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Legal History Commons™

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2012

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Institution
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Articles 421 - 425 of 425

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

My “Country” Lies Over The Ocean: Seasteading And Polycentric Law, Allen P. Mendenhall Dec 2011

My “Country” Lies Over The Ocean: Seasteading And Polycentric Law, Allen P. Mendenhall

Allen Mendenhall

This essay considers the implications of the Seasteading Institute upon notions of law and sovereignty and argues that seasteading could make possible the implementation or ordering of polycentric legal systems while providing evidence for the viability of private-property anarchism or anarchocapitalism, at least in their nascent forms. This essay follows in the wake of Edward P. Stringham’s edition Anarchy and the Law and treats seasteading and polycentric law as concrete realities that lend credence to certain anarchist theories. Polycentric law in particular allows for institutional diversity that enables a multiplicity of rules to coexist and even compete in the open …

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Hauerwas And The Law: Is There A Basis For Conversation?, M. Cathleen Kaveny Dec 2011

Hauerwas And The Law: Is There A Basis For Conversation?, M. Cathleen Kaveny

M. Cathleen Kaveny

No abstract provided.

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Between “Metaphysics Of The Stone Age” And The “Brave New World”: H.L.A. Hart On The Law’S Assumptions About Human Nature, Péter Cserne Dec 2011

Between “Metaphysics Of The Stone Age” And The “Brave New World”: H.L.A. Hart On The Law’S Assumptions About Human Nature, Péter Cserne

Péter Cserne

This paper analyses H.L.A. Hart’s views on the epistemic character of the law’s assumptions about human behaviour, as articulated in Causation in the Law and Punishment and Responsibility. Hart suggests that the assumptions behind legal doctrines typically combine common sense factual beliefs, moral intuitions, and philosophical theories of earlier ages with sound moral principles, and empirical knowledge. An important task of legal theory is to provide a ‘rational and critical foundation’ for these doctrines. This does not only imply conceptual clarification in light of an epistemic ideal of objectivity but also involves legal theorists in ‘enlightenment’ about empirical facts, ‘demystification’ …

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What Piece Of Work Is Man: Frans De Waal And Pragmatist Naturalism, Wouter H. De Been, Sanne Taekema Dec 2011

What Piece Of Work Is Man: Frans De Waal And Pragmatist Naturalism, Wouter H. De Been, Sanne Taekema

Wouter H. de Been

Frans de Waal has questioned a central premise of liberal theory, i.e. that human beings are primarily defined by selfishness and rationality. This premise does not conform to what we know from research about our primate origins - namely that primates are gregarious and guided by sympathy and empathy. De Waal argues we should return to Adam Smith’s moral theory and his focus on sympathy and empathy. We believe a return to pragmatism would be more appropriate. Pragmatism largely conforms to the view of human nature that De Waal’s research now supports. We argue that pragmatism can provide a more …

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Bad News For John Marshall, David B. Kopel, Gary Lawson Dec 2011

Bad News For John Marshall, David B. Kopel, Gary Lawson

David B Kopel

In Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, we demonstrated that the individual mandate’s forced participation in commercial transactions cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause as the Clause was interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland. Professor Andrew Koppelman’s response, Bad News for Everybody, wrongly conflates that argument with a wide range of interpretative and substantive positions that are not logically entailed by taking seriously the requirement that laws enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be incidental to an enumerated power. His response is thus largely unresponsive to our actual arguments.

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