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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton
Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.
The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
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No abstract provided.
The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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America's political institutions are built on the principle that individual preferences are central to the formation of policy. The two most important institutions in our system, democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation of policy and the allocation of resources. American legal traditions have always reflected the centrality of preference in policy determination. In private law, the importance of preference is reflected mainly in the development and persistence of common-law rules, which are intended to facilitate private transactions over legal entitlements. In constitutional law, the centrality of preference is reflected in the high position we assign …
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
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Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …