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Expert evidence

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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Making Rule 23 Ideal: Using A Multifactor Test To Evaluate The Admissibility Of Evidence At Class Certification, Cianan M. Lesley Oct 2019

Making Rule 23 Ideal: Using A Multifactor Test To Evaluate The Admissibility Of Evidence At Class Certification, Cianan M. Lesley

Michigan Law Review

Circuit courts are split on whether and to what extent the Daubert standard should apply at class certification. Potential plaintiffs believe that application of Daubert would make it nearly impossible to obtain class certification. For potential defendants, the application of the standard is an important way to ensure that the certification process is fair. This Note examines the incentives underlying the push to apply the Daubert standard at class certification and the benefits and drawbacks associated with that proposal. It proposes a solution that balances the concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants by focusing on three factors: the obstacles to ...


Forensics, Chicken Soup, And Meteorites: A Tribute To Michael Risinger, Edward K. Cheng Jan 2018

Forensics, Chicken Soup, And Meteorites: A Tribute To Michael Risinger, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Michael Risinger's scholarship has had a profound impact on our field. And while his work has run the gamut in evidence law, I think it is clear that Michael's true love has always been expert evidence, and more specifically, forensics. So let me take a moment to revisit "an oldie but a goodie": his 1989 article entitled Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," published in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and co-authored with Mark Denbeaux and Michael Saks.' For those of you who have not read the article ...


Reliability Of Expert Evidence In International Disputes, Matthew W. Swinehart Jan 2017

Reliability Of Expert Evidence In International Disputes, Matthew W. Swinehart

Michigan Journal of International Law

Part I of this article traces the historical trends in the use of expert evidence in international disputes, from the scattered reliance on experts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the ubiquity of experts in modern disputes. With that perspective, Part II examines how decision makers have attempted to ensure reliability of the expert evidence that is flooding the evidentiary records of international disputes, while Part III outlines the many problems that still remain. Finally, Part IV proposes a non-exhaustive and nonbinding checklist of questions for analyzing the reliability of any type of expert evidence.


Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye Mar 2016

Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye

David Kaye

This article, part of a symposium on the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v. McVey, questions that court’s rationales for refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to psychiatric testimony about the retrieval of repressed memories. It also challenges the court’s use of a “personal observations” exception to the heightened scrutiny standard of Frye v. United States. It proposes that a better solution to problems of scientific and expert evidence would be to adopt a sliding scale that attends to the use to which the evidence is put and the degree to which it has been shown ...


The Increasing Use Of Challenges To Expert Evidence Under Daubert And Rule 702 In Patent Litigation, Douglas G. Smith Oct 2015

The Increasing Use Of Challenges To Expert Evidence Under Daubert And Rule 702 In Patent Litigation, Douglas G. Smith

Journal of Intellectual Property Law

No abstract provided.


A Simple Theory Of Complex Valuation, Anthony J. Casey, Julia Simon-Kerr May 2015

A Simple Theory Of Complex Valuation, Anthony J. Casey, Julia Simon-Kerr

Michigan Law Review

Complex valuations of assets, companies, government programs, damages, and the like cannot be done without expertise, yet judges routinely pick an arbitrary value that falls somewhere between the extreme numbers suggested by competing experts. This creates costly uncertainty and undermines the legitimacy of the court. Proposals to remedy this well-recognized difficulty have become increasingly convoluted. As a result, no solution has been effectively adopted and the problem persists. This Article suggests that the valuation dilemma stems from a misconception of the inquiry involved. Courts have treated valuation as its own special type of inquiry distinct from traditional fact-finding. We show ...


Why Judges Applying The Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About The Social, Institutional, And Rhetorical -- And Not Just The Methodological Aspects Of Science, Lewis H. Larue, David S. Caudill Sep 2014

Why Judges Applying The Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About The Social, Institutional, And Rhetorical -- And Not Just The Methodological Aspects Of Science, Lewis H. Larue, David S. Caudill

David S Caudill

In response to the claim that many judges are deficient in their understanding of scientific methodology, this Article identifies in recent cases (i) a pragmatic perspective on the part of federal appellate judges when they reverse trial judges who tend to idealize science (i.e., who do not appreciate the local and practical goals and limitations of science), and (ii) an educational model of judicial gatekeeping that results in reversal of trial judges who defer to the social authority of science (i.e., who mistake authority for reliability). Next, this Article observes that courts (in the cases it analyzes) are ...


