Legal History Commons^™

Let The Facts Speak For Themselves: The Empiricist Origins Of The Right To Remain Silent, Randa Helfield

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Historians have traced the right to silence to early canon law, the political conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even The Prisoner’s Counsel Act, which effectively silenced the accused by allowing his lawyer to speak for him. This article argues that changes in philosophical notions of truth best explain how, given the importance of the accused’s testimony at the altercation trial, her silence could ever have been tolerated and ultimately enforced as a right. By the mid-eighteenth century, the rise of empiricism had shifted the trial’s reliance on testimony to a preference for facts, which seemed more immediately …

Today's Porn: Not A Constitutional Right; Not A Human Right, Patrick Trueman

Dignity: A Journal of Analysis of Exploitation and Violence

No abstract provided.

Preclusion And Criminal Judgment, Lee Kovarsky

Notre Dame Law Review

The defining question in modern habeas corpus law involves the finality

of a state conviction: What preclusive effect does (and should) a criminal

judgment have? Res judicata and collateral estoppel —the famous preclusion

rules for civil judgments—accommodate basic legal interests in fairness,

certitude, and sovereignty. Legal institutions carefully calibrate the preclusive

effect of civil judgments because judicial resources are scarce, because

the reliability and legitimacy of prior process can vary, and because courts

wield the authority of a repeat-playing sovereign that will find its own civil

judgments attacked in foreign litigation. In stark contrast to the legal sophistication

lavished on …

Beyond Law And Fact: Jury Evaluation Of Law Enforcement, Lauren M. Ouziel

Notre Dame Law Review

Criminal trials today are as much about the adequacy and legitimacy of the defendant’s accusers—police and prosecutors—as the alleged deeds of the accused. Yet we lack theory to conceptualize this reality, doctrine to set its parameters, and institutional mechanisms to adapt to it. The traditional framework used by courts and scholars to delineate the jury’s role—along the continuum between “fact-finding” and “law-finding”—is inadequate to the task. Jury evaluations of law enforcement are more accurately conceptualized as enforcement-finding, a process that functions both in and outside that continuum. In considering enforcement-finding’s justification and proper scope, history offers a useful analytical frame. …