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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Sotomayor's Empathy Moves The Court A Step Closer To Equitable Adjudication, Veronica Couzo
Sotomayor's Empathy Moves The Court A Step Closer To Equitable Adjudication, Veronica Couzo
Notre Dame Law Review
On August 6, 2009, then-Judge, now-Justice, Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed as the nation’s first Latina Supreme Court Justice. While many Latinos embraced the idea of having “Sonia from the Bronx” on the bench, others were fearful that her jurisprudence, combined with her background, would result in “reverse racism.” These fears, while arguably unfounded at the time, have been completely dispelled. Just as Justice Thurgood Marshall transformed the adjudications of the Supreme Court through experiential discourse, so too, to a lesser extent, has Justice Sotomayor. In both oral arguments and written opinions, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has demonstrated educative leadership—enlightening her colleagues …
Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, Michael B. Rappaport
Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, Michael B. Rappaport
Notre Dame Law Review
In this Article, I challenge the claim that the original meaning clearly allows the states to engage in affirmative action. I argue that the original meaning does not plainly establish that affirmative action by the states is constitutional. Instead, there is, at the least, a reasonable argument to be made that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional. In fact, based on the available evidence, I believe that the case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning prohibits affirmative action as to laws within its scope is stronger than the case for concluding that it allows affirmative action. I do …
Precedent And Jurisprudential Disagreement, Amy Coney Barrett
Precedent And Jurisprudential Disagreement, Amy Coney Barrett
Journal Articles
This Article, a contribution to a symposium on constitutional foundations, maintains that an unappreciated function of stare decisis is that of referee between competing visions of the Constitution. Stare decisis is styled as a doctrine of error-correction, but in controversial cases, "error" is often a stand-in for disagreement about first principles. In these cases, stare decisis functions less to guide the business of correcting mistakes — a conception that oversimplifies the reality of pluralism on the Court — than to mediate intense disputes about the Court’s role in interpreting the Constitution. Identifying this function of stare decisis offers a different …
The History Of International Adjudication, Mary O'Connell, Lenore Vanderzee
The History Of International Adjudication, Mary O'Connell, Lenore Vanderzee
Book Chapters
This chapter on the history of international adjudication will show that courts and tribunals have been part of international law since the emergence of modern international law with the rise of the state system in the mid-seventeenth century. Courts and their role within international law have also been a persistent part of the theoretical debates about the nature of international law. From an early emphasis on arbitration, support grew for the creation of courts with general compulsory jurisdiction. By the late twentieth century, the theoretical trend shifted toward interest in courts with special subject matter jurisdiction, including human rights, trade, …
Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method And The Path Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel
Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method And The Path Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel
Journal Articles
Constitutional precedents give rise to a jurisprudential tug-of-war. On one side is the value of adhering to precedent and allowing the law to remain settled. On the other side is the value of departing from precedent and allowing the law to improve. In this Article, I contend that negotiating the tension depends on bridging the divide between constitutional precedent and interpretive method. My aim is to analyze the ways in which theories of precedent are, and are not, derivative of overarching methods of constitutional interpretation. I seek to demonstrate that although certain consequences of deviating from precedent can be studied …