Jurisprudence Commons^™

Four Futures Of Chevron Deference, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

In two upcoming cases, the Supreme Court will consider whether to overturn the Chevron doctrine, which, since 1984, has required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of otherwise ambiguous statutes. In this short essay, I defend the proposition that, even on death’s door, Chevron deference is likely to be resurrected, and I offer a simple positive political theory model that helps explain why. The core insight of this model is that the prevailing approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law is politically contingent—that is, it is likely to represent an equilibrium that efficiently maximizes the Supreme Court’s …

Brief Of Amici Curiae Administrative And Federal Regulatory Law Professors In Support Of Respondents, Andrew F. Popper

Amicus Briefs

Amici write to address the first question presented: whether Chevron should be overruled. Properly understood, it should not. Chevron has been much discussed but not always understood. On the one hand, courts have sometimes misapplied the doctrine or failed to understand its legal foundations. On the other, courts and commentators alike have criticized Chevron, often as a result of such aggressive applications. This case provides an opportunity for the Court to clarify what Chevron does and does not entail, while reaffirming the essential role that judicial recognition of constitutionally delegated policymaking authority plays in federal statutory programs. Many of …

Brief Of Scholars Of Administrative Law And The Administrative Procedure Act As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Jeffrey Lubbers

Amicus Briefs

The principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law has been a pillar of this Court's administrative law doctrine for more than a century. This Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), formalized one version of that principle, creating the two-step framework that is now subject to a multifaceted attack. Among other things, Chevron's opponents argue that the doctrine is at odds with the original public meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. This is wrong, and the text and history of that landmark statute provide no basis for …

Stepification, Mitchell Chervu Johnston

Northwestern University Law Review

Multistep tests pervade the law to the point that they appear to be a fundamental feature of legal reasoning. Famous doctrines such as Chevron or qualified immunity take this form, as do more obscure doctrinal formulas. But surprisingly, these doctrinal formulations as a class are relatively new. The reality is that the intellectual moment that gave rise to Chevron was one in which multiple older doctrines that relied on multifactor balancing were replaced by new tests formulated as multistep inquiries in which each step was a discrete inquiry.

This Article provides the first historical and normative account of this phenomenon—which …

Taxing Combat, Samuel Kan

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

When you are being shot at or dodging landmines you are in a combat zone. Diplomatic niceties aside, these brave warriors are in danger because of the policies of their Government and we must take care of them. Quite frankly, we must act to insure that we do not have a repeat of what happened in Somalia. In Somalia, the families of the soldiers who lost their lives could not receive the benefits that should have gone to them under the Tax Code because the President never declared it a combat zone.

We don’t know exactly where we’re at in …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Notre Dame Law Review

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this …

The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than eighty cases per year. …

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not. Among …

Chevron'S Legacy, Justice Scalia's Two Enigmatic Dissents, And His Return To The Fold In City Of Arlington, Tex. V. Fcc, Stephen J. Leacock

Catholic University Law Review

The creation by the judiciary of the doctrine of Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ determinations, followed by the judiciary’s application and supervision of the Chevron deference doctrine in Administrative Law continue. Protection by the judiciary of the evolution of the doctrine also continues as an integral component of the judiciary’s contribution to the central objective of the three coequal branches of government to achieve for the United States a more perfect union. However, synergistic cooperation between the three branches in order to achieve that central objective requires that each branch honor its own constitutional obligation under the United States Constitution …

City Of Arlington V. Fcc: Jurisdictional Or Nonjurisdictional, Where To Draw The Line?, Whitney Ruijuan Hao

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Deferential Review Of The U.S. Tax Court, After Mayo Foundation V. United States (2011), Andre L. Smith

Andre L. Smith

Deferential Review of the U.S. Tax Court, After Mayo examines whether the Chevron doctrine requires federal circuit courts of appeal to deferentially review the U.S. Tax Court decisions of law. Mayo Foundation v. US (2011) rejects tax exceptionalism and requires the U.S. Tax Court to defer to Treasury regulations carrying the force of law. But Mayo avoids dealing with whether Chevron applies to appellate review of the Tax Court. In “The Fight Over ‘Fighting Regs’ and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation”, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 643 (2012), Professor Leandra Lederman (Indiana) contends that deference belongs to the agency and not …

Deciding Who Decides: Searching For A Deference Standard When Agencies Preempt State Law, John R. Ablan

John R Ablan

When a federal agency determines that the statute that it administers or regulations it has promulgated preempt state law, how much deference must a federal court give to that determination? In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide what standard of deference courts should apply when an agency makes a preemption determination pursuant to a specific congressional delegation to do so. Under this circumstance, this Article counsels against applying any single deference standard to an agency’s entire determination. Instead, it observes that preemption determinations are a complex inquiry involving questions of federal law, state law, and …

The Chevron Two-Step In Georgia's Administrative Law, David Shipley

Scholarly Works

The Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have long accepted the General Assembly’s authority to enact legislation that establishes administrative agencies and empowers those agencies to promulgate rules and regulations to implement their enabling statutes. In addition, the Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may authorize agencies to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Administrative agencies with broad powers enjoy a secure position under Georgia law.

Like federal and state administrative agencies throughout the nation, Georgia’s many boards, commissions and authorities make policy when they apply their governing statutes in promulgating regulations of general applicability, and in ruling on specific matters …

Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion In Statutory Interpretation, Frank H. Easterbrook

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation Of Conflict Adjudication In Erisa Benefit Claims Under The Guise Of Judicial Deference, Donald T. Bogan

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Textualism's Selective Canons Of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, And Deference To Executive Agencies, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Article demonstrates that textualist Judges, most notably Justices Scalia, Thomas, and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy, have applied some canons too aggressively, and slighted others. Textualist Judges have overused clear-statement rules that narrow statutory meaning, especially as a means to promote federalism and states' rights. On the other hand, textualists have neglected canons that promote individual liberty or executive authority Because canons must be applied on a case-by-case basis and different canons can conflict, it is impossible to formulate one rule for how they should be applied. Nevertheless, the common textualist approach of selectively favoring some canons at the …