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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Legal Theoretic Inadequacy And Obesity Epidemic Analysis, David Yosifon Apr 2008

Legal Theoretic Inadequacy And Obesity Epidemic Analysis, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article explores crucial analytic and normative limitations in presently dominant and ascendant approaches to legal theory. The approaches' failure to provide a satisfying framework for analyzing the obesity epidemic presently raging undeterred in American society reveals these limitations. Conventional law and economics scholars writing on the subject have deployed familiar frameworks to reach predictable conclusions that are neither intellectually nor morally justifiable. This Article argues that recent theoretical innovations promulgated within the burgeoning law and behavioralism movement have thus far provided no more reliable a framework for legal analysis of the obesity epidemic than has conventional law and economics. …


The Reasonable Person In Trademark Law, Laura A. Heymann Apr 2008

The Reasonable Person In Trademark Law, Laura A. Heymann

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’S Fallacy?: A Reply To Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green Apr 2008

Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’S Fallacy?: A Reply To Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin’s Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us about the Law’, I argued that in Law’s Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived his interpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theory of meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin’s fallacy’. In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that he committed the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact that he considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—in Law’s Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each, he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning, which he describes …