Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Jurisprudence Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Guarding The Guardians: Judges' Rights And Virginia's Judicial Inquiry And Review Commission, Jeffrey D. Mcmahan Jr. Nov 2008

Guarding The Guardians: Judges' Rights And Virginia's Judicial Inquiry And Review Commission, Jeffrey D. Mcmahan Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters Oct 2008

Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters

All Faculty Scholarship

In this contribution to a Wayne Law Review symposium on the first three years of the Roberts Court, the author normatively assesses the Court's practice of "under-the-table overruling," or "underruling," in high-profile constitutional cases involving abortion, campaign-finance reform, and affirmative action. The Court "underrules" when it renders a decision that undercuts a recent precedent without admitting that it is doing so. The author contends that underruling either is not supported by, or is directly incompatible with, three common rationales for constitutional stare decisis: the noninstrumental rationale, the predictability rationale, and the legitimacy rationale. In particular, while the latter rationale ...


Money As Property: The Effects Of Doctrinal Misallocation On Campaign Finance Reform, Maneesh Sharma May 2008

Money As Property: The Effects Of Doctrinal Misallocation On Campaign Finance Reform, Maneesh Sharma

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

By applying First Amendment jurisprudence to campaign finance measures, this Note argues that the Supreme Court has misallocated campaign finance within its doctrinal scheme. This doctrinal misallocation has stymied the ability of legislatures to enact effective reforms to reduce the role of money in politics. This Note argues that money in the political process more closely resembles property than speech and should therefore be analyzed under a less stringent property review. This Note concludes by proposing a standard of review developed from the Court's property jurisprudence.


"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Tracey E. George, Chris Guthrie Jan 2008

"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Tracey E. George, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.


Friction By Design: The Necessary Contest Of State Judicial Power And Legislative Policymaking, Michael L. Buenger Jan 2008

Friction By Design: The Necessary Contest Of State Judicial Power And Legislative Policymaking, Michael L. Buenger

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Case Note: Golden Gate Restaurant Association V. City And County Of San Francisco: Setting The Stage For Supreme Court Review Of The Most Important Preemption Matter In The History Of Erisa, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 995 (2008), Joshua Waldbeser Jan 2008

Case Note: Golden Gate Restaurant Association V. City And County Of San Francisco: Setting The Stage For Supreme Court Review Of The Most Important Preemption Matter In The History Of Erisa, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 995 (2008), Joshua Waldbeser

The John Marshall Law Review

No abstract provided.


De-Moralized: Glucksberg In The Malaise, Steven D. Smith Jan 2008

De-Moralized: Glucksberg In The Malaise, Steven D. Smith

Michigan Law Review

Ten years down the road, what is the enduring significance of the "assisted suicide" cases, Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill? The cases reflect an unusually earnest, but nonetheless unsuccessful, attempt by the Supreme Court to grapple with a profound moral issue. So, why was the Court unable to provide a more satisfying justification for its conclusions? This Article, written for a symposium on the tenth anniversary of Glucksberg,, discusses that question. Part I examines some of the flaws in reasoning in the Glucksberg and Quill opinions and suggests that these flaws stem from the opinion writers' inability to ...


Formalism And Judicial Supremacy In Federal Indian Law, Alex Tallchief Skibine Jan 2008

Formalism And Judicial Supremacy In Federal Indian Law, Alex Tallchief Skibine

American Indian Law Review

No abstract provided.


Due Process Traditionalism, Cass R. Sunstein Jan 2008

Due Process Traditionalism, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

In important cases, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of "substantive due process" by reference to tradition, but it has yet to explain why it has done so. Due process traditionalism might be defended in several distinctive ways. The most ambitious defense draws on a set of ideas associated with Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek, who suggested that traditions have special credentials by virtue of their acceptance by many minds. But this defense runs into three problems. Those who have participated in a tradition may not have accepted any relevant proposition; they might suffer from a systematic bias; and ...


Overcoming Lochner In The Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights And Popular Sovereignty Seriously As We Seek To Secure Equal Citizenship And Promote The Public Good, Thomas B. Mcaffee Jan 2008

Overcoming Lochner In The Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights And Popular Sovereignty Seriously As We Seek To Secure Equal Citizenship And Promote The Public Good, Thomas B. Mcaffee

University of Richmond Law Review

Professor McAffee reviews substantive due process as the textual basis for modern fundamental rights constitutional decision-making. He contends that we should avoid both the undue literalism that rejects the idea of implied rights, as well as the attempt to substitute someone's preferred moral vision for the limits, and compromises, that are implicit in and intended by the Constitution's text. He argues, moreover, that we can largely harmonizethe variousgoals of our constitutionalsystem by taking rights se- riously and by understanding that securing rights does not ex-haustthe Constitution'spurposes.


Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophony Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Matthew J. Parlow, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2007

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophony Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Matthew J. Parlow, Donald J. Kochan

Matthew Parlow

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States ...