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Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman Dec 2003

Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the ...


Benin’S Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model For Enforcing Human Rights, Anna Rotman Nov 2003

Benin’S Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model For Enforcing Human Rights, Anna Rotman

ExpressO

This piece is based on field research the author conducted in Benin, West Africa during January 2003. The paper explores how the Court operates as a hybrid institution, by combining the competences traditionally associated with a constitutional court with the mandate of a national human rights commission. The paper argues that the Beninese Constitutional Court could provide an institutional model for guaranteeing human rights through a state-sponsored institution.


No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce The Legal System's Ability To Induce Efficient Behavior, Abraham Lee Wickelgren Aug 2003

No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce The Legal System's Ability To Induce Efficient Behavior, Abraham Lee Wickelgren

ExpressO

While there is widespread agreement that it is better for cases to settle than go to trial, the arguments in favor of settlement have typically overlooked how settlement affects one of the most important functions of the legal system: influencing the behavior that gives rise to lawsuits. This essay argues that, in some cases, settlement can impair the ability of the legal system to deter harmful behavior without chilling desirable behavior. Where it exists, this effect is a fundamental property of settlement in that there is no way to change other legal rules to eliminate it. Because settlements also have ...