Legal History Commons^™

Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, Michael B. Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Article, I challenge the claim that the original meaning clearly allows the states to engage in affirmative action. I argue that the original meaning does not plainly establish that affirmative action by the states is constitutional. Instead, there is, at the least, a reasonable argument to be made that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional. In fact, based on the available evidence, I believe that the case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning prohibits affirmative action as to laws within its scope is stronger than the case for concluding that it allows affirmative action. I do …

Nfib V. Sebelius And The Transformation Of The Taxing Power, Barry Cushman

Notre Dame Law Review

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a majority of five Justices in holding that the “shared responsibility payment” required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) constituted an imposition of a “tax” rather than a “penalty.” Thus, even though the Chief Justice and four other Justices had concluded that the provision was not a legitimate exercise of the commerce power, the Court held that it was a valid exercise of the taxing power.

The origin of the distinction between taxes and penalties in taxing power jurisprudence is found in the 1922 …

The Appointment And Removal Of William J. Marbury And When An Office Vests, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

Notre Dame Law Review

Scholars have ignored the most important question in one of the most famous constitutional law cases, obscuring the machinations that spawned the dispute. This Article sheds light on the events that precipitated Marbury v. Madison and also explains when an appointment vests. Thomas Jefferson famously refused to deliver a commission to William J. Marbury, causing the latter to seek a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court. The received wisdom supposes that Jefferson’s refusal rested on the grounds that Marbury had not been appointed a justice of the peace precisely because he never had received a commission. In fact, Jefferson’s …

Precedent And Reliance, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

Among the most prevalent justifications for deference to judicial precedent is the protection of reliance interests. The theory is that when judicial pronouncements have engendered significant reliance, there should be a meaningful presumption against adjudicative change. Yet there remains a fundamental question as to why reliance on precedent warrants judicial protection in the first place.

This Article explores the dynamics and implications of precedential reliance. It contends that the case for protecting reliance on precedent is uncertain. There are several reasons why reliance might potentially be worth protecting, but all are subject to serious limitations or challenges. To bolster the …

The Court-Packing Plan As Symptom, Casualty, And Cause Of Gridlock, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This essay, prepared for the Notre Dame Law Review's Symposium, “The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock,” considers three ways in which President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing bill was related to the phenomenon of gridlock in the 1930s. First, as FDR's public remarks on the subject demonstrate, he believed that the early New Deal was a victim of partisan gridlock between the Democrat-controlled political branches and the Republican-controlled judiciary. Moreover, he did not believe that the impasse could be overcome through an amendment to the Constitution, for he regarded Article V's supermajority requirements as virtually encoding gridlock into the …

Court-Packing And Compromise, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing bill would have permitted him to appoint six additional justices to the Supreme Court, thereby expanding its membership to fifteen immediately. Throughout the ultimately unsuccessful campaign to enact the measure, Roosevelt was presented with numerous opportunities to compromise for a measure authorizing the appointment of fewer additional justices. The President rejected each of these proposals, and his refusal to compromise often has been attributed to stubbornness, overconfidence, or hubris. Yet an examination of the papers of Attorney General Homer S. Cummings reveals why FDR and his advisors believed that he required no fewer than …