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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Putting Religious Symbolism In Context: A Linguistic Critique Of The Endorsement Test, B. Jessie Hill Dec 2005

Putting Religious Symbolism In Context: A Linguistic Critique Of The Endorsement Test, B. Jessie Hill

Michigan Law Review

The treatment of Establishment Clause challenges to displays of religious symbolism by the Supreme Court and the lower courts is notoriously unpredictable: a crèche is constitutionally acceptable if it is accompanied by a Santa Claus house and reindeer, a Christmas tree, and various circus figures, but unacceptable if it is accompanied by poinsettias, a "peace tree," or a wreath, a tree, and a plastic Santa Claus. A menorah may be displayed next to a Christmas tree, or next to Kwanzaa symbols, Santa Claus, and Frosty the Snowman, but not next to a crèche and a Christmas tree. A number of ...


Testing Minimalism: A Reply, Cass R. Sunstein Oct 2005

Testing Minimalism: A Reply, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

Some judges are less ambitious than others; they have minimalist tendencies. Minimalists are unambitious along two dimensions. First, they seek to rule narrowly rather than broadly. In a single case, they do not wish to resolve other, related problems that might have relevant differences. They are willing to live with the costs and burdens of uncertainty, which they tend to prefer to the risks of premature resolution of difficult issues. Second, minimalists seek to rule shallowly rather than deeply, in the sense that they favor arguments that do not take a stand on the foundational debates in law and politics ...


A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel Aug 2005

A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel

Michigan Law Review

According to the prevailing wisdom in academic public law, constitutional theory is a field that seeks to articulate and evaluate abstract accounts of the nature of the United States Constitution. Theorists offer those accounts as guides to subsequent judicial construction of constitutional provisions. As typically conceived, therefore, constitutional theory tends to proceed analytically from the general to the particular; its animating idea is that correct decisions in constitutional cases presuppose theoretical commitments to the methodological principles that should guide constitutional interpretation and the substantive values such interpretation should advance. In its enthusiasm for abstraction, constitutional theory has, at times, generated ...


Rule-Oriented Realism, Emily Sherwin May 2005

Rule-Oriented Realism, Emily Sherwin

Michigan Law Review

In his new book The Law and Ethics of Restitution, Hanoch Dagan undertakes to explain and justify the American law of restitution. He offers a broad theoretical account of this poorly understood subject, designed not only to fortify the substantive law of restitution but also to clarify the role and methodology of courts in developing the field. Dagan's book also provides lively discussion of the role of restitution in some of the most highly publicized legal developments of recent years. Those who think of restitution as an obscure branch of "legal remedies" may be surprised to read about the ...


Against Interpretive Supremacy, Saikrishna Prakash, John Yoo May 2005

Against Interpretive Supremacy, Saikrishna Prakash, John Yoo

Michigan Law Review

Many constitutional scholars are obsessed with judicial review and the many questions surrounding it. One perennial favorite is whether the Constitution even authorizes judicial review. Another is whether the other branches of the federal government must obey the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and what, if anything, the other branches must do to execute the judiciary's judgments. Marbury v. Madison has been a full-employment program for many constitutional law scholars, including ourselves. Larry Kramer, the new Dean of Stanford Law School, shares this passion. He has devoted roughly the last decade of his career, with two lengthy ...


Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman May 2005

Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman

Michigan Law Review

It is a cliché of contemporary legal scholarship that, in the last few decades, the study of law has witnessed a vast proliferation of competing theoretical approaches. The old faith in the careful honing of doctrinal concepts and the essential usefulness of legal analysis has given way to a cacophony of competing theoretical sects. Economists, moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have stepped forward to offer the insights of this or that discipline as a new and superior path to legal enlightenment. Perhaps nowhere has this cliché been truer than in the realm of contracts scholarship, where, for a generation ...


Theory Wars In The Conflict Of Laws, Louise Weinberg May 2005

Theory Wars In The Conflict Of Laws, Louise Weinberg

Michigan Law Review

Fifty years ago, at the height of modernism in all things, there was a great revolution in American choice-of-law theory. You cannot understand what is going on in the field of conflict of laws today without coming to grips with this central fact. With this revolution, the old formalistic way of choosing law was dethroned, and has occupied a humble position on the sidelines ever since. Yet there has been no lasting peace. The American conflicts revolution is still happening, and poor results are still frustrating good intentions. Now comes Dean Symeon Symeonides, the author of the choice of- law ...


Deferring, Frederick Schauer May 2005

Deferring, Frederick Schauer

Michigan Law Review

Many academics, upon encountering a book on deference by a leading legal theorist, would assume that the book was still another contribution to a long and prominent debate about the existence (or not) of an obligation to obey the law. But that would be a mistake. In fact, this is a book not about obligation or obedience but about deference, and it is precisely in that difference that the significance of Philip Soper's book lies. Especially in law, where the Supreme Court (sometimes) defers to the factual, legal, and even constitutional determinations of Congress and administrative agencies, where appellate ...