Jurisprudence Commons^™

Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, And The Faux Conservatism Of J. Harvie Wilkinson, Iii, Nelson Lund, David B. Kopel

David B Kopel

Writing in the Virginia Law Review, a distinguished federal judge maintains that true conservatives are required to substitute principles of judicial restraint for an inquiry into the original meaning of the Constitution. Accordingly, argues J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, the Supreme Court's Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller is an activist decision just like Roe v. Wade: "[B]oth cases found judicially enforceable substantive rights only ambiguously rooted in the Constitution's text." In this response, we challenge his critique.

Part I shows that Judge Wilkinson's analogy between Roe and Heller is untenable. The right of the people to keep …

The “Institutional Turn” In Jurisprudence: Critique And Reconstruction., Andres Palacios Lleras

Andrés Palacios Lleras

This paper engages in a inquiry into the roles that courts play within the legal system, given that judges are interdependent interpreters of legal rules that are boundedly rational and, arguably, politically biased. Contemporary authors claim that, although these two conditions play an important role in interpretation, contemporary theories in jurisprudence have not addressed them properly. Their assessments raise legal issues that are very significant; given the fact that judges are boundedly rational and tend to display political biases, how should they interpret legal rules? Is it best for them to interpret these rules in a formalist fashion, without resorting …

The Indeterminate Side Of Constitutions As Precommitment Strategies, Andres Palacios Lleras

Andrés Palacios Lleras

This paper engages in a time-honored inquiry in American jurisprudence, an inquiry which continues to be invigorated by contemporary studies in Constitutional Law. It is an inquiry into the determinacy of the American Constitution as a legal text, taking into account that it was drafted and approved more than two hundred years ago with the purpose, arguably, to organize present and future political decision-making. Some contemporary authors claim that the discussion about the role of the Constitution is muddled, and that to acknowledge its authority does not necessarily entail a theory of constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, other authors have claimed that …

Popular Constitutionalism And Relaxing The Dead Hand: Can The People Be Trusted?, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

A growing number of constitutional scholars are urging the nation to rethink its commitment to judicial supremacy. Popular constitutionalists argue that the American people, not the courts, hold the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution’s many open-ended provisions whose meanings are reasonably contestable. This Article defends popular constitutionalism on two important fronts. First, using originalism as a paradigmatic example of the ways in which courts frequently draw constitutional meaning from sources rooted deep in the past, the Article contends that defenders of judicial supremacy still have not persuasively responded to the familiar dead-hand query: Why should constitutional meanings that prevailed …

Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article challenges the validity of plain language textualism, an allegedly superior method of constitutional interpretation based solely on the “plain language” of the Constitution. First, this Article demonstrates that, notwithstanding the ebb and flow of support for this interpretive method, both the Supreme Court and its individual Justices often seek to “plainly” define various provisions in the Constitution. What matters most to this Article is not whether any individual “plain language” interpretation of a constitutional provision seems reasonable or even best, but rather whether the use of “plain language” is consistent with the expressed and unexpressed objectives and purposes …