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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Justice In Time, Robert C. Hockett
Justice In Time, Robert C. Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
Challenges raised by the subject of intergenerational justice seem often to be thought almost uniquely intractable. In particular, apparent conflicts between the core values of impartiality and efficiency raised by a large and still growing number of intertemporal impossibility results derived by Koopmans, Diamond, Basu & Mitra, and others have been taken to foreclose fruitful policy assessment done with a view to the distant future. This Essay aims to dispel the sense of bewilderment, pessimism and attendant paralysis that afflicts intertemporal justice assessment. It works toward that end by demonstrating that the most vexing puzzles raised by questions of intergenerational …
Why Paretians Can’T Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, And Imperatives In Law And Policy, Robert C. Hockett
Why Paretians Can’T Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, And Imperatives In Law And Policy, Robert C. Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
Recent years have witnessed two linked revivals in the legal academy. The first is renewed interest in articulating a normative “master principle” by which legal rules might be evaluated. The second is renewed interest in the prospect that a variant of Benthamite “utility” might serve as the requisite touchstone. One influential such variant now in circulation is what the Article calls “Paretian welfarism.” This Article rejects Paretian welfarism and advocates an alternative it calls “fair welfare.” It does so because Paretian welfarism is inconsistent with ethical, social, and legal prescription, while fair welfare is what we have been groping for …
Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics, Robert C. Hockett
Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics, Robert C. Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls's selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. …
Promise Against Peril: Of Power, Purpose, And Principle In International Law, Robert Hockett
Promise Against Peril: Of Power, Purpose, And Principle In International Law, Robert Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
I take two recent monographs on international law – Mary Ellen O’Connell’s "The Power and Purpose of International Law," and Eric Posner’s "The Perils of Global Legalism," as case studies in a more general inquiry into the role of the "rule of law" ideal in domestic and international law. I argue that international and domestic law alike give varyingly explicit and effective expression to the rule of law ideal, and that the task before us is accordingly steadily to improve their effectiveness in so doing, not to pretend that there is no role for this ideal to play in interpreting …
The Impossibility Of A Prescriptive Paretian, Robert C. Hockett
The Impossibility Of A Prescriptive Paretian, Robert C. Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
Most normatively oriented economists appear to be “welfarist” and Paretian to one degree or another: They deem responsiveness to individual preferences, and satisfaction of one or more of the Pareto criteria, to be a desirable attribute of any social welfare function. I show that no strictly “welfarist” or Paretian social welfare function can be normatively prescriptive. Economists who prescribe must embrace at least one value apart from or additional to “welfarism” and Paretianism, and in fact will do best to dispense with Pareto entirely.