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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Sweet Caroline: The Backslide From Federal Rule Of Evidence 613(B) To The Rule In Queen Caroline's Case, Katharine T. Schaffzin Jan 2014

Sweet Caroline: The Backslide From Federal Rule Of Evidence 613(B) To The Rule In Queen Caroline's Case, Katharine T. Schaffzin

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Since 1975, Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has governed the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement in federal court. Rule 613(b) requires the proponent of the prior inconsistent statement to provide the declarant an opportunity to explain or deny it. There is no requirement that the proponent provide that opportunity at any particular time or in any particular sequence. Rule 613 reflected a change from the common law that had fallen out of fashion in the federal courts. That common law rule, known as the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, required the proponent of …


The Confrontation Right Across The Systemic Divide, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2008

The Confrontation Right Across The Systemic Divide, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

In his notable work, Evidence Law Adrift, Mirjan Damaška identified three pillars of the common law system of determining facts in adjudication, and examined these through a comparative lens: the organisation of the trial court; the phenomenon of temporally compressed trials; and a high degree of control by parties and their counsel. In reviewing the book, I suggested that a strong concept of individual rights was another critical feature of the common law system, especially in its American variant and especially with respect to criminal defendants.

In this essay, I will explore how these four features play out in the …


Face To Face': Rediscovering The Right To Confront Prosecution Witnesses, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

Face To Face': Rediscovering The Right To Confront Prosecution Witnesses, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of an accused 'to confront the witnesses against him'. The United States Supreme Court has treated this Confrontation Clause as a broad but rather easily rebuttable rule against using hearsay on behalf of a criminal prosecution; with respect to most hearsay, the exclusionary rule is overcome if the court is persuaded that the statement is sufficiently reliable, and the court can reach that conclusion if the statement fits within a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception. This article argues that this framework should be abandoned. The clause should not be regarded …


No Link: The Jury And The Origins Of The Confrontation Right And The Hearsay Rule, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2002

No Link: The Jury And The Origins Of The Confrontation Right And The Hearsay Rule, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

The rule against hearsay has long been one of the most distinctive elements of the common law of evidence, and indeed— except for recent changes on the civil side in many jurisdictions— of the common law system of trial. Observers have long believed that the rule, like most of the other exclusionary rules of the common law of evidence, is "the child of the jury system". Though Edmund Morgan argued vigorously to the contrary, the received understanding is that the jury's inability to account satisfactorily for the defects of hearsay explains the rule. A famous, and perhaps seminal, expression of …


Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro Jan 1999

Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro

Articles

The following article is an edited version of the amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1998, in the case of Benjamin Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of Virginia (No. 98-5881). "This case raises important questions about the meaning of the confrontation clause, which has been a vital ingredient of the fair trial right for hundreds of years," Professor Richard Friedman and his co-authors say. "In particular, this case presents the Court with an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay." On June 10 the …


Prohibiting Nonaccess Testimony By Spouses: Does Lord Mansfield's Rule Protect Illegitimates?, Michigan Law Review Jun 1977

Prohibiting Nonaccess Testimony By Spouses: Does Lord Mansfield's Rule Protect Illegitimates?, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Not surprisingly, there has been widespread disagreement concerning the validity of the policies advanced in support of Lord Mansfield's Rule and the efficacy of the rule to promote those policies. This Note assesses the validity of this rule of evidence in order to determine whether it is the most appropriate method of safeguarding the interests affected by the litigation of legitimacy. First, the historical development and justifications for Lord Mansfield's Rule are identified, and, in section II, the extent of the current acceptance of the rule in the United States is delineated. Section III analyzes traditional arguments advanced in support …


Witnesses-Wife As Witness Against Husband In Prosecution Under Mann Act, James F. Gordy S. Ed. Feb 1950

Witnesses-Wife As Witness Against Husband In Prosecution Under Mann Act, James F. Gordy S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant was convicted of having transported his wife in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act. Defendant's wife testified to the various transportations which defendant had made of her and to her practicing of prostitution at their different destinations. Defendant contended that the trial court erred in permitting his wife, over his objection, to testify against him. On appeal, held, affirmed. So far as appellant's rights were concerned, the wife's testimony was competent evidence against him. Shores v. United States, (8th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 838.