Evidence Commons^™

Symposium: Reimagining The Rules Of Evidence At 50, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Prior to the eighteenth century, cartographers would often fill uncharted areas of maps with sea monsters, other artwork, or even rank speculation—a phenomenon labeled “horror vacui,” or fear of empty spaces. For example, in Paolo Forlani’s world map of 1565, a yet to-be-discovered southern continent was depicted with anticipated mountain chains and animals. The possible explanations for horror vacui are varied, but one reason may have been a desire “to hide [the mapmakers’] ignorance.” Not until “maps began to be thought of as more purely scientific instruments . . . [did] cartographers . . . restrain their concern about spaces …

Introduction, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law Review

Prior to the eighteenth century, cartographers would often fill uncharted areas of maps with sea monsters, other artwork, or even rank speculation-a phenomenon labeled "horror vacui," or fear of empty spaces. For example, in Paolo Forlani's world map of 1565, a yet- to-be-discovered southern continent was depicted with anticipated mountain chains and animals. The possible explanations for horror vacui are varied, but one reason may have been a desire "to hide [the mapmakers'] ignorance." Not until "maps began to be thought of as more purely scientific instruments . . . [did] cartographers . . . restrain their concern about spaces …

Ignorance Of The Rules Of Omission: An Essay On Privilege Law, Rebecca Wexler

Vanderbilt Law Review

Evidentiary privileges--that is, rules that empower people to withhold evidence from legal proceedings-are one thread in a mesh of secrecy powers that control the flow of information in society. They are part and parcel of the laws, rules, norms, and practicalities that determine who can conceal and who can compel, that allocate power based on access to knowledge and its opposite. Despite the significance of privileges and of the harms that they produce, our understanding of this body of law has profound gaps.5 The questions posed above turn out to be more challenging than they might at first appear. Notwithstanding …

One Size Does Not Fit All: Alternatives To The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Henry Zhuhao Wang

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Federal Rules of Evidence have been so successful that many people equate them to the whole field of evidence law. But this is a false equivalence. Our world is complicated, diversified, and dynamic. So, too, is evidence law, which is like a rainforest in which the Federal Rules are simply the largest tree, not a forest unto themselves. In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence are limited in their applicability due to three fundamental assumptions: the presence of a jury trial, an adversarial process, and witness oral testimony. The universe of dispute resolution, however, extends far beyond a contour …

On Proving Mabrus And Zorgs, Michael S. Pardo

Vanderbilt Law Review

An unfortunate disconnect exists in modern evidence scholarship. On one hand, a rich literature has explored the process of legal proof in general and legal standards of proof in particular. Call this the "macro level" of legal proof. On the other hand, a rich literature has explored the admissibility rules that regulate the admission or exclusion of particular types of evidence (such as hearsay, character evidence, expert testimony, and so on). Call this the "micro level" of legal proof. Little attention, however, has focused on how the issues discussed in these two distinct strands of evidence scholarship intertwine. One important …

Binding Hercules: A Proposal For Bench Trials, Maggie Wittlin -- Associate Professor

Vanderbilt Law Review

If you were a federal judge presiding over a bench trial, you probably would not want the Federal Rules of Evidence to apply to you. Sure, you might want to be insulated from privileged information. But you are, no doubt, capable of cool-headed, rational reasoning, and you have a realistic understanding of how the world works; if you got evidence that was unreliable or easy to overvalue, you could handle it appropriately. But surely, you would have the same desire if you were a juror--it is not your position as a judge that makes you want all the relevant evidence. …

The Superfluous Rules Of Evidence, Jeffrey Bellin -- Professor Of Law

Vanderbilt Law Review

There are few American legal codifications as successful as the Federal Rules of Evidence. But this success masks the project's uncertain beginnings. The drafters of the Federal Rules worried that lawmakers would not adopt the new rules and that judges would not follow them. As a result, they included at least thirty rules of evidence that do not, in fact, alter the admissibility of evidence. Instead, these rules: (1) market the rules project, and (2) guide judges away from anticipated errors in applying the (other) nonsuperfluous rules.

Given the superfluous rules' covert mission, it should not be surprising that the …

How Machines Reveal The Gaps In Evidence Law, Andrea Roth -- Barry Tarlow Chancellor's Chair In Criminal Justice And Professor Of Law

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Symposium asks participants to reimagine the Federal Rules of Evidence on the fiftieth anniversary of their effective date. As part of that conversation, this short Essay argues that the Rules of Evidence contain critical gaps in terms of empowering litigants to meaningfully challenge the credibility of evidence. Specifically, the increasing use of machine-generated proof has made clear that evidence law does not offer sufficiently meaningful opportunities to scrutinize conveyances of information whose flaws cannot be exposed through cross-examination. These underscrutinized conveyances include machine-generated output, information conveyed by animals, and statements made by absent hearsay declarants. Even for some witnesses …

"Pics Or It Didn't Happen" And "Show Me The Receipts": A Folk Evidentiary Rule, Timothy Lau

Vanderbilt Law Review

"Pics or It Didn't Happen," "Show Me the Receipts," and related refrains are frequently encountered in online discussion threads today. They are typically invoked to demand corroboration in support of a claim or to declare from the outset that a claim is supported by some sort of proof In many ways, they are the functional counterpart of legal evidentiary objections in online discussions. They embody a folk evidentiary rule, democratically and organically developed by the people.

The topic of "Pics or It Didn't Happen" is much broader than can be covered in a symposium piece. As such, this Article seeks …

Race, Gatekeeping, Magical Words, And The Rules Of Evidence, Bennet Capers -- Professor Of Law

Vanderbilt Law Review

Although it might not be apparent from the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves, or the common law that preceded them, there is a long history in this country of tying evidence-what is deemed relevant, what is deemed trustworthy-to race. And increasingly, evidence scholars are excavating that history. Indeed, not just excavating, but showing how that history has racial effects that continue into the present.

One area that has escaped racialized scrutiny-at least of the type I am interested in-is that of expert testimony. Even in my own work on race and evidence, I have avoided discussion of expert testimony. In …

Models And Limits Of Federal Rule Of Evidence 609 Reform, Anna Roberts

Vanderbilt Law Review

A Symposium focusing on Reimagining the Rules of Evidence at 50 makes one turn to the federal rule that governs one's designated topic--prior conviction impeachment--and think about how that rule could be altered. Part I of this Article does just that, drawing inspiration from state models to propose ways in which the multiple criticisms of the existing federal rule might be addressed. But recent scholarship by Alice Ristroph, focusing on ways in which criminal law scholars talk to their students about "the rules," gives one pause. Ristroph identifies a pedagogical tendency to erase the many humans who turn rules into …

Evidence-Based Hearsay, Justin Sevier -- Professor Of Litigation

Vanderbilt Law Review

The hearsay rule initially appears straightforward and sensible. It forbids witnesses from repeating secondhand, untested gossip in court, and who among us prefers to resolve legal disputes through untested gossip? Nonetheless, the rule's unpopularity in the legal profession is well-known and far-reaching. It is almost cliche to say that the rule confounds law students, confuses practicing attorneys, and vexes trial judges, who routinely make incorrect calls at trial with respect to hearsay admissibility. The rule fares no better in the halls of legal academia. Although defenses exist, scholars have unleashed a parade of pejoratives at the rule over the years, …

A New Baseline For Character Evidence, Julia Simon-Kerr -- Professor Of Law

Vanderbilt Law Review

Perhaps no rules of evidence are as contested as the rules governing character evidence. To ward off the danger of a fact finder's mistaking evidence of character for evidence of action, the rules exclude much contextual information about the people at the center of the proceeding. This prohibition on character propensity evidence is a bedrock principle of American law. Yet despite its centrality, it is uncertain of both content and application. Contributing to this uncertainty is a definitional lacuna. Although a logical first question in thinking about character evidence is how to define it, the Federal Rules of Evidence have …

Shifting The Male Gaze Of Evidence, Teneille R. Brown Professor Of Law And Associate Dean

Vanderbilt Law Review

Rationality is deeply embedded in both the Rules themselves and the ways they are interpreted. David Leonard stated that rationality "lies at the heart of modern evidentiary principles" because relevance itself is "grounded in rationality." Of the many reasons we have evidence rules-to streamline trials, foster legitimacy and predictability, and promote due process-encouraging "rational fact- finding" is often at the top of this list.

In contemporary evidence law the hegemonic goal-of-rationality is "often taken for granted" and can be traced "from Bentham through Wigmore to the present day." It is a "remarkably homogeneous" view that has "dominated legal scholarship for …

Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The evidence rules have well-established, standard textual meanings—meanings that evidence professors teach their law students every year. Yet, despite the rules’ clarity, courts misapply them across a wide array of cases: Judges allow past acts to bypass the propensity prohibition, squeeze hearsay into facially inapplicable exceptions, and poke holes in supposedly ironclad privileges. And that’s just the beginning.

The evidence literature sees these misapplications as mistakes by inept trial judges. This Article takes a very different view. These “mistakes” are often not mistakes at all, but rather instances in which courts are intentionally bending the rules of evidence. Codified evidentiary …

Embracing Deference, Edward K. Cheng, Elodie O. Currier, Payton B. Hampton

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A fundamental conceptual problem has long dogged discussions about scientific and other expert evidence in the courtroom. In American law, the problem was most famously posed by Judge Learned Hand, who asked: "[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all." This puzzle, sometimes known as the "expert paradox," is quite general. It applies not only to the jury as factfinder, but also to the judge as gate- keeper under the …

Something Doesn’T Add Up: Solving Dna Forensic Science Statistical Fallacies In Trial Testimony, Kendall Brooke Kilberger

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

While the limitations of traditional forensic sciences are generally recognized, the presentation of DNA forensic science statistical testimony has widely evaded criticism. This lack of oversight has allowed four DNA forensic science statistical fallacies to plague the legal system: providing statistics without empirical support, the individualization fallacy, the prosecutor’s fallacy, and the defense attorney’s fallacy. These fallacies pose a significant risk to the preservation of justice, as erroneous DNA forensic science statistical testimony plays a critical role in wrongfully convicting innocent defendants.

This Note suggests administering standard jury instructions every time DNA forensic science statistical testimony is presented during trial. …

Rapt Admissions: Comparing Proposed Federal Rule Of Evidence 416 “Rap Shield” With The Rule 412 “Rape Shield”, Patience Tyne

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Creative expression depicting illicit activity can cause jurors to infer improper conclusions about a defendant, even when the jