Jurisprudence Commons^™

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

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No abstract provided.

How And Understanding Of The Second Personal Standpoint Can Change Our Understanding Of The Law: Hart's Unpublished Response To Exclusive Legal Positivism, Robin B. Kar

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This Article describes recent developments in moral philosophy on the “second personal standpoint,” and argues that they will have important ramifications for legal thought. Moral, legal and political thinkers have, for some time now, understood important distinctions between the first personal perspective (of deliberation) and the third personal perspective (of observation, cause and effect), and have plumbed these distinctions to great effect in their thought. This distinction is, in fact, implicit the law and economics movement’s “rational actor” model of decision, which currently dominates much legal academic thought. Recent developments in value theory due to philosopher Stephen Darwall suggest, however, …

Patterns In A Complex System: An Empirical Study Of Valuation In Business Bankruptcy Cases, Bernard Trujillo

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This Article applies complex systems research methods to explore the characteristics of the bankruptcy legal system, presenting the results of an empirical study of twenty years of bankruptcy court valuation doctrine in business cramdown cases. These data provide solid descriptions of how courts exercise their discretion in valuing firms and assets.

This Article accomplishes two objectives: First, using scientific methodology, this Article explains the content of bankruptcy valuation doctrine. Second, this Article uses doctrine as a variable to explore system dynamics that govern the processes of change over time.

Significant findings include (i) courts tend to “split the difference” in …

The Deep Structure Of Law And Morality, Robin B. Kar

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This Article argues that morality and law share a deep and pervasive structure, an analogue of what Noam Chomsky calls the “deep structure” of language. This structure arises not to resolve linguistic problems of generativity, but rather from the fact that morality and law engage psychological adaptations with the same natural function: to allow us to resolve social contract problems flexibly. Drawing on and extending a number of contemporary insights from evolutionary psychology and evolutionary game theory, this Article argues that we resolve these problems by employing a particular class of psychological attitudes, which are neither simply belief-like states nor …