Jurisprudence Commons^™

Precedent In A Polarized Era, Zachary S. Price

Notre Dame Law Review

My Review begins below in Part I with a brief synopsis of Professor Kozel’s argument. Part II then discusses his theory’s particular value, and challenges, in our historical moment of acute polarization and political conflict over constitutional law. To make Part II’s claims more concrete, Part III then turns to Janus and Wayfair. It uses the two cases to illustrate pressures courts may face in the years ahead and assesses how well these decisions accord with Kozel’s theory. The Review ends with a conclusion reflecting more broadly on the importance of stare decisis and other institutional restraints in the current …

Feminist Judgments And Women's Rights At Work, Gillian Thomas

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The history of the law’s treatment of working women is largely a history of the law’s treatment of women’s bodies. Overwhelmingly created by male judges, that jurisprudence considers women from a remove—their physicality, their reproductive capacity, their stature, their sexuality—eclipsing meaningful consideration of their lived experience, on or off the job. As vividly illustrated by so many of the alternative rulings contained in Feminist Judgments, that erasure resulted in Supreme Court decisions that—even when they came out the “right” way, that is, in favor of the female litigant—squandered opportunities for advancing sex equality.

The tantalizing notion of “what might …

Revisiting Roe To Advance Reproductive Justice For Childbearing Women, Elizabeth Kukura

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The rewritten opinions that comprise Feminist Judgments together provide a powerful critique of judicial decisionmaking that renders certain women’s experiences invisible. By reimagining key Supreme Court decisions, the opinion writers unmask various ways that gendered conceptions of social roles are deeply entrenched in the rulings and reasoning of the highest court of the United States. The authors also show, through their alternative texts, that opinions which are celebrated as women’s rights victories can nevertheless impede progress toward equality and liberty.

Kimberly Mutcherson’s rewritten concurrence in Roe v. Wade illustrates the missed opportunities and unintended consequences that have made the landmark …

Looking To The Litigant: Reaction Essay To Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions Of The United States Supreme Court, Claire B. Wofford

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Feminist Judgments’s focus on jurists alone is not unusual. My own discipline has devoted a great deal of study to understanding why and how the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court make the decisions they do. Some of the scholarship has even examined whether women judges might operate differently than their male counterparts, though the findings have been mixed at best. The emphasis, moreover, is understandable and laudable, as it is jurists who have the final say on the content of law.

Emphasizing judicial behavior, however, unfortunately overlooks the fundamental passivity of the courts. As much as they might …

Extending The Critical Rereading Project, Gabrielle Appleby, Rosalind Dixon

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In this reflection, we want to explain a project in Australia that extends the feminist judgments project and adapts it specifically for the purpose of teaching critical theory, critical legal thinking, and the assumptions inherent in the legal method.

Feminist Judgments And The Future Of Reproductive Justice, Sarah Weddington

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Roe v. Wade is one of the twenty-five Supreme Court cases that has been rewritten from a feminist perspective by an imaginative group of law professors and lawyers. This Essay is based on remarks made by Ms. Weddington at a panel discussion held at Temple University Beasley School of Law on November 13, 2017.

The Love In Loving: Overcoming Artificial Racial Barriers, Justice Leah Ward Sears (Ret.), Sasha N. Greenberg

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The rewritten opinion of Loving v. Virginia in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court is in stark contrast to the original. Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb’s judgment for the court “unmasks—and renders unavoidable— the link between America’s history of White supremacy and patriarchy and America’s legal structures for regulating marriage and families.” The feminist opinion relies almost entirely on legal, social, and cultural history, in particular the history of marriage and family relationships among and between Blacks and Whites during the colonial, antebellum, and postbellum eras in the American South.

For the authors of this response Essay, both …

How Is Sex Harassment Discriminatory?, Noa Ben-Asher

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Feminist Judgments takes us to a key moment in the history of sexual harassment law. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It also held that to be actionable under Title VII, sexual advances must be (1) “unwelcome” and (2) “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” The latter part of the test (“sufficiently severe or pervasive”) fits well into the …

Rewriting Judicial Opinions And The Feminist Scholarly Project, Linda L. Berger, Kathryn M. Stanchi, Bridget J. Crawford

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In 1995, the authors of a law review article examining “feminist judging” focused on the existing social science data concerning women judges and compared the voting records and opinions of the only female Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O’Connor. Based on this review, the authors concluded that appointing more women as judges would make little difference to judicial outcomes or processes. The authors accused those who advocated for more women on the bench of having a hidden feminist agenda and bluntly concluded that “[b]y any measure, feminist judges fit very uneasily in most …

Feminist Judgments & #Metoo, Margaret E. Johnson

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The Feminist Judgments book series and the #MeToo movement share the feminist method of narrative. Feminist Judgments is a scholarly project of rewriting judicial opinions using feminist legal theory. #MeToo is a narrative movement by people, primarily women, telling their stories of sexual harassment or assault. Both Feminist Judgments and #MeToo bring to the surface stories that have been silenced, untold, or overlooked. These narrative collections can and do effectuate genderjustice change by empowering people, changing perspectives, opening up new learning, and affecting future legal and nonlegal outcomes.

