Judges Commons^™

Four Futures Of Chevron Deference, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

In two upcoming cases, the Supreme Court will consider whether to overturn the Chevron doctrine, which, since 1984, has required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of otherwise ambiguous statutes. In this short essay, I defend the proposition that, even on death’s door, Chevron deference is likely to be resurrected, and I offer a simple positive political theory model that helps explain why. The core insight of this model is that the prevailing approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law is politically contingent—that is, it is likely to represent an equilibrium that efficiently maximizes the Supreme Court’s …

Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr

Faculty Scholarship

The evidence rules have well-established, standard textual meanings—meanings that evidence professors teach their law students every year. Yet, despite the rules’ clarity, courts misapply them across a wide array of cases: Judges allow past acts to bypass the propensity prohibition, squeeze hearsay into facially inapplicable exceptions, and poke holes in supposedly ironclad privileges. And that’s just the beginning.

The evidence literature sees these misapplications as mistakes by inept trial judges. This Article takes a very different view. These “mistakes” are often not mistakes at all, but rather instances in which courts are intentionally bending the rules of evidence. Codified evidentiary …

Legal Clutter: How Concurring Opinions Create Unnecessary Confusion And Encourage Litigation, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

Good judges are clear writers. And clear writers avoid legal clutter. Legal clutter occurs when judges publish multiple individually written opinions that are neither useful nor necessary. This essay argues that concurring opinions are the worst form of legal clutter. Unlike majority opinions, concurring opinions are legal asides, musings of sorts—often by a single judge—that add length and confusion to an opinion often without adding meaningful value. Concurring opinions do not change the outcome of a case. Unlike dissenting opinions, they do not claim disagreement with the ultimate decision. Instead, concurring opinions merely offer an idea or viewpoint that failed …

Criminal Court System Failures During Covid-19: An Empirical Study, Cynthia Alkon

Faculty Scholarship

How did the criminal legal system respond to the early months of pandemic in 2020? This article reports the results of a unique national survey of judges, defense lawyers, and prosecutors that gives a snapshot of how the criminal legal system responded to the COVID-19 in the first five chaotic months. Criminal courts in the United States rely on in-person proceedings and formal and informal in-person communications to manage caseloads. The survey results detail, in ways not previously fully understood, how crucial these in-person communications are and how ill-prepared the criminal courts and legal professionals were to deal with the …

Taking Courthouse Discrimination Seriously: The Role Of Judges As Ethical Leaders, Susan Saab Fortney

Faculty Scholarship

Sexual misconduct allegations against Alex Kozinski, a once powerful judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9^th Circuit, spotlighted concerns related to sexual harassment in the judiciary. Following news reports related to the alleged misconduct, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. charged a working group with examining safeguards to deal with inappropriate conduct in the judicial workplace. Based on recommendations made in the Report of the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group, the Judicial Conference approved a number of reforms and improvements related to workplace conduct in the federal judiciary. The reforms included revising the Code of …

Endogenous And Dangerous, Brian N. Larson

Faculty Scholarship

Empirical studies show that courts frequently cite cases that the parties did not cite during briefing and oral arguments—endogenous cases. This Article shows the cognitive and rational dangers of endogenous cases and presents an empirical study of their use. I contend that judges should avoid using endogenous cases in their reasoning and opinions. This Article’s first significant contribution is to provide the first exhaustive treatment in the American legal literature of the rational bases upon which defeasible legal deductions and legal analogies may be built and the critical questions or defeaters that can weaken or bring them down. As far …

The Unbearable Emptiness Of Formalism: Autonomy, Equality, And The Future Of Affirmative Action, Rachel F. Moran

Faculty Scholarship

Debates over affirmative action in higher education generally focus on equality interests under the Fourteenth Amendment but ignore liberty interests under the First Amendment. That tendency persists, even though the academic freedom to enroll a diverse student body has allowed colleges and universities to defend race-conscious admissions programs against legal challenges for decades. Today, the rise of formalism in judicial interpretation poses new perils for these programs. Justice Powell’s seminal decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was a pragmatic compromise that used diversity to temper the polarized debate over equality that sharply divided the Court. In …

Precedent As Rational Persuasion, Brian N. Larson

Faculty Scholarship

The ways that judges and lawyers make and justify their arguments and decisions have profound impacts on our lives. Understanding those practices in light of theories of reasoning and argumentation is thus critical for understanding law and the society it shapes. An inquiry that explores the very foundations of all legal reasoning leads to a broad, important question: How do lawyers and judges use cited cases in their legal arguments? It turns out there is practically no empirical research to suggest the answer. As the first step in a comprehensive empirical effort to answer this question, this article performs a …

Litigating Epa Rules: A Fifty-Year Retrospective Of Environmental Rulemaking In The Courts, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Goodbye To Concurring Opinions, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

Modern Supreme Court opinions are too long. They are too fractured. And they often lack clarity. Separate opinions, particularly concurring opinions, are largely to blame. Today’s justices are more inclined to publish separate opinions than their predecessors.The justices do not want to read lengthy briefs but appear willing to publish lengthy opinions. Yet the justices owe us clarity. They should want the law to be understandable—and understood. In hopes of achieving greater legal clarity, this article calls for an end to concurring opinions.

The modern Court writes more separate opinions than past courts. It is becoming far too common that …

Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

How do we evaluate a Supreme Court that writes more than it decides? Despite having the lowest decisional output in the modern era, the Roberts Court is the most verbose Supreme Court in history. The current Justices are more likely than past Justices to have their individual say in cases, writing more concurring and dissenting opinions than prior Courts. These opinions are longer, often strongly worded, and rarely add clarity to the underlying decision. The Roberts Court has shifted from being a decisional body to becoming an institution that comments on more cases than it decides.

This article critiques the …

Supreme Verbosity: The Roberts Court's Expanding Legacy, Mary Margaret Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

The link between courts and the public is the written word. With rare exceptions, it is through judicial opinions that courts communicate with litigants, lawyers, other courts, and the community. Whatever the court’s statutory and constitutional status, the written word, in the end, is the source and the measure of the court’s authority.

It is therefore not enough that a decision be correct—it must also be fair and reasonable and readily understood. The burden of the judicial opinion is to explain and to persuade and to satisfy the world that the decision is principled and sound. What the court says, …

The Way Pavers: Eleven Supreme Court-Worthy Women, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

Four women have served as Associate Justices on the United States Supreme Court. Since the Court’s inception in 1789, 162 individuals have been nominated to serve as Supreme Court Justices. Five nominees, or roughly 3 percent, have been women. To help put this gender dearth in perspective, more men named “Samuel” have served as Supreme Court Justices than women. Thirteen U.S. Presidents have nominated more people to the Supreme Court than the total number of women that have served on the Court. Finally, there are currently more Catholics serving on the Supreme Court than the number of women appointed in …

Introduction: Perceived Legitimacy And The State Judiciary, G. Alexander Nunn

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Nunn provides an introduction for the Symposium: The Least Understood Branch: The Demands and Challenges of the State Judiciary.

Magistrate Judges, Settlement, And Procedural Justice, Nancy A. Welsh

Faculty Scholarship

This Article begins, in Part I, with an overview of magistrate judges’ history and role generally, including a discussion of the mechanism of “blind consent” that must be undertaken before a magistrate judge may conduct a trial. Part I then turns to magistrate judges’ role in settlement and ADR, outlines the procedural and ethical rules governing judges’ role in settlement, and highlights research revealing lawyers’ concerns regarding judges’ role in settlement. In Part II, the Article provides a brief overview of mediation in the federal courts and considers the relationship between judge-hosted settlement sessions and mediation. With this background regarding …

High Court Pretense, Lower Court Candor: Judicial Impartiality After Capterton V. Massey Coal Co., Lynne H. Rambo

Faculty Scholarship

Apolitical, impartial judging has always been our judicial ideal. In the last twenty years, however, special interest groups have sought power over (and through) judges by pouring millions into judicial elections, and the Court has recognized their first amendment right to do so. In the midst of this politicization of judicial elections, the Court five years ago reinforced the impartiality ideal, holding very broadly in Caperton v. Massey Coal Co. that it violates due process for a judge to sit whenever there is a “probability of bias,” i.e., whenever the average judge is unlikely to be neutral. Caperton involved a …

Ideology, Qualifications, And Covert Senate Obstruction Of Federal Court Nominations, Ryan J. Owens, Daniel E. Walters, Ryan C. Black, Anthony Madonna

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars, policymakers, and journalists have bemoaned the emphasis on ideology over qualifications and party over performance in the judicial appointment process. Though, for years, the acrimony between the two parties and between the Senate and President remained limited to appointments to the United States Supreme Court, the modern era of judicial appointments has seen the so-called “appointments rigor mortis” spread throughout all levels of judicial appointments. A host of studies have examined the causes and consequences of the growing acrimony and obstruction of lower federal court appointments, but few rely on archival data and empirical evidence to examine the underlying …