Empiricism In Daubert And The California Supreme Court In Sargon, Robert Sanger Aug 2014

Empiricism In Daubert And The California Supreme Court In Sargon, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

California has become a Daubert state. In Sargon v. The University of Southern California, the California Supreme Court held that judges are the “gatekeepers” with regard to expert or scientific evidence in this state, just as has been the case in the federal system (and many other states) since the decision in Daubert. Now that California is avowedly a Daubert state, it is important to understand why courtroom evidence – scientific, expert or, for that matter, otherwise – is properly grounded in empiricism. Empiricism is the theory that knowledge is derived from experience. Understanding this empirical basis for both Daubert and Sargon ...


Adaptation And The Courtroom: Judging Climate Science, Kirsten Engel, Jonathan Overpeck Sep 2013

Adaptation And The Courtroom: Judging Climate Science, Kirsten Engel, Jonathan Overpeck

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

Climate science is increasingly showing up in courtroom disputes over the duty to adapt to climate change. While judges play a critical role in evaluating scientific evidence, they are not apt to be familiar with the basic methods of climate science nor with the role played by peer review, publication, and training of climate scientists. This Article is an attempt to educate the bench and the bar on the basics of the discipline of climate science, which we contend is a distinct scientific discipline. We propose a series of principles to guide a judge’s evaluation of the reliability and ...


A Match Made On Earth: Getting Real About Science And The Law, Susan Haack Jan 2013

A Match Made On Earth: Getting Real About Science And The Law, Susan Haack

Articles

Modern legal systems increasingly depend on scientific testimony; but they also need somehow to ensure, so far as possible, that fact-finders aren't misled by highly speculative, poorly-conducted, or dishonestly-presented science. The Critical Common-sensist understanding of science that the author has developed in Defending Science and elsewhere sheds some light on why these interactions between law and science have proven so problematic. But Ms. Acharya's approach to these difficult issues rests on a flawed conception of the supposed "scientific method, " and an idea of legal "legitimacy" too weak to bear the weight she places on it; and her claim ...


Brain Trauma, Pet Scans And Forensic Complexity, Jane Moriarty, Daniel Langleben, James Provenzale Dec 2012

Brain Trauma, Pet Scans And Forensic Complexity, Jane Moriarty, Daniel Langleben, James Provenzale

Jane Campbell Moriarty

Positron Emission Tomography (PET) is a medical imaging technique that can be used to show brain function. Courts have admitted PET scan evidence in cases involving brain damage, injury, toxic exposure, or illness ("brain trauma") and to support claims of diminished cognitive abilities and impulse control. Despite the limited data on the relationships between PET, brain trauma and behavior, many courts admit PET scan evidence without much critical analysis. This article examines the use of PET as proof of functional impairment and justification of abnormal behavior by explaining its diagnostic use and limitations, the limited support for claims of its ...


Mind Reading And The Art Of Drafting Medical Opinions In Veterans Benefits Claims, James Ridgway Jan 2012

Mind Reading And The Art Of Drafting Medical Opinions In Veterans Benefits Claims, James Ridgway

James D. Ridgway

Once upon a time, deciding veterans benefits claims was simple and logical, although not perfect. Prior to the institution of judicial review, when a veteran filed a disability claim, the relevant records would be gathered and given to a panel of medical and legal experts. The experts would each bring their own specialized knowledge to the discussion and issue a decision that applied medical science and applicable law to the facts of the case. Such decisions may well have been correct as to the science and the law, but they were impossible to verify in the absence of any stated ...


Judging, Expertise, And The Rule Of Law, Chad M. Oldfather Jan 2012

Judging, Expertise, And The Rule Of Law, Chad M. Oldfather

Washington University Law Review

We live in an era of hyper specialization. Professionals across a spectrum of fields focus on mastering and practicing in narrow subspecialties. This is hardly a surprise. As the scale of knowledge grows, it becomes increasingly difficult for any one person to stay on top of details and developments across a field, and specialization represents something of a natural division of labor. Law is no exception.

There already exists a relatively large body of literature outlining proposals for specialized courts and otherwise considering their perceived virtues. I seek in this Article to engage this literature in two ways. First, I ...