Feminist Judgments And The Rewritten Price Waterhouse, Sandra Sperino

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In Feminist Judgments, Professor Martha Chamallas reimagines the canonical case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff can prevail on a Title VII claim by showing that a protected trait was a motivating factor in a negative employment outcome. In that case, the Court noted that plaintiffs in discrimination cases should not be required to prove but-for cause to prevail.

The introduction to the Professor Chamallas concurrence correctly notes many of the rewritten opinion’s strengths. Professor Chamallas provides richer detail about the facts underlying the case and the context in …

Teaching The Lochner Era, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This article, prepared for the St. Louis University Law Journal's issue on “Teaching the Fourteenth Amendment,” develops a taxonomy of the Supreme Court's economic substantive due process jurisprudence during the so-called “Lochner Era” of the late-19th and early-20th centuries, and offers an assessment of the trajectory and mechanisms of the decline of that body of doctrine.

The Limits Of Natural Law Originalism, Mikolaj Barczentewicz

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh outline how originalism in constitutional interpretation can be grounded in modern natural law theory as developed by John Finnis. Their argument to that effect is powerful and constitutes a welcome addition both to natural law theory and to originalist theory. However, the authors chose to present their account as a superior alternative to, or modification of, the “positive” (“original law”) originalism of Stephen Sachs and William Baude. It is that aspect of the paper that I focus on in this short Essay. Contrary to their strong claims in that direction, …

The Canon Of Rational Basis Review, Katie R. Eyer

Notre Dame Law Review

The modern constitutional law canon fundamentally misdescribes rational basis review. Through a series of errors—of omission, simplification, and recharacterization—we have largely erased a robust history of the use of rational basis review by social movements to generate constitutional change. Instead, the story the canon tells is one of dismal prospects for challengers of government action—in which rational basis review is an empty, almost meaningless form of review.

This Article suggests that far from the weak and ineffectual mechanism that most contemporary accounts suggest, rational basis review has, in the modern era, served as one of the primary equal protection entry …

Originalism, Cass R. Sunstein

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism might be defended on two very different grounds. The first is that it is in some sense mandatory—for example, that it follows from the very idea of interpretation, from having a written Constitution, or from the only legitimate justifications for judicial review. The second is that originalism is best on broadly consequentialist grounds. While the first kind of defense is not convincing, the second cannot be ruled off limits. In an imaginable world, it is right; in our world, it is usually not. But in the context of impeachment, originalism is indeed best, because there are no sufficiently helpful …

Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications Of A Neglected History, Randy Beck

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court concluded twenty-five years ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that uninjured private plaintiffs may not litigate “generalized grievances” about the legality of executive branch conduct. According to the Lujan Court, Congress lacked power to authorize suit by a plaintiff who could not establish some “particularized” injury from the challenged conduct. The Court believed litigation to require executive branch legal compliance, brought by an uninjured private party, is not a “case” or “controversy” within the Article III judicial power and impermissibly reassigns the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Notre Dame Law Review

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this …

Irreconcilable Differences? Whole Woman’S Health, Gonzales, And Justice Kennedy’S Vision Of American Abortion Jurisprudence, O. Carter Snead, Laura Wolk

Journal Articles

A law is unconstitutional if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' Twenty-five years have elapsed since a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated this undue burden standard in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, yet its contours remain elusive. Notably, two current members of the Court-Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy-seem to fundamentally differ in their understanding of what Casey requires and permits. In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy emphasized a wide range of permissible state interests implicated by abortion and indicated …

A New Deal Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored By Justice Robert Jackson, Charles Patrick Thomas

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

The Case Against Oral Argument: The Effects Of Confirmation Bias On The Outcome Of Selected Cases In The Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals, Christine M. Venter

Journal Articles

Scholars have long been divided over the role, function, and significance, if any, of oral argument in judicial decision-making.' Federal courts seem similarly divided, as some circuits routinely grant oral argument in almost every case, while others grant oral argument in only a small fraction of appeals. This divide should not be dismissed as merely an idiosyncratic debate or as a response to excessive workload, particularly when one considers that approximately 53,000 appeals were filed in federal courts of appeals in the year ending September 30, 2016.2 Since the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only approximately eighty cases each year, …

Dead Precedents, Riley T. Svikhart

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Part I explores the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents more thoroughly. Part II provides a modest account for this phenomenon. Section II.A considers the relationship between the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents and its law declaration bent. Section II.B evaluates this reluctance in light of the doctrinal commitment of stare decisis. Finally, Section II.C examines the link between the Roberts Court’s treatment of dying precedents and its trademark adherence to the constitutional avoidance doctrine.

