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Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Judicial Independence In Excess: Reviving The Judicial Duty Of The Supreme Court, Paul D. Carrington, Roger C. Cramton Mar 2009

Judicial Independence In Excess: Reviving The Judicial Duty Of The Supreme Court, Paul D. Carrington, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Independence from extrinsic influence is, we know, indispensable to public trust in the integrity of professional judges who share the duty to decide cases according to preexisting law. But such independence is less appropriate for those expected to make new law to govern future events. Indeed, in a democratic government those who make new law are expected to be accountable to their constituents, not independent of their interests and unresponsive to their desires. The Supreme Court of the United States has in the last century largely forsaken responsibility for the homely task of deciding cases in accord with preexisting law …


Some Observations On The Role Of Social Change On The Courts, Gerald Torres Jan 2006

Some Observations On The Role Of Social Change On The Courts, Gerald Torres

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Approaches To Statutory Interpretation And Legislative History In France, Claire M. Germain Jul 2003

Approaches To Statutory Interpretation And Legislative History In France, Claire M. Germain

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Designing Judicial Review: A Comment On Schauer, Emily Sherwin Jan 2003

Designing Judicial Review: A Comment On Schauer, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In his characteristically lucid paper, Neutrality and Judicial Review, Frederick Schauer revisits the meaning and plausibility of Herbert Wechsler’s argument for neutral principles in constitutional adjudication. Unlike some critics, Schauer takes the argument seriously, on its own terms, and does an excellent job of sorting through the different ideas that lie behind it. Schauer identifies four different versions of the argument for neutrality. At least three of these are drawn from Wechsler’s 1959 article. Schauer is particularly interested in a fourth version, which favors neutrality in the design and management of the institution of judicial review.


Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, Michael C. Dorf, Samuel Issacharoff Oct 2001

Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, Michael C. Dorf, Samuel Issacharoff

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The political process theory introduced by the Carolene Products footnote and developed through subsequent scholarship has shaped much of the modern constitutional landscape. Process theory posits that courts may justifiably intervene in the political arena when institutional obstacles impede corrective action by political actors themselves. Judged by this standard, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore was a failure, because the majority could not explain why its interference was necessary. More broadly, Bush v. Gore points to a central deficiency in process theory: it relies upon the Justices to guard against their own overreaching, but does not …


A Cognitive Theory Of Fiduciary Relationships, Gregory S. Alexander Mar 2000

A Cognitive Theory Of Fiduciary Relationships, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Is there anything special or distinctive about fiduciary relationships? Or is the term "fiduciary" nothing more than a label that obscures rather than clarifies? Recently, several law-and-economics scholars, building on the economic literature on agency costs, have argued that nothing categorically distinguishes fiduciary from nonfiduciary legal relationships. So-called fiduciary relationships, they argue, are nothing more or less than contractual relationships.

This Essay hypothesizes that courts possess a fairly well-developed schema of the fiduciary role, but have not developed a comparable schema for ordinary contracting parties. The fiduciary role-schema often makes courts more likely to over-interpret behavior of fiduciaries than in …


Preliminary Thoughts On The Virtues Of Passive Dialogue, Michael Heise Jan 2000

Preliminary Thoughts On The Virtues Of Passive Dialogue, Michael Heise

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The judicial, legislative, and executive branches interact in many ways. These interactions fuel a constitutional dialogue that serves as a backdrop to myriad governmental activities, both large and small. The judiciary's participation is necessary, desirable, and, as a practical matter, inevitable. In my article I analyze two competing models that bear on the normative question: What form should the judiciary's participation take?

Debates over the judiciary's appropriate role in the public constitutional dialogue have captured scholarly attention for decades. Recent attention has focused on a growing distinction between the active and passive models of judicial participation. My article approaches this …


The Supreme Court 1997 Term -- Foreword: The Limits Of Socratic Deliberation, Michael C. Dorf Nov 1998

The Supreme Court 1997 Term -- Foreword: The Limits Of Socratic Deliberation, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Role Of History In Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Study, Gary J. Simson Jan 1985

The Role Of History In Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Study, Gary J. Simson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.