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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Moral Limits On Morals Legislation: Lessons For U.S. Constitutional Law From The Declaration On Religious Freedom, Gregory A. Kalscheur S.J.
Moral Limits On Morals Legislation: Lessons For U.S. Constitutional Law From The Declaration On Religious Freedom, Gregory A. Kalscheur S.J.
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.
A persistent American confusion regarding the proper relationship between law and morality is manifest in the opinions in Lawrence v. Texas. The Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom provides the foundation for an analytical framework that can bring clarity to that confusion. The heart of this framework is the moral concept of public order. This concept offers a principled explanation of both the holding in Lawrence and the limitations the Court placed on that holding. The Court could clarify the confusion manifest in Lawrence by explicitly acknowledging that a state interest only becomes legitimate for purposes of rational basis …
The Hollowness Of The Harm Principle, Steven D. Smith
The Hollowness Of The Harm Principle, Steven D. Smith
Steven D. Smith
Among the various instruments in the toolbox of liberalism, the so-called “harm principle,” presented as the central thesis of John Stuart Mill’s classic On Liberty, has been one of the most popular. The harm principle has been widely embraced and invoked in both academic and popular debate about a variety of issues ranging from obscenity to drug regulation to abortion to same-sex marriage, and its influence is discernible in legal arguments and judicial opinions as well. Despite the principle’s apparent irresistibility, this essay argues that the principle is hollow. It is an empty vessel, alluring but without any inherent legal …
The Tenuous Case For Conscience, Steven D. Smith
The Tenuous Case For Conscience, Steven D. Smith
Steven D. Smith
If there is any single theme that has provided the foundation of modern liberalism and has infused our more specific constitutional commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of speech, that theme is probably “freedom of conscience.” But some observers also perceive a progressive cheapening of conscience– even a sort of degradation. Such criticisms suggest the need for a contemporary rethinking of conscience. When we reverently invoke “conscience,” do we have any idea what we are talking about? Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what “conscience” is or why it …
A Comment On "Legisprudence", Vlad F. Perju
The Jurisprudence Of Dignity, Leslie Meltzer Henry
The Jurisprudence Of Dignity, Leslie Meltzer Henry
Leslie Meltzer Henry
Few words play a more central role in modern constitutional law without appearing in the Constitution than dignity. The term appears in nearly one thousand Supreme Court opinions, but despite its popularity, dignity is a concept in disarray. Its meaning and functions are commonly presupposed, but rarely articulated. The result is a cacophony of uses so confusing that some critics argue that word ought to be abandoned altogether. This Article fills a void in the literature by offering the first empirical study of Supreme Court opinions that invoke dignity, and then proposing a typology of dignity based on a Wittgensteinian …
The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, And The Ends Of Good Government: A Reply To Professor Randy Barnett, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, And The Ends Of Good Government: A Reply To Professor Randy Barnett, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
Working Paper Series
Randy Barnett has recently argued that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it is an improper regulation under the Necessary and Proper Clause (in conjunction with the Commerce Clause) because it improperly "commandeers" the people and thereby violates their sovereignty. In this paper, I counter that the argument from sovereignty is unavailing because it is, among other defects, hopelessly ambiguous. The variety of historically attested meanings of "sovereignty" renders the concept useless for purposes of answering questions of comparative authority, including the authority of the Congress to mandate that individuals purchase health insurance from a private market. There is no …
Resolving The Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims For Nominal Damages, James E. Pfander
Resolving The Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims For Nominal Damages, James E. Pfander
Faculty Working Papers
Scholars have criticized the Court's qualified immunity decision in Pearson v. Callahan on the ground that it may lead to stagnation in the judicial elaboration of constitutional norms. Under current law, officers sued in their personal capacity for constitutional torts enjoy qualified immunity from liability unless the plaintiff can persuade the court that the conduct in question violated clearly established law. Pearson permits the lower courts to dismiss on the basis of legal uncertainty; it no longer requires the courts to address the merits of the constitutional question. This essay suggests that constitutional tort claimants should be permitted to avoid …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
Children's Oppression, Rights And Liberation, Samantha Godwin
Children's Oppression, Rights And Liberation, Samantha Godwin
Samantha Godwin
This paper advances a radical and controversial analysis of the legal status of children. I argue that the denial of equal rights and equal protection to children under the law is inconsistent with liberal and progressive beliefs about social justice and fairness. In order to do this I first situate children’s legal and social status in its historical context, examining popular assumptions about children and their rights, and expose the false necessity of children’s current legal status. I then offer a philosophical analysis for why children’s present subordination is unjust, and an explanation of how society could be sensibly and …
Advice And Consent Vs. Silence And Dissent? The Contrasting Roles Of The Legislature In U.S. And U.K. Judicial Appointments, Mary Clark
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The Senate‘s role in judicial appointments has come under increasingly withering criticism for its uninformative and spectacle-like nature. At the same time, Britain has established two new judicial appointment processes - to accompany its new Supreme Court and existing lower courts - in which Parliament plays no role. This Article seeks to understand the reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of the legislature in the U.S. and U.K. judicial appointment processes adopted at the creation of their respective Supreme Courts.
The Article proceeds by highlighting the ideas and concerns motivating inclusion of the legislature in judicial appointments in the early …