Interview With Christoph Möllers: On The Possibilities And Afacticity Of Norms, Christoph Moellers

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

Christoph Möllers, Professor of Public Law and Jurisprudence at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, discussed his recent book, The Possibility of Norms, and related concepts of jurisprudence on June 16, 2016 with Alex Holznienkemper, Ph.D. of Baylor University. The following is an edited transcript of their interview as translated by Dr. Holznienkemper.

The Exceptional Role Of Courts In The Constitutional Order, N.W. Barber, Adrian Vermeule

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article looks at a rare part of the judicial role: those exceptional cases when the judge is called upon to pass judgment on the constitution itself. This arises in three groups of cases, roughly speaking. First, in exceptional cases the validity of the constitution and the legal order is thrown into dispute. Second, on some occasions the judge is asked to rule on the transition from one constitutional order to another. Third, there are some cases in which the health of the constitutional order requires the judge to act not merely beyond the law, as it were, but actually …

Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously In The Judicial Enforcement Of Economic And Social Rights, Richard Stacey

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

The international human rights revolution in the decades after the Second World War recognized economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966, regional treaties, and subject-specific treaties variously describe rights to food, shelter, health, and education, and set out state obligations for the treatment of children. When they first appeared, these international, economic, and social rights instruments raised questions about whether economic and social rights are justiciable in domestic legal contexts and whether they can be meaningfully enforced by courts …

Truth And Politics: A Symposium On Peter Simpson's Political Illiberalism: A Defense Of Freedom., Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

There is no more important question in thinking about life-and actually living-in political community than whether it is to be permeated by, and purposefully oriented around, the main truths about human flourishing. It is at least paradoxical that, precisely when the state and its law and political life are shaping people's lives more and more, the professed roots of all this influence are growing thinner, more shallow. Lawmakers who profess and in many cases even think they should be "neutral" about values are more involved with how persons' lives go than, perhaps, ever before.

Of course, any community which has …

Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay reviews John Dickinson’s neglected classic, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States. Writing on the cusp of the New Deal, Dickinson helped establish a mainstream, moderate stance about the shape and legitimacy of the administrative state. A closer reading of this work, which is rich in jurisprudential reflection and historical learning, offers a better idea about the structure, promise, and limits of the doctrinal world he helped create.

The Unconscionable War On Moral Conscience, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Notre Dame Law Review

My thesis in this review builds on and is inspired in part by George’s book: Where, or to the extent that, a conflict between conscience and authority reduces to a pure stand on principle by each side—sincere conscience for its sake versus authority for its—in a free society conscience should almost always win. The only time that claims of government authority should triumph over genuine claims of religious conscience is when religiously motivated conduct would produce essentially intolerable harm to others—harm of a kind and degree that would lead one to conclude (in effect, not literally) that it is inconceivable …

Inside The Taft Court: Lessons From The Docket Books, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

For many years, the docket books kept by certain of the Taft Court Justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Though the existence of these docket books had been brought to the attention of the scholarly community, access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a review of all of the Taft Court docket books held by the Office of the Curator, which are the only …

Realising The Promise Of Costs Budgets: An Economic Analysis, Jay Tidmarsh

Journal Articles

The costs-budget system implemented in the Jackson reforms promises to keep litigation costs within socially appropriate bounds. To realise this promise fully however; the goal of this reform must be reoriented. Using real-options analysis, this article demonstrates that costs budgeting in its present form often fails to achieve a reduction of litigation costs to the socially appropriate level–defined to be the point at which the social benefits of litigation exceeds its costs–because parties may have a private incentive to invest socially excessive amounts on litigation. This result is true under both the English ("loser pays") and the American ("bear your …

Judicial Candor And Extralegal Reasoning: Why Extralegal Reasons Require Legal Justifications (And No More), Eric Dean Hageman

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note’s first Part explores two landmark Supreme Court cases, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and NFIB, that may have been decided based on extralegal considerations. Part II describes three prominent theories of judicial candor with an eye to the results they might yield with respect to extralegal reasoning. Part III offers and defends a new, partial theory of judicial candor. This theory is that a judge who employs extralegal reasoning should omit discussion of her reliance on that reasoning and justify her decision with legal reasoning.

The first two Parts will demonstrate that there is a …