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Articles 31 - 38 of 38
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The General Welfare Clause And The Public Trust: An Essay In Original Understanding, Robert G. Natelson
The General Welfare Clause And The Public Trust: An Essay In Original Understanding, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
This article explains the original meaning/understanding of the Constitution's General Welfare Clause, including the scope of the taxing and spending power granted to Congress
The Constitution And The Public Trust, Robert G. Natelson
The Constitution And The Public Trust, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
The American Founders believed that public officials were bound by fiduciary obligations, and they wrote that view into the Constitution. This article copiously documents their position.
The Enumerated Powers Of States, Robert G. Natelson
The Enumerated Powers Of States, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
This article lists and discusses the powers reserved exclusively to the states, according the representations made to the ratifying public during the debates over the U.S. Constitution.
The Constitutional Contributions Of John Dickinson, Robert G. Natelson
The Constitutional Contributions Of John Dickinson, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
This article reviews the impact on the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution of the man sometimes referred to as the most underappreciated Founder
Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, Robert G. Natelson
Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
The article explains the extent to which the Founders' Constitution permitted and prohibited retroactive legislation, and the provisions in that document relevant to the question.
A Reminder: The Constitutional Values Of Sympathy And Independence, Robert G. Natelson
A Reminder: The Constitutional Values Of Sympathy And Independence, Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
Nearly all participants in the American Founding shared constitutiona/ values of "sympathy" and "independence." According to the ideal of sympathy, government actors should mirror the full range of popular attitudes. According to the ideal of independence, voters should remain independent of other citizens and of governmental entities, and those entities should remain independent of, and competitive with, each other. Sympathy and independence were central, not peripheral, to the Founders' Constitution, so the document cannot be interpreted properly without keeping them in view. The author provides examples of how constitutional practice might be altered had these central values not been overlooked.
James Madison And The Constitution's “Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson
James Madison And The Constitution's “Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson
Robert G. Natelson
This article traces the progress of James Madison's thought on the Constitution's "convention for proposing amendments as a way for states to assert themselves against the federal government. Madison saw the convention as an important part of the Constitution, and a constitutional alternative to nullification.
Constituição, Soberania E Ditadura Em Carl Schmitt, Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior
Constituição, Soberania E Ditadura Em Carl Schmitt, Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior
Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior
On the basis of a reconstruction of Schmitt's decisionism and of the analysis of its effects on key terms of his conception like democracy, sovereignty and dictatorship, Schmitt'sthought is examined regarding his theoretical and practical positions on the constitutional issues of Weimar's Germany and of National-socialism. Special attention is given to how for him the unity and the hierarchy of the political powers and of the lae demand a strong State and a centralized command instead of a pluralistic balance.