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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Scotus Short Title Turmoil: Time For A Congressional Bill Naming Authority, Brian Christopher Jones Nov 2013

Scotus Short Title Turmoil: Time For A Congressional Bill Naming Authority, Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

This past summer saw the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in United States v. Windsor, and while the case has generated copious amounts of commentary and scholarship, relatively little attention has been paid to the case’s discussion of bill short titles. Central to the case’s analysis was a dispute over the role of short titles in inferring legislative purpose, and given this dispute, this Remark will argue that it’s time for a Congressional bill naming authority to ensure sensible, descriptive bill names.


New Paths For The Court: Protections Afforded Juveniles Under Miranda; Effective Assistance Of Counsel; And Habeas Corpus Decisions Of The Supreme Court’S 2010/2011 Term, Richard Klein Oct 2013

New Paths For The Court: Protections Afforded Juveniles Under Miranda; Effective Assistance Of Counsel; And Habeas Corpus Decisions Of The Supreme Court’S 2010/2011 Term, Richard Klein

Richard Daniel Klein

No abstract provided.


Lower Court Compliance With Supreme Court Remands, Elise Borochoff Jun 2013

Lower Court Compliance With Supreme Court Remands, Elise Borochoff

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Decision Theory And Babbitt V. Sweet Home: Skepticism About Norms, Discretion, And The Virtues Of Purposivism, Victoria Nourse May 2013

Decision Theory And Babbitt V. Sweet Home: Skepticism About Norms, Discretion, And The Virtues Of Purposivism, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this writing, the author applies a “decision theory” of statutory interpretation, elaborated recently in the Yale Law Journal, to Professor William Eskridge’s illustrative case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. In the course of this application, she takes issue with the conventional wisdom that purposivism, as a method of statutory interpretation, is inevitably a more virtuous model of statutory interpretation. First, the author questions whether we have a clear enough jurisprudential picture both of judicial discretion and legal as opposed to political normativity. Second, she argues that, under decision theory, Sweet Home is …


Explaining The Supreme Court's Interest In Patent Law, Timothy R. Holbrook Apr 2013

Explaining The Supreme Court's Interest In Patent Law, Timothy R. Holbrook

IP Theory

No abstract provided.


Holmes And The Common Law: A Jury's Duty, Matthew P. Cline Mar 2013

Holmes And The Common Law: A Jury's Duty, Matthew P. Cline

Matthew P Cline

The notion of a small group of peers whose responsibility it is to play a part in determining the outcome of a trial is central to the common conception of the American legal system. Memorialized in the Constitution of the United States as a fundamental right, and in the national consciousness as the proud, if begrudged, duty of all citizens, juries are often discussed, but perhaps not always understood. Whatever misunderstandings have come to be, certainly many of them sprang from the juxtaposition of jury and judge. Why do we have both? How are their responsibilities divided? Who truly decides …


E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March To Be The Singular Influence On Civil Rights At The Supreme Court, Aaron J. Shuler Jan 2013

E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March To Be The Singular Influence On Civil Rights At The Supreme Court, Aaron J. Shuler

Barry Law Review

This article seeks to apply Rogers Smith’s Multiple Traditions thesis to the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment to uncover the influences behind its major civil rights decisions. It will argue that liberalism dominates at the Court after mostly, but not completely, shedding its illiberal tendencies. This article will argue that the Court’s focus on intent over impact and its “color-blind” approach to racial classifications in the era of subterranean prejudice and indifference or ignorance to inequality solidifies and perpetuates the hierarchies created by ascriptive forms of Americanism under the Court’s liberal notions. This article will also …


“Dealing With The Appellate Caseload Crisis”: The Report Of The Federal Courts Study Committee Revisited, Roger J. Miner Jan 2013

“Dealing With The Appellate Caseload Crisis”: The Report Of The Federal Courts Study Committee Revisited, Roger J. Miner

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


The New Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, And Abortion Rights: A Reply To Jeffrey Rosen, Neil S. Siegel Jan 2013

The New Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, And Abortion Rights: A Reply To Jeffrey Rosen, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take On How United States V. Jones Fits Into The Court's Technology Jurisprudence, Tamara Rice Lave Jan 2013

Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take On How United States V. Jones Fits Into The Court's Technology Jurisprudence, Tamara Rice Lave

Articles

This Article argues that the Supreme Court's technology jurisprudence can be best understood as protecting the privacy interest of elites. After providing an overview of the major technology cases from Olmstead to Kyllo, the Article focuses on the recent case of United States v Jones. The Article does not contend that the Court intended to protect elites, but instead posits that this motive likely operated at a more unconscious level because of the Justices' greater relative affluence and elevated social position.


Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz Jan 2013

Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone--or a foreign government alone--can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase …