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Evidence Commons

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A Three-Dimensional Model For The Use Of Expert Psychiatric And Psychological Evidence In False Confession Defenses Before The Trier Of Fact, Major Joshua E. Kastenberg Jan 2003

A Three-Dimensional Model For The Use Of Expert Psychiatric And Psychological Evidence In False Confession Defenses Before The Trier Of Fact, Major Joshua E. Kastenberg

Seattle University Law Review

Part I of this Article delineates a defendant's right to present voluntariness and credibility evidence against his or her confession. This section analyzes the basic constitutional framework of how a defendant can present this evidence and describes the traditional safeguards against false confessions. This background information provides a context for the overarching issue of expert testimony admissibility. Part II provides a basic understanding of differences between the psychiatric (medical model) and psychological (social model) approach to false confessions. It then examines the types of false confession defenses used by defendants and the interrogation techniques challenged by defendants. Part III ...


Why Judges Applying The Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About The Social, Institutional, And Rhetorical -- And Not Just The Methodological Aspects Of Science, Lewis H. Larue, David S. Caudill Jan 2003

Why Judges Applying The Daubert Trilogy Need To Know About The Social, Institutional, And Rhetorical -- And Not Just The Methodological Aspects Of Science, Lewis H. Larue, David S. Caudill

Scholarly Articles

In response to the claim that many judges are deficient in their understanding of scientific methodology, this Article identifies in recent cases (i) a pragmatic perspective on the part of federal appellate judges when they reverse trial judges who tend to idealize science (i.e., who do not appreciate the local and practical goals and limitations of science), and (ii) an educational model of judicial gatekeeping that results in reversal of trial judges who defer to the social authority of science (i.e., who mistake authority for reliability). Next, this Article observes that courts (in the cases it analyzes) are ...


Squeezing Daubert Out Of The Picture, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Squeezing Daubert Out Of The Picture, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this essay, I will offer some thoughts on how we might reframe the issues governing the admissibility of expert evidence. My principal focus is not on any particular type of expert evidence but on broader questions: the extent to which we ought to rely on rulings of admissibility, the standards that should govern admissibility rulings, and the role of the trial and appellate courts in making those rulings. To some extent, I will concentrate on the context of criminal cases, but for the most part my conclusions apply in both civil and criminal litigation. Here are my conclusions: First ...


Expert Information And Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, Samuel R. Gross, Jennifer L. Mnookin Jan 2003

Expert Information And Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, Samuel R. Gross, Jennifer L. Mnookin

Articles

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 speaks in very general terms. It governs every situation in which "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," and provides that, in that situation, "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .' In 2000, following a trio of Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 702, the Rule was amended to include a third requirement, in addition to the helpfulness of the testimony and the qualifications of the witness: reliability. Under Rule 702 as amended, a qualified ...


Minimizing The Jury Over-Valuation Concern (Visions Of Rationality In Evidence Law Symposium), Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Minimizing The Jury Over-Valuation Concern (Visions Of Rationality In Evidence Law Symposium), Richard D. Friedman

Articles

A great deal of the rhetoric of evidence discourse concerns the supposed cognitive inadequacies of the jury. In various contexts we are told that although an item of evidence is probative, it must be excluded because the jury will give it too much weight. I believe this approach has played far too great a role in evidentiary law, and that it is an interesting project to see whether we can construct a satisfactory body of law without relying at all on the cognitive inadequacy argument. I think that, at least to a large extent, we can. In some settings, where ...