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Legal Studies

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Legal Philosophy

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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

The Normativity Of Copying In Copyright Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh Nov 2012

The Normativity Of Copying In Copyright Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Not all copying constitutes copyright infringement. Quite independent of fair use, copyright law requires that an act of copying be qualitatively and quantitatively significant enough or “substantially similar” for it to be actionable. Originating in the nineteenth century, and entirely the creation of courts, copyright’s requirement of “substantial similarity” has thus far received little attention as an independently meaningful normative dimension of the copyright entitlement. This Article offers a novel theory for copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement by placing it firmly at the center of the institution and its various goals and purposes. As a common-law-style device that mirrors the ...


Punishment As Contract, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 2011

Punishment As Contract, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper provides a sketch of a contractarian approach to punishment, according to a version of contractarianism one might call “rational contractarianism,” by contrast with the normative contractarianism of John Rawls. Rational contractarianism suggests a model according to which rational agents, with maximal, rather than minimal, knowledge of their life circumstances, would agree to the outlines of a particular social institution or set of social institutions because they view themselves as faring best in such a society governed by such institutions, as compared with a society governed by different institutional schemes available for adoption. Applied to the institution of punishment ...


What Will Our Future Look Like And How Will We Respond?, Michael A. Fitts Jan 2011

What Will Our Future Look Like And How Will We Respond?, Michael A. Fitts

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


James Wilson And The Scottish Enlightenment, William Ewald Apr 2010

James Wilson And The Scottish Enlightenment, William Ewald

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


James Wilson And The Drafting Of The Constitution, William Ewald Jun 2008

James Wilson And The Drafting Of The Constitution, William Ewald

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Disadvantages Of Immigration Restriction As A Policy To Improve Income Distribution, Howard F. Chang Jan 2008

The Disadvantages Of Immigration Restriction As A Policy To Improve Income Distribution, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this Article, I argue that tax and transfer policies are more efficient than immigration restrictions as instruments for raising the after tax incomes of the least skilled native workers. Policies to protect these native workers frol1'l immigrant competition in the labor market do no better at promoting distributive justice and are likely to impose a greater economic burden on natives in the country of immigration than the tax alternative. These immigration restrictions are especially costly given the disproportionate burden that they place on households with working women, which discourages fel1'wle participation in the labor force. This burden ...


The Rhetoric Of Anti-Relativism In A Culture Of Certainty, Howard Lesnick Jan 2007

The Rhetoric Of Anti-Relativism In A Culture Of Certainty, Howard Lesnick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


A Contractarian Argument Against The Death Penalty, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Oct 2006

A Contractarian Argument Against The Death Penalty, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Opponents of the death penalty typically base their opposition on contingent features of its administration, arguing that the death penalty is applied discriminatory, that the innocent are sometimes executed, or that there is insufficient evidence of the death penalty’s deterrent efficacy. Implicit in these arguments is the suggestion that if these contingencies did not obtain, serious moral objections to the death penalty would be misplaced. In this Article, Professor Finkelstein argues that there are grounds for opposing the death penalty even in the absence of such contingent factors. She proceeds by arguing that neither of the two prevailing theories ...


Hart On Social Rules And The Foundations Of Law: Liberating The Internal Point Of View, Stephen R. Perry Jan 2006

Hart On Social Rules And The Foundations Of Law: Liberating The Internal Point Of View, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Government Regulation Of Irrationality: Moral And Cognitive Hazards, Jonathan Klick, Gregory Mitchell Jan 2006

Government Regulation Of Irrationality: Moral And Cognitive Hazards, Jonathan Klick, Gregory Mitchell

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


What Personal Rules Can Teach Us About Basic Institutions, Claire O. Finkelstein Jan 2005

What Personal Rules Can Teach Us About Basic Institutions, Claire O. Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Functional Law And Economics: The Search For Value-Neutral Principles Of Lawmaking, Francesco Parisi, Jonathan Klick Jan 2004

Functional Law And Economics: The Search For Value-Neutral Principles Of Lawmaking, Francesco Parisi, Jonathan Klick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Virtues Of Uncertainty In Law: An Experimental Approach, Tom Baker, Alon Harel, Tamar Kugler Jan 2004

The Virtues Of Uncertainty In Law: An Experimental Approach, Tom Baker, Alon Harel, Tamar Kugler

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Implications Of Transition Theory For Stare Decisis, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2003

The Implications Of Transition Theory For Stare Decisis, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Harm, History, And Counterfactuals, Stephen R. Perry Jan 2003

Harm, History, And Counterfactuals, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal Law-Values And Criminal Procedure: The Case Of Alford And Nolo Contendere Pleas, Stephanos Bibas Jan 2003

Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal Law-Values And Criminal Procedure: The Case Of Alford And Nolo Contendere Pleas, Stephanos Bibas

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Right To Remain Silent Helps Only The Guilty, Stephanos Bibas Jan 2003

The Right To Remain Silent Helps Only The Guilty, Stephanos Bibas

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Method And Principle In Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry Jan 2002

Method And Principle In Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Inefficiency Of Mens Rea, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 2000

The Inefficiency Of Mens Rea, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


When The Rule Swallows The Exception, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 2000

When The Rule Swallows The Exception, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Possibility Of A Fair Paretian, Howard F. Chang Jan 2000

The Possibility Of A Fair Paretian, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Hazards Of Legal Fine Tuning: Confronting The Free Will Problem In Election Law Scholarship, Michael A. Fitts Jun 1999

The Hazards Of Legal Fine Tuning: Confronting The Free Will Problem In Election Law Scholarship, Michael A. Fitts

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


On The Obligation Of The State To Extend A Right Of Self-Defense To Its Citizens, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 1999

On The Obligation Of The State To Extend A Right Of Self-Defense To Its Citizens, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Threats And Preemptive Practices, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 1999

Threats And Preemptive Practices, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Preempting Oneself: The Right And The Duty To Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing, Leo Katz Jan 1999

Preempting Oneself: The Right And The Duty To Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing, Leo Katz

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Self-Defense As A Rational Excuse, Claire O. Finkelstein Jan 1996

Self-Defense As A Rational Excuse, Claire O. Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Duress: A Philosophical Account Of The Defense In Law, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 1995

Duress: A Philosophical Account Of The Defense In Law, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Case Against Statutes Of Limitations For Stolen Art, Stephanos Bibas Jan 1994

The Case Against Statutes Of Limitations For Stolen Art, Stephanos Bibas

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes On Civic Republicanism, Michael A. Fitts Jan 1988

Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes On Civic Republicanism, Michael A. Fitts

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, William Ewald Jan 1988

Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, William Ewald

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Of all the scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, none has garnered greater attention or higher praise than Roberto Unger of Harvard Law School. In this Article, William Ewald argues that Professor Unger's reputation as a brilliant philosopher of law is undeserved. Despite the seeming erudition of his books, Professor Unger's work displays little familiarity with the basic philosophical literature, and the philosophical, legal, and political analysis in those works-in particular, the celebrated critique of liberalism in Knowledge and Politics-is so riddled with logical and historical errors as to be unworthy of serious scholarly attention.