Don’T I Know You?: The Effect Of Prior Acquaintance/Familiarity On Witness Identification, James E. Coleman Jr., Theresa A. Newman, Neil Vidmar, Elizabeth Zoeller Jan 2012

Don’T I Know You?: The Effect Of Prior Acquaintance/Familiarity On Witness Identification, James E. Coleman Jr., Theresa A. Newman, Neil Vidmar, Elizabeth Zoeller

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, And Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, David A. Moran, Keith A. Findley, Patrick D. Barnes, Waney Squier Jan 2012

Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, And Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, David A. Moran, Keith A. Findley, Patrick D. Barnes, Waney Squier

Articles

In the past decade, the existence of shaken baby syndrome (SBS) has been called into serious question by biomechanical studies, the medical and legal literature, and the media. As a result of these questions, SBS has been renamed abusive head trauma (AHT). This is, however, primarily a terminological shift: like SBS, AHT refers to the two-part hypothesis that one can reliably diagnose shaking or abuse from three internal findings (subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and encephalopathy) and that one can identify the perpetrator based on the onset of symptoms. Over the past decade, we have learned that this hypothesis fits poorly ...


Who Must Testify To The Results Of A Forensic Laboratory Test? Bullcoming V. New Mexico, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2011

Who Must Testify To The Results Of A Forensic Laboratory Test? Bullcoming V. New Mexico, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Does the Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the reported test?


Raising The Standard For Expert Testimony: An Unwarranted Obstacle In Proving Claims Of Child Sexual Abuse In Dependency Hearings, Matthew J. Dulka Sep 2010

Raising The Standard For Expert Testimony: An Unwarranted Obstacle In Proving Claims Of Child Sexual Abuse In Dependency Hearings, Matthew J. Dulka

Golden Gate University Law Review

This comment will examine the Amber B. court's decision to characterize evidence provided by the mental health professionals as scientific evidence and not as expert opinion. Secondly, this comment will explore the desirability of imposing the scientific evidence standard, usually applied in criminal cases, to dependency hearings. Finally, this comment will discuss the implications of the Amber B. decision in light of the already present evidentiary difficulties of proving child sexual abuse claims and the social policy of protecting the welfare of the abused child.


The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome And The Criminal Courts, Deborah Tuerkheimer Jan 2009

The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome And The Criminal Courts, Deborah Tuerkheimer

Washington University Law Review

Every year in this country, hundreds of people are convicted of having shaken a baby, most often to death. In a prosecution paradigm without precedent, expert medical testimony is used to establish that a crime occurred, that the defendant caused the infant’s death by shaking, and that the shaking was sufficiently forceful to constitute depraved indifference to human life. Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) is, in essence, a medical diagnosis of murder, one based solely on the presence of a diagnostic triad: retinal bleeding, bleeding in the protective layer of the brain, and brain swelling. New scientific research has cast ...


Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage Of Science And Law, Susan Haack Jan 2009

Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage Of Science And Law, Susan Haack

Articles

No abstract provided.


Race, Genes And Justice: A Call To Reform The Presentation Of Forensic Dna Evidence In Criminal Trials, Jonathan Kahn Jan 2009

Race, Genes And Justice: A Call To Reform The Presentation Of Forensic Dna Evidence In Criminal Trials, Jonathan Kahn

Faculty Scholarship

The article considers how and when, if at all, is it appropriate to use race in presenting forensic DNA evidence in a court of law? This relatively straightforward question has been wholly overlooked by legal scholars. By pursuing it, this article promises to transform fundamentally the presentation forensic DNA evidence. Currently, it is standard practice for prosecutors to use race in presenting the odds that a given defendant's DNA matches DNA found at a crime scene. This article takes an interdisciplinary approach to question the validity of this widespread but largely uninterrogated practice. It examines how race came to ...


Of Truth, In Science And In Law, Susan Haack Jan 2008

Of Truth, In Science And In Law, Susan Haack

Articles

No abstract provided.


What's Wrong With Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay In Legal Epistemology, Susan Haack Jan 2008

What's Wrong With Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay In Legal Epistemology, Susan Haack

Articles

No abstract provided.


Can A Jury Believe My Eyes, And Should Courts Let Experts Tell Them Why Not? The Admissibility Of Expert Testimony On Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification In New York After People V. Young, Jody E. Frampton Apr 2007

Can A Jury Believe My Eyes, And Should Courts Let Experts Tell Them Why Not? The Admissibility Of Expert Testimony On Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification In New York After People V. Young, Jody E. Frampton

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.


