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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence: A Descriptive And Normative Analysis Of Law, Christopher P. Portman
Jurisprudence: A Descriptive And Normative Analysis Of Law, Christopher P. Portman
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of Law by Anthony D'Amato
Rising Above Principle, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
Rising Above Principle, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
What A Sensible Natural Lawyer And A Sensible Utilitarian Agree About And Disagree About: Comments On Finnis, Donald H. Regan
What A Sensible Natural Lawyer And A Sensible Utilitarian Agree About And Disagree About: Comments On Finnis, Donald H. Regan
Articles
Before I start, let me say two things. First of all, to the extent that John Finnis is entering a plea for more attention to what is a relatively neglected tradition (in the narrow his message a hundred percent. And you courd learning about the natural law tradition than by reading his book, Natural Law and Natural Rights. My second introductory observation is that Finnis and I agree about many more things than you might expect if you just think of him as a natural law theorist and me as a utilitarian. I am very eccentric as a utilitarian. He …
Law's Halo, Donald H. Regan
Law's Halo, Donald H. Regan
Articles
Like many people these days, I believe there is no general moral obligation to obey the law. I shall explain why there is no such moral obligation - and I shall clarify what I mean when I say there is no moral obligation to obey the law - as we proceed. But also like many people, I am unhappy with a position that would say there was no moral obligation to obey the law and then say no more about the law's moral significance. In our thinking about law in a reasonably just society, we have a strong inclination to …
The Ninth Amendment: Source Of A Substantive Right To Privacy, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 959 (1986), Gerald G. Watson
The Ninth Amendment: Source Of A Substantive Right To Privacy, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 959 (1986), Gerald G. Watson
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.
Alternative Methodologies In Contemporary Jurisprudence: Comments On Dworkin, Philip E. Soper
Alternative Methodologies In Contemporary Jurisprudence: Comments On Dworkin, Philip E. Soper
Articles
I have two brief points to make. Both involve recent developments in jurisprudence, by which I mean by and large the subject that Ronald Dworkin has just been discussing. Indeed, the first point is little more than an acknowledgement of the debt that is owed to Dworkin, not only for his specific contributions to this field, but for the implications of his work for law teaching generally.