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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Legal Profession
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión de Derechos en el Código Civil Peruano
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
No abstract provided.
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John M. Lande
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John M. Lande
Faculty Publications
This article critiques Professor Chris Guthrie's lead symposium article entitled, "Misjudging." Guthrie's article makes two major arguments. The first is a descriptive, empirical argument that judges are prone to error because of three types of "blinders" and that people underestimate the amount of such judicial error. The second argument is prescriptive, recommending that, because of these judicial blinders, disputants should consider using non-judicial dispute resolution processes generally, and particularly facilitative mediation and arbitration.This article critiques both arguments. It notes that, although Guthrie presents evidence that judges do make the kinds of errors that he describes, his article does not address …
A Necessary And Proper Role For Federal Courts In Prison Reform: The Benjamin V. Malcolm Consentdecrees, Harold Baer Jr., Arminda Bepko
A Necessary And Proper Role For Federal Courts In Prison Reform: The Benjamin V. Malcolm Consentdecrees, Harold Baer Jr., Arminda Bepko
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.