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Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Judges
Why Judges Can't Save Democracy, Robert L. Tsai
Why Judges Can't Save Democracy, Robert L. Tsai
Faculty Scholarship
In The Specter of Dictatorship,1 David Driesen has written a learned, lively book about the dangers of autocracy, weaving together incisive observations about democratic backsliding in other countries with a piercing critique of American teetering on the brink of executive authoritarianism at home. Driesen draws deeply and faithfully on the extant literature on comparative constitutionalism and democracy studies. He also builds on the work of scholars of the American political system who have documented the largely one-way transfer of power over foreign affairs to the executive branch. Driesen's thesis has a slight originalist cast, holding that "the Founders aimed …
Judge James A. Wynn, Originalism, And The Juridical/Judicial Role, Michael E. Tigar
Judge James A. Wynn, Originalism, And The Juridical/Judicial Role, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos
Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos
Faculty Scholarship
This symposium poses a provocative question: Should judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political branches as a means of giving voice to the “will of the people”? The inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs of the political branches—a connection we argue is frayed, at best, in the current political context.
In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of our political system—ranging from representational distortions in federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan polarization and the behavior of elected officials—call into question whether political outcomes reliably …
Judges As Superheroes: The Danger Of Confusing Constitutional Decisions With Cosmic Battles, H. Jefferson Powell
Judges As Superheroes: The Danger Of Confusing Constitutional Decisions With Cosmic Battles, H. Jefferson Powell
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang
Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang
Faculty Scholarship
Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each ready to issue an injunction. But their injunctions may clash, ordering incompatible actions by the defendant. Each judge has written an opinion justifying her own intended relief, but the need to avoid conflicting injunctions presses her to make a further choice – “Should I issue the injunction or should I stay it for now?” Each must make this decision in anticipation of what the other will do.
This Article analyzes such a judicial coordination problem, drawing on recent examples including the DACA cases and the “sanctuary cities” cases. It then …
Theorizing The Judicialization Of International Relations, Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer
Theorizing The Judicialization Of International Relations, Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer
Faculty Scholarship
This article introduces a Thematic Section and theorizes the multiple ways that judicializing international relations shifts power away from national executives and legislatures toward litigants, judges, arbitrators, and other nonstate decision-makers. We identify two preconditions for judicialization to occur—(1) delegation to an adjudicatory body charged with applying designated legal rules, and (2) legal rights-claiming by actors who bring—or threaten to bring—a complaint to one or more of these bodies. We classify the adjudicatory bodies that do and do not contribute to judicializing international relations, including but not limited to international courts. We then explain how rights-claiming initiates a process for …
How Bayesian Are Judges?, Jack Knight, Mitu Gulati, David F. Levi
How Bayesian Are Judges?, Jack Knight, Mitu Gulati, David F. Levi
Faculty Scholarship
Richard Posner famously modeled judges as Bayesians in his book, How Judges Think? A key element of being Bayesian is that one constantly updates with new information. This model of the judge who is constantly learning and updating, particularly about local conditions, also is one of the reasons why the factual determinations of trial judges are given deference on appeal. But do judges in fact act like Bayesian updaters? Judicial evaluations of search warrant requests for probable cause provides an ideal setting to examine this question because the judges in this context have access to information on how well they …
Simplifying The Standard Of Review In North Carolina Administrative Appeals, Sarah H. Ludington
Simplifying The Standard Of Review In North Carolina Administrative Appeals, Sarah H. Ludington
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
What Happened In Iowa?, David Pozen
What Happened In Iowa?, David Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Reply to Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011).