Doctors & Juries, Philip G. Peters Jr. Jan 2007

Doctors & Juries, Philip G. Peters Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Physicians widely believe that jury verdicts are unfair. This Article tests that assumption by synthesizing three decades of jury research. Contrary to popular belief the data show that juries consistently sympathize more with doctors who are sued than with patients who sue them. Physicians win roughly half of the cases that expert reviewers believe physicians should lose and nearly all of the cases that experts feel physicians should win. Defendants and their hired experts, it turns out, are more successful than plaintiffs and their hired experts at persuading juries to reach verdicts contrary to the opinions of independent reviewers.


Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past And Present, Edward K. Cheng May 2006

Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past And Present, Edward K. Cheng

Michigan Law Review

For over twenty years, and particularly since the Supreme Court's Daubert decision in 1993, much ink has been spilled debating the problem of scientific evidence in the courts. Are jurors or, in the alternative, judges qualified to assess scientific reliability? Do courts really need to be concerned about "junk science"? What mechanisms can promote better decision making in scientific cases? Even a cursory scan of the literature shows the recent explosion of interest in these issues, precipitating new treatises, hundreds of articles, and countless conferences for judges, practitioners, and academics. To this literature, Professor Tal Golan adds Laws of ...


Squeezing Daubert Out Of The Picture, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Squeezing Daubert Out Of The Picture, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this essay, I will offer some thoughts on how we might reframe the issues governing the admissibility of expert evidence. My principal focus is not on any particular type of expert evidence but on broader questions: the extent to which we ought to rely on rulings of admissibility, the standards that should govern admissibility rulings, and the role of the trial and appellate courts in making those rulings. To some extent, I will concentrate on the context of criminal cases, but for the most part my conclusions apply in both civil and criminal litigation. Here are my conclusions: First ...


Why Judges Applying The Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About The Social, Institutional, And Rhetorical -- And Not Just The Methodological Aspects Of Science, Lewis H. Larue, David S. Caudill Jan 2003

Why Judges Applying The Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About The Social, Institutional, And Rhetorical -- And Not Just The Methodological Aspects Of Science, Lewis H. Larue, David S. Caudill

Scholarly Articles

In response to the claim that many judges are deficient in their understanding of scientific methodology, this Article identifies in recent cases (i) a pragmatic perspective on the part of federal appellate judges when they reverse trial judges who tend to idealize science (i.e., who do not appreciate the local and practical goals and limitations of science), and (ii) an educational model of judicial gatekeeping that results in reversal of trial judges who defer to the social authority of science (i.e., who mistake authority for reliability). Next, this Article observes that courts (in the cases it analyzes) are ...


Minimizing The Jury Over-Valuation Concern (Visions Of Rationality In Evidence Law Symposium), Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Minimizing The Jury Over-Valuation Concern (Visions Of Rationality In Evidence Law Symposium), Richard D. Friedman

Articles

A great deal of the rhetoric of evidence discourse concerns the supposed cognitive inadequacies of the jury. In various contexts we are told that although an item of evidence is probative, it must be excluded because the jury will give it too much weight. I believe this approach has played far too great a role in evidentiary law, and that it is an interesting project to see whether we can construct a satisfactory body of law without relying at all on the cognitive inadequacy argument. I think that, at least to a large extent, we can. In some settings, where ...


Expert Information And Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, Samuel R. Gross, Jennifer L. Mnookin Jan 2003

Expert Information And Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, Samuel R. Gross, Jennifer L. Mnookin

Articles

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 speaks in very general terms. It governs every situation in which "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," and provides that, in that situation, "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .' In 2000, following a trio of Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 702, the Rule was amended to include a third requirement, in addition to the helpfulness of the testimony and the qualifications of the witness: reliability. Under Rule 702 as amended, a qualified ...


A Three-Dimensional Model For The Use Of Expert Psychiatric And Psychological Evidence In False Confession Defenses Before The Trier Of Fact, Major Joshua E. Kastenberg Jan 2003

A Three-Dimensional Model For The Use Of Expert Psychiatric And Psychological Evidence In False Confession Defenses Before The Trier Of Fact, Major Joshua E. Kastenberg

Seattle University Law Review

Part I of this Article delineates a defendant's right to present voluntariness and credibility evidence against his or her confession. This section analyzes the basic constitutional framework of how a defendant can present this evidence and describes the traditional safeguards against false confessions. This background information provides a context for the overarching issue of expert testimony admissibility. Part II provides a basic understanding of differences between the psychiatric (medical model) and psychological (social model) approach to false confessions. It then examines the types of false confession defenses used by defendants and the interrogation techniques challenged by defendants. Part III ...