Jurisprudence Commons^™

Obergefell V. Hodges: How The Supreme Court Should Have Ruled, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

In Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion legalizing same-sex marriage was based on “the mystical aphorisms of a fortune cookie,” and “indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.” Kennedy’s opinion was comprised largely of philosophical ramblings about liberty that have neither a constitutional foundation nor any conceptual limitation. The fictional opinion below arrives at the same conclusion, but the reasoning is based on equal protection rather than due process principles. The majority opinion holds that same-sex marriage bans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they: (1) discriminate on the basis of gender; (2) promote gender-based stereotypes; and …

Equal Protection; State Alimony Statutes; Sex Discrimination; Orr V. Orr, David A. Detec, Jane L. Thomas-Moore

Akron Law Review

In Orr v. Orr the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Alabama alimony statutes which provided that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce. The Court's principal reason for so holding was the statutes' violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment on the basis of sex discrimination.

Justice Kennedy's Decision In Obergefell: A Sad Day For The Judiciary, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marriage under the Equal Protection Clause, not under Justice Kennedy’s self-serving and ever-changing definition of liberty. The long-term impact of Kennedy’s decision will be to the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests “upon the respect accorded to its judgments,” which is based on the perception—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases according to the Constitution and law.” Justice Kennedy’s decision eschewed these values, giving the Court the power to discover “new dimensions of freedom,” and to ensure that all citizens, through …

Fundamental Unenumerated Rights Under The Ninth Amendment And Privileges Or Immunities Clause, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

The failure to link the Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of creating unenumerated fundamental rights has been a persistent but rarely discussed aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence. That should change. There need not be an ongoing tension between the Court’s counter-majoritarian role and the authority of states to govern through the democratic process. If the Constitution’s text gives the Court a solid foundation upon which to recognize new rights and thereby create a more just society, then the exercise of that power is fundamentally democratic. The Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that …

Justice-As-Fairness As Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls And The Warren Court, Michael Anthony Lawrence

Michael Anthony Lawrence

This Article looks back to the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the years 1953-1969 when Earl Warren served as Chief Justice, a period marked by numerous landmark rulings in the areas of racial justice, criminal procedure, reproductive autonomy, First Amendment freedom of speech, association and religion, voting rights, and more. The Article further discusses the constitutional bases for the Warren Court’s decisions, principally the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process clauses.

The Article explains that the Warren Court’s equity-based jurisprudence closely resembles, at its root, the “justice-as-fairness” approach promoted in John Rawls’s monumental 1971 work, A Theory of …

The Ironies Of Affirmative Action, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s most recent confrontation with race-based affirmative action, Fisher v. University of Texas, did not live up to people’s expectations—or their fears. The Court did not explicitly change the current approach in any substantial way. It did, however, signal that it wants race-based affirmative action to be subject to real strict scrutiny, not the watered-down version featured in Grutter v. Bollinger. That is a significant signal, because under real strict scrutiny, almost all race-based affirmative action programs are likely unconstitutional. This is especially true given the conceptual framework the Court has created for such programs—the way …

A Deer In Headlights: The Supreme Court, Lgbt Rights, And Equal Protection, Nan D. Hunter

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this essay, I argue that the problems with how courts apply Equal Protection principles to classifications not already recognized as suspect reach beyond the most immediate example of sexual orientation. Three structural weaknesses drive the juridical reluctance to bring coherence to this body of law: two doctrinal and one theoretical. The first doctrinal problem is that the socio-political assumptions that the 1938 Supreme Court relied on in United States v. Carolene Products, Inc. to justify strict scrutiny for “discrete and insular minorities” have lost their validity. In part because of Roe v. Wade-induced PTSD, the courts have …