November 2, 2010 is the latest milestone in the evolution of state judicial elections from sleepy, sterile affairs into meaningful political contests. Following an aggressive ouster campaign, voters in Iowa removed three supreme court justices, including the chief justice, who had joined an opinion finding a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution. Supporters of the campaign rallied around the mantra, “It’s we the people, not we the courts.” Voter turnout surged to unprecedented levels; the national …
The Conflicted Assumptions Of Modern Constitutional Law, H. Jefferson Powell
The Conflicted Assumptions Of Modern Constitutional Law, H. Jefferson Powell
Faculty Scholarship
Contribution to Symposium - The Nature of Judicial Authority: A Reflection on Philip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Duty
A Tale Of Two Paradigms: Judicial Review And Judicial Duty, Philip A. Hamburger
A Tale Of Two Paradigms: Judicial Review And Judicial Duty, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
What is the role of judges in holding government acts unconstitutional? The conventional paradigm is "judicial review." From this perspective, judges have a distinct power to review statutes and other government acts for their constitutionality. The historical evidence, however, reveals another paradigm, that of judicial duty. From this point of view, presented in my book Law and Judicial Duty, a judge has an office or duty, in all decisions, to exercise judgment in accord with the law of the land. On this understanding, there is no distinct power to review acts for their constitutionality, and what is called "judicial review" …
The Supreme Common Law Court Of The United States, Jack M. Beermann
The Supreme Common Law Court Of The United States, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. Supreme Court's primary role in the history of the United States, especially in constitutional cases (and cases hovering in the universe of the Constitution), has been to limit Congress's ability to redefine and redistribute rights in a direction most people would characterize as liberal. In other words, the Supreme Court, for most of the history of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a conservative force against change and redistribution. The Court has used five distinct devices to advance its control over the law. First, it has construed rights-creating constitutional provisions narrowly when those …
The Irony Of Judicial Elections, David E. Pozen
The Irony Of Judicial Elections, David E. Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Judicial elections in the United States have undergone a dramatic transformation. For more than a century, these state and local elections were relatively dignified, low-key affairs. Campaigning was minimal; incumbents almost always won; few people voted or cared. Over the past quarter century and especially the past decade, however, a rise in campaign spending, interest group involvement, and political speech has disturbed the traditional paradigm. In the "new era," as commentators have dubbed it, judicial races routinely feature intense competition, broad public participation, and high salience.
This Article takes the new era as an opportunity to advance our understanding of …
A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.
One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …
Law And Judicial Duty, Philip A. Hamburger
Law And Judicial Duty, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
Two hundred years ago, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall delivered an opinion that has come to dominate modern discussions of constitutional law. Faced with a conflict between an act of Congress and the U.S. Constitution, he explained what today is known as "judicial review." Marshall described judicial review in terms of a particular type of "superior law" and a particular type of "judicial duty." Rather than speak generally about the hierarchy within law, he focused on "written constitutions."
He declared that the U.S. Constitution is "a superior, paramount law" and that if "the constitution is superior to any …
Marbury And Judicial Deference: The Shadow Of Whittington V. Polk And The Maryland Judiciary Battle, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Marbury And Judicial Deference: The Shadow Of Whittington V. Polk And The Maryland Judiciary Battle, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
On the 200th anniversary of Whittington and approaching the 200th anniversary of Marbury, this article revisits these two decisions and challenges legal scholars' assumptions that they were such strong precedents for judicial review.5 When one takes into account the broader contexts, both decisions were in fact judicial capitulations to aggressive legislatures and executives. The Maryland General Court asserted its judicial supremacy only in dicta, and the court failed to enforce judicial supremacy when it was legally justified. This article picks apart the court's reasoning step by step, using Whittington to illuminate Marbury and Marbury to illuminate Whittington. …
Piercing The Veil: William J. Brennan's Account Of Regents Of The University Of California V. Bakke, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight
Piercing The Veil: William J. Brennan's Account Of Regents Of The University Of California V. Bakke, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Judicial Auditing, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley
Judicial Auditing, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, …
Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler
Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …
Choosing Judges The Democratic Way, Larry Yackle
Choosing Judges The Democratic Way, Larry Yackle
Faculty Scholarship
A generation ago, the pressing question in constitutional law was the countermajoritarian difficulty.' Americans insisted their government was a democratic republic and took that to mean rule by a majority of elected representatives in various offices and bodies, federal and local. Yet courts whose members had not won election presumed to override the actions of executive and legislative officers who had. The conventional answer to this apparent paradox was the Constitution, which arguably owed its existence to the people directly. Judicial review was justified, accordingly, when court decisions were rooted firmly in the particular text, structure, or historical backdrop of …
Apartheid And The South African Judiciary, Lawrence G. Baxter
Apartheid And The South African Judiciary, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan
Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan
Faculty Scholarship
My major difficulty with Professor Van Alstyne's paper is its incomplete character. In the end, he makes only two points: first, judges are authorized to apply "this Constitution," not to do justice; and second, judges should not lie about what they are doing. The danger is that after a while the first point sounds somewhat empty, while the actual content of the second point seems entirely parasitic on the first.