical use of the corporate form? Second, can it explain the development of corporation law doctrines? And third, can we place the development of the theory as such into the intellectual history of corporation theories at large? The author will state my bottom line up front: while the Article finds the team production theory insightful and useful for my historical research, for teaching corporation law, and for thinking about …
Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces
Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces
Seattle University Law Review
For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …
Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi
Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi
Seattle University Law Review
In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in …
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Seattle University Law Review
In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …
The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson
The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson
Seattle University Law Review
We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance. We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a “team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focusing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hierarchical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, however, that …
Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho
Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho
Seattle University Law Review
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, advances a dual thesis: first, that team production theory does a better job than its competitors (in particular, principal–agent theory) of explaining the advantages of the public corporation and key features of corporate law; and second, that, as a matter of corporate law, corporate boards are charged with advancing the collective interest of all the contributors to the corporate enterprise rather than the shareholders’ interests alone. Its central insight is that the role of the independent, or insulated, corporate board is to serve as a “mediating …
Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair
Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair
Seattle University Law Review
In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket chain into …
The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout
The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout
Seattle University Law Review
This Symposium Article argues that the board-controlled corporation can be understood as a legal innovation that historically has functioned as a means of transferring wealth forward and sometimes backward through time, for the benefit of present and future generations. In this fashion the board-controlled corporation promotes both intergenerational equity and intergenerational efficiency. Logic and evidence each suggest, however, that the modern embrace of “shareholder value” as the only corporate objective and “shareholder democracy” as the ideal of corporate governance is damaging the corporate form’s ability to serve this economically and ethically important function.
Team Production Theory And Private Company Boards, Elizabeth Pollman
Team Production Theory And Private Company Boards, Elizabeth Pollman
Seattle University Law Review
In their path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout provided a new theory of the board of directors in a corporation. Drawing on the economic theory of team production, Blair and Stout argued that the board of directors serves as a mediating hierarchy for the firm as a whole, encouraging firm-specific investments from team members and reducing shirking and opportunistic behavior. While Blair and Stout provided a dramatically different view of the corporation from the conventional principal-agent account, they also delineated limitations to their proposed theory. Most importantly, they suggested that the …
Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja
Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja
Seattle University Law Review
In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …