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Understanding "The Problem Of Social Cost", Enrico Baffi Jan 2013

Understanding "The Problem Of Social Cost", Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities). Assessing their two most important works, it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for an evaluation of total efficiency, while Pigou, with some exceptions, is convinced that it is almost always socially desirable to reach marginal efficiency through taxes or liability. It is interesting that the economist of Chicago, who has elaborated on the renowned theorem, thinks that is not desirable to reach efficiency at the margin every time, and that it is often preferable to evaluate the total, which …


Contracting In Modern World, Enrico Baffi Jan 2012

Contracting In Modern World, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

In this paper I try explore some of the basic features of modern mass contracting. In my opinion, there are basically four characteristics of modern mass contracting: a)he reduced negotiations; b) the dissemination of standard form contracts; c) the presence of abusive clauses; d) and the recapitulation of the contract and its execution in a single act of stipulation. All the changes are the consequences in the changes of relative costs of activities: a) The reduction in negotiations is the result first of all of the costs that this activity requires and of the costs required to manage personalized contracts; …


Casev. Pigou: A Still Difficult Debate, Enrico Baffi Jan 2012

Casev. Pigou: A Still Difficult Debate, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

This paper examine the positions of Coase and Pigou about the problem of the externalities. From the reading of their most two important works it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for a evaluation of efficiency at the total, while Pigou, with some exception, is convinced that is possible to reach marginal efficiency through taxes or compensation. It’s interesting that Coase, who has elaborated the famous theorem, is convinced that is not important to reach the efficiency at the margin every time and that sometimes is necessary a valuation at the total, that tells us which solution is …


La Buena Fe En La Negociación De Los Contratos: Apuntes Comparatísticos Sobre El Artículo 1362 Del Código Civil Peruano Y Su Presunto Papel Como Fundamento De La Responsabilidad Precontractual (2004), Leysser L. Leon Jan 2007

La Buena Fe En La Negociación De Los Contratos: Apuntes Comparatísticos Sobre El Artículo 1362 Del Código Civil Peruano Y Su Presunto Papel Como Fundamento De La Responsabilidad Precontractual (2004), Leysser L. Leon

Leysser L. León

En este artículo, se efectúa un análisis histórico y comparativo de la responsabilidad civil por daños ocasionados durante los tratos previos al contrato.

A propósito, se demuestra, con los mismos instrumentos metodológicos, por qué las cláusulas normativas generales (Generalklauseln) son inapropiadas en ordenamientos jurídicos como el peruano, y por qué son aplicables a esta hipótesis de ilícito civil las reglas de la responsabilidad aquiliana o extracontractual (artículo 1969º del Código Civil peruano).