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1999

Constitutional Law

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Articles 1 - 30 of 43

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Recovering The Original Fourth Amendment, Thomas Y. Davies Dec 1999

Recovering The Original Fourth Amendment, Thomas Y. Davies

Michigan Law Review

Claims regarding the original or intended meaning of constitutional texts are commonplace in constitutional argument and analysis. All such claims are subject to an implicit validity criterion - only historically authentic assertions should matter. The rub is that the original meaning commonly attributed to a constitutional text may not be authentic. The historical Fourth Amendment is a case in point. If American judges, lawyers, or law teachers were asked what the Framers intended when they adopted the Fourth Amendment, they would likely answer that the Framers intended that all searches and seizures conducted by government officers must be reasonable given …


The Strange History Of "All Men Are Created Equal", Pauline Maier Jun 1999

The Strange History Of "All Men Are Created Equal", Pauline Maier

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.


The American Founders' Responsibility, Ralph Lerner Jun 1999

The American Founders' Responsibility, Ralph Lerner

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.


Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, Michael C. Dorf May 1999

Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Forgotten Constitutional History: The Production And Migration Of Meaning Within Constitutional Cultures, Gregory A. Mark May 1999

Forgotten Constitutional History: The Production And Migration Of Meaning Within Constitutional Cultures, Gregory A. Mark

Michigan Law Review

When was the last time you read a serious, recently published work of constitutional history that did not deal mainly with the work of the Supreme Court? When, even among those works, did the author look beyond the immediate litigants to give the reader a sense of an evolving constitutional culture - a culture in symbiosis with the larger political and social culture - its eddies and byways, as well as its mainstream? My strong hunch is that anyone who can triumphantly respond to the implicit condemnation of narrowness in these questions will do so in large measure having read …


The Qualities Of Completeness: More? Or Less?, Mark R. Killenbeck May 1999

The Qualities Of Completeness: More? Or Less?, Mark R. Killenbeck

Michigan Law Review

On January 14, 1983, Chief Judge W. Brevard Hand announced what he knew would be widely regarded as a rather startling proposition. Believing that "[t]he first amendment in large part was a guarantee to the states which insured that the states would be able to continue whatever church-state relationship existed in 1791," Judge Hand held that the people of Alabama were perfectly free to "establish[] a religion," in this instance by allowing public school teachers to begin the school day with prayer. The ruling reversed an earlier decision in the same case, which characterized the statutory provision at issue as …


Appendix: Biographies Of Participants , American University Law Review Apr 1999

Appendix: Biographies Of Participants , American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Should Progressives Support The Constitution?, Steven H. Shiffrin Apr 1999

Should Progressives Support The Constitution?, Steven H. Shiffrin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In the closing pages of Constitutional Faith Sanford Levinson asks himself whether he would have signed the Constitution in Philadelphia, warts and all. He concludes that he would have joined the signers primarily because of a progressive faith that the evils of the Constitution would erode with time. So too, Levinson's frequent co-author J.M. Balkin, asks in the midst of a symposium on fidelity in constitutional theory, whether the present Constitution deserves our fidelity. Balkin does not deny the presence of sanctioned evil under our Constitution. He suggests, for example, that the Constitution fails to protect the poor. In so …


Transcript: Responses To The Debate On Whether Congress Must End The Disenfranchisement Of The District Of Columbia , American University Law Review Mar 1999

Transcript: Responses To The Debate On Whether Congress Must End The Disenfranchisement Of The District Of Columbia , American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda Mar 1999

Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …


Transcript: What Makes The District An Anomaly? , American University Law Review Feb 1999

Transcript: What Makes The District An Anomaly? , American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Transcript: Must Congress End The Disenfranchisement Of The District Of Columbia? A Constitutional Debate , American University Law Review Feb 1999

Transcript: Must Congress End The Disenfranchisement Of The District Of Columbia? A Constitutional Debate , American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Transcript: The Nature Of The American Constitution: Is There A Constitutional Right To Vote And Be Represented? , American University Law Review Feb 1999

Transcript: The Nature Of The American Constitution: Is There A Constitutional Right To Vote And Be Represented? , American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Transcript: Keynote Address , American University Law Review Feb 1999

Transcript: Keynote Address , American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Transcript: Welcome Address, American University Law Review Feb 1999

Transcript: Welcome Address, American University Law Review

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To Rebel Against The State, Michael S. Green Jan 1999

The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To Rebel Against The State, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Regulatory Takings And Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far", Andrew S. Gold Jan 1999

Regulatory Takings And Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far", Andrew S. Gold

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


All The Way Down The Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition In England And Some Lessons For Civil Liberties In America, David B. Kopel, Joseph Olson Jan 1999

All The Way Down The Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition In England And Some Lessons For Civil Liberties In America, David B. Kopel, Joseph Olson

David B Kopel

Whenever civil liberties issues are contested, proponents of greater restrictions often chide civil liberties defenders for being unwilling to offer moderate concessions. Frequently, persons advocating restrictions on civil liberties claim that the "moderate" restriction will not infringe the core civil liberty. When rights advocates raise the "slippery slope" argument, they are criticized for being excessively fearful. The goal of the article is to refine our understanding of "slippery slopes" by examining a case in which a civil liberty really did slide all the way down the slippery slope.

The right to arms in Great Britain was entirely unrestricted at the …


Justice Blackmun's Mark On Criminal Law And Procedure, Kit Kinports Jan 1999

Justice Blackmun's Mark On Criminal Law And Procedure, Kit Kinports

Journal Articles

When Justice Blackmun was nominated to the Court in 1970, Americans were consumed with the idea of crime control. In the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon had called the Supreme Court "soft on crime" and had promised to "put 'law and order' judges on the Court." While sitting on the Eighth Circuit, the Justice had "seldom struck down searches, seizures, arrests or confessions," and most of his opinions in criminal cases had "affirmed guilty verdicts and sentences." Thus, according to one commentator, Justice Blackmun seemed to be "exactly what Nixon was looking for: a judge who believed in judicial restraint, …


Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins Jan 1999

Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins

Publications

No abstract provided.


"High Crimes And Misdemeanors": Recovering The Intentions Of The Founders, Gary L. Mcdowell Jan 1999

"High Crimes And Misdemeanors": Recovering The Intentions Of The Founders, Gary L. Mcdowell

Law Faculty Publications

Such serious charges by so many distinguished historians demand a careful consideration of what the Founders meant by "high Crimes and Misdemeanors": Were they only indictable crimes or did they include what one of the Framers called "political crimes and misdemeanors?" Were they offenses that a President would commit only in "the exercise of executive power" or did they also include a President's malfeasance committed in his private capacity? Were they subject to a reasonably fixed meaning or were they to be determined simply by the exercise of the "awful discretion" of those in Congress called upon to impeach and …


The Myth Of Choice Of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, Kermit Roosevelt Iii Jan 1999

The Myth Of Choice Of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

Choice of law is a mess. That much has become a truism. It is a "dismal swamp," a morass of confusion, a body of doctrine "killed by a realism intended to save it," and now "universally said to be a disaster." One way to demonstrate its tribulations would be to look at the academic dissensus and the hopelessly underdeterminative Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Another would be to examine the Supreme Court's abdication of the task of articulating constitutional constraints on state choice-of-law rules. This article will do both. At the outset, though, I want to suggest that one …


The Architecture Of Judicial Independence, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 1999

The Architecture Of Judicial Independence, Stephen B. Burbank

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Sovereignty, Compliance, And The World Trade Organization: Lessons From The History Of Supreme Court Review, Mark L. Movsesian Jan 1999

Sovereignty, Compliance, And The World Trade Organization: Lessons From The History Of Supreme Court Review, Mark L. Movsesian

Faculty Publications

One of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO's) more remarkable and controversial innovations is its mechanism for resolving trade disputes among member states. Traditionally, states have resolved such disputes in "pragmatic" fashion, through negotiation and compromise informed by the relative power of the parties involved. But no longer: the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU) provides that disputes between member states are to be resolved in adversary proceedings before impartial panels of experts." Under the DSU, panels have authority to decide whether members' laws violate international trade norms; panel decisions are essentially binding, though …


What Spending Clause? - (Or The President's Paramour): An Examination Of The Views Of Hamilton, Madison, And Story On Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 Of The United States Constitution, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 81 (1999), Jeffrey T. Renz Jan 1999

What Spending Clause? - (Or The President's Paramour): An Examination Of The Views Of Hamilton, Madison, And Story On Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 Of The United States Constitution, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 81 (1999), Jeffrey T. Renz

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, Eric J. Segall Jan 1999

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, Eric J. Segall

Faculty Publications By Year

No abstract provided.


Beyond The Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation As Litigation, Margo Schlanger Jan 1999

Beyond The Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation As Litigation, Margo Schlanger

Reviews

In 1955, in its second decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court suggested that federal courts might be called upon to engage in long-term oversight of once-segregated schools. Through the 1960s, southern resistance pushed federal district and appellate judges to turn that possibility into a reality. The impact of this saga on litigation practice extended beyond school desegregation, and even beyond the struggle for African-American equality; through implementation of Brown, the nation’s litigants, lawyers, and judges grew accustomed both to issuance of permanent injunctions against state and local public institutions, and to extended court oversight of compliance. …


Understanding The Limits Of Power: Judicial Restraint In General Jurisdiction Court Systems, Justice Philip A. Talmadge Jan 1999

Understanding The Limits Of Power: Judicial Restraint In General Jurisdiction Court Systems, Justice Philip A. Talmadge

Seattle University Law Review

This Article draws on my legislative and judicial background to focus both on the tendency of the courts to exceed their core constitutional role and the implications of such judicial activism. This article contend that modern courts of general jurisdiction are too often embroiled in sociopolitical controversies best left to the political branches of government. Part I addresses the concept of judicial restraint in our constitutional system and the need to define the core powers of the judicial branch of government. Part II discusses principles of judicial restraint in the federal courts. Part III, using the example of Washington State …


A Little Theory Is A Dangerous Thing: The Myth Of Adjudicative Retroactivity, Kermit Roosevelt Iii Jan 1999

A Little Theory Is A Dangerous Thing: The Myth Of Adjudicative Retroactivity, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

The article analyzes the question of the retroactive effect of judicial decisions. It surveys the history of retroactivity doctrine to demonstrate that the current approach to retroactivity jurisprudence is a consequence of the Warren Court's adoption of the principle that parties should be governed by the law in effect at the time of their actions. This principle leads to a theoretical framework that suffers from serious difficulties. In particular, it is unable to distinguish between cases presented on direct and collateral review, and consequently unable to reach a satisfactory treatment of habeas petitions based on changes in law. The article …


The Legalization Of The Presidencey: A Twenty-Five Year Watergate Retrospective, Michael A. Fitts Jan 1999

The Legalization Of The Presidencey: A Twenty-Five Year Watergate Retrospective, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.