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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

A Theory Without A Movement, A Hope Without A Name: The Future Of Marxism In A Post-Marxist World, Justin Schwartz Jun 2013

A Theory Without A Movement, A Hope Without A Name: The Future Of Marxism In A Post-Marxist World, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Just as Marx's insights into capitalism have been most strikingly vindicated by the rise of neoliberalism and the near-collapse of the world economy, Marxism as social movement has become bereft of support. Is there any point in people who find Marx's analysis useful in clinging to the term "Marxism" - which Marx himself rejected -- at time when self-identified Marxist organizations and societies have collapsed or renounced the identification, and Marxism own working class constituency rejects the term? I set aside bad reasons to give on "Marxism," such as that the theory is purportedly refuted, that its adoption leads necessarily …


Neoliberalism And The Law: How Historical Materialism Can Illuminate Recent Governmental And Judicial Decision Making, Justin Schwartz Jan 2013

Neoliberalism And The Law: How Historical Materialism Can Illuminate Recent Governmental And Judicial Decision Making, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Neoliberalism can be understood as the deregulation of the economy from political control by deliberate action or inaction of the state. As such it is both constituted by the law and deeply affects it. I show how the methods of historical materialism can illuminate this phenomenon in all three branches of the the U.S. government. Considering the example the global financial crisis of 2007-08 that began with the housing bubble developing from trade in unregulated and overvalued mortgage backed securities, I show how the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which established a firewall between commercial and investment banking, allowed this …


The Rise Of Planning In Industrial America, 1865-1914 Dec 2011

The Rise Of Planning In Industrial America, 1865-1914

Richard Adelstein

How American firms grew very large after the Civil War, and how Americans responded to them.


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …


Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein Dec 2009

Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A close look at what firms are and how they act.


Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein Dec 2009

Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A contribution to a symposium on a paper by Richard Posner.


Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein Dec 2006

Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A short summary of earlier work for a sociological audience.


An Economic Model Of Fair Use (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Dec 2005

An Economic Model Of Fair Use (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A formal model of the law of fair use.


Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein Dec 2004

Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A theory of central planning employing Austrian themes and applied to private firms and Taylorism.


Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein Dec 2001

Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Intellectual property and patent protection in light of the AIDS crisis in Africa.


Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Dec 2000

Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A comparison of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal adjudication and its implications for plea bargaining.


Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton Jan 1999

Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein Dec 1998

Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A brief recasting of the price exaction model.


Four Entries, Richard Adelstein Dec 1997

Four Entries, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Four entries: "American Institutional Economics and the Legal System" (I: 61-66); "John Rogers Commons" (I: 324-327); Richard Theodore Ely" (II: 28-29); and "Plea Bargaining: A Comparative Approach"


Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz Jan 1997

Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS.

The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is overwhelming: there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into …


The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 1997

The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


What's Wrong With Exploitation?, Justin Schwartz Jan 1995

What's Wrong With Exploitation?, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Abstract: Marx thinks that capitalism is exploitative, and that is a major basis for his objections to it. But what's wrong with exploitation, as Marx sees it? (The paper is exegetical in character: my object is to understand what Marx believed,) The received view, held by Norman Geras, G.A. Cohen, and others, is that Marx thought that capitalism was unjust, because in the crudest sense, capitalists robbed labor of property that was rightfully the workers' because the workers and not the capitalists produced it. This view depends on a Labor Theory of Property (LTP), that property rights are based ultimately …


In Defence Of Exploitation, Justin Schwartz Jan 1995

In Defence Of Exploitation, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

The concept of exploitation is thought to be central to Marx's Critique of capitalism. John Roemer, an analytical (then-) Marxist economist now at Yale, attacked this idea in a series of papers and books in the 1970s-1990s, arguing that Marxists should be concerned with inequality rather than exploitation -- with distribution rather than production, precisely the opposite of what Marx urged in The Critique of the Gotha Progam.

This paper expounds and criticizes Roemer's objections and his alternative inequality based theory of exploitation, while accepting some of his criticisms. It may be viewed as a companion paper to my What's …


The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 1994

The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

America's political institutions are built on the principle that individual preferences are central to the formation of policy. The two most important institutions in our system, democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation of policy and the allocation of resources. American legal traditions have always reflected the centrality of preference in policy determination. In private law, the importance of preference is reflected mainly in the development and persistence of common-law rules, which are intended to facilitate private transactions over legal entitlements. In constitutional law, the centrality of preference is reflected in the high position we assign …


The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz Jan 1993

The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A standard problem with the objectivity of social scientific theory in particular is that it is either self-referential, in which case it seems to undermine itself as ideology, or self-excepting, which seem pragmatically self-refuting. Using the example of Marx and his theory of ideology, I show how self-referential theories that include themselves in their scope of explanation can be objective. Ideology may be roughly defined as belief distorted by class interest. I show how Marx thought that natural science was informed by class interest but not therefore necessarily ideology. Capitalists have an interest in understanding the natural world (to a …


From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz Jan 1992

From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A standard natural rights argument for libertarianism is based on the labor theory of property: the idea that I own my self and my labor, and so if I "mix" my own labor with something previously unowned or to which I have a have a right, I come to own the thing with which I have mixed by labor. This initially intuitively attractive idea is at the basis of the theories of property and the role of government of John Locke and Robert Nozick. Locke saw and Nozick agreed that fairness to others requires a proviso: that I leave "enough …


Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein Dec 1990

Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Antitrust as a constitutional constraint on the growth of firms.


The Competition Of Technologies In Markets For Ideas: Copyright And Fair Use In Evolutionary Perspective (With Steven Peretz), Richard Adelstein Dec 1984

The Competition Of Technologies In Markets For Ideas: Copyright And Fair Use In Evolutionary Perspective (With Steven Peretz), Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A theory of intellectual goods as distinct from public or private goods, and the rationale for copyright that flows from it.


The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton Jan 1984

The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …


The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein Dec 1980

The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A comparative view of adjudication by guilty plea in the US and the UK.


Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein Dec 1980

Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

An extended development of the foundations of the price exaction model of the criminal process.


The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein Dec 1978

The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

More on price exaction, and punishments as conveyors of cost information in the criminal process.


Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein Dec 1978

Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A further development of the price exaction model and an application to the problem of sentencing standards.


The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein Dec 1977

The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

An early exposition of the price exaction framework and the place of plea bargaining in it.


The Plea Bargain In Theory Dec 1977

The Plea Bargain In Theory

Richard Adelstein

A formal dynamic model of plea bargains.