Natural Law Commons^™

Reevaluating Legal Theory, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Must a good general theory of law incorporate what is good for persons in general? This question has been at the center of methodological debates in general jurisprudence for decades. Answering “no,” Julie Dickson’s book Evaluation and Legal Theory offered both a clear and concise conspectus of positivist methodology, as well as a response to the longstanding objection that such an approach has to evaluate the data it studies rather than simply describe facts about legal systems. She agreed that legal positivism must evaluate. At the same time, she argued, it is possible to offer an evaluative theory of the …

Legal Agreement, Andrew Tutt

Akron Law Review

This Article grapples with the question of what it means to agree about what the law is. First, it shows that the question of what it means to “agree about the law” invites us to consider many different kinds of agreement and disagreement we might have about what the law is. Second, it shows that without selecting one of these kinds of agreement, we cannot speak intelligibly about whether we agree or disagree. Third, it explains that this failure to choose is a source of much confusion and apparent disagreement between competing philosophers and philosophies of law. Fourth, it argues …

"The Tempest": Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. V. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added To The Confusion - But Should Not Have, Donald L. Doernberg

Akron Law Review

This Article discusses the effect Shady Grove is likely to have on vertical choice-of-law in cases involving a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure...Part II of the Article discusses the majority opinion. Part III deals with parts II-B and II-C of Justice Scalia’s opinion and with the concurrence. Part IV addresses the dissent. Part V offers a critical evaluation of the opinions. Part VI discusses some of the scholarly interpretations of REA and suggests two possible perspectives on REA’s substantive-rights limitation that make it more understandable in light of the Erie doctrine’s history, easier to navigate, and less of a threat …

International Law: Practical Authority, Global Justice, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

How Persuasive Is Natural Law Theory?, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, in honor of John Finnis, evaluates the persuasiveness of one central element of natural law theory – its claim to an objective moral truth discoverable by reason. Although I stand outside the tradition, my interest in natural law theory goes back to my college days. John Finnis, especially in his work Natural Law and Natural Rights, has much enriched my understanding of moral, political, and legal philosophy. Prior to that book, natural lawyers and analytic jurists had little to say to each other; by and large, the members of each group had scant respect for the scholarly endeavors …

On The Incoherence Of Legal Positivism, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

Legal positivism is an incoherent intellectual enterprise. It sets itself an explanatory task which it makes itself incapable of carrying through. In the result it offers its students purported and invalid derivations of ought from is.

In this brief Essay I note various features of legal positivism and its history, before trying to identify this incoherence at its heart. I do not mean to renege on my belief that reflections on law and legal theory are best carried forward without reference to unstable and parasitic academic categories, or labels, such as "positivism" (or "liberalism" or "conservatism," etc.). I use the …

The Separation Of Law And Morals, Noel Reynolds

Noel B Reynolds

The classic opposition of legal positivism and natural law theory resurfaces continually and reminds us that we have yet to resolve this key conflict in our ways of understanding the moral authority of law. The strengths and weaknesses of the two theories are reviewed—both have fatal flaws. Conventionalism is proposed as a means of finding internal standards in a man-made system of law. The naturally emerging standards for a conventionalist system of law turn out to be the already familiar principles of the rule of law.

Legal Positivism And The Natural Law: The Controversy Between Professor Hart And Professor Fuller, George Breckenridge

Vanderbilt Law Review

Professor Hart defends legal positivism and Professor Fuller sets out his view of the natural law. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Fuller is against positivism and Hart against natural law. Each is an untypical representative of the varied traditions that bear these names. Each is, at the same time, because of his radical restatement and defense of his positions, probably the most reasonable and least extreme antagonist. In this dialogue, if anywhere, we are likely to discover the true issues and the common ground, if any, between the two positions. In fact each concedes, frankly or …