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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp Oct 2006

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.


Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp Jun 2006

Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.


Dual Class Shares In Canada: An Historical Analysis, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Poonam Puri Apr 2006

Dual Class Shares In Canada: An Historical Analysis, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Poonam Puri

Dalhousie Law Journal

Dual class shares have been used by Canadian corporations to access public capital markets for the past sixty years. The debates surrounding the regulation of dual class shares have been reenergized. The authors of this article argue that only by looking to the legitimating role of nationalist policy, legislation and discourse in the historical development of dual class share structures can we derive context to the current debates surrounding the regulation of dual class shares and obtain a fuller understanding of the contemporary issues theypresent. Based on an analysis of the use of dual class shares as a financing technique …


Corporate Form And Substantive Consolidation, William H. Widen Mar 2006

Corporate Form And Substantive Consolidation, William H. Widen

ExpressO

This Article reformulates substantive consolidation doctrine in light of modern financing techniques. Building upon the author's research showing the prevalence of substantive consolidation in large public bankruptcies, it offers an economic account (based on Coase's theory of firm size) to explain why we should expect that the circumstances giving rise to substantive consolidation should be common (rather than rare as suggested by the rhetoric of case law). Extending the asset partitioning theory developed by Professors Hannsmann and Kraakman, it offers a model for looking at the corporate form within corporate groups, particularly in the insolvency context. The recent Third Circuit …


Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung Mar 2006

Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung

ExpressO

To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order of things. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state of incorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation’s internal affairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm’s choice of corporate law, the doctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first …


Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo Feb 2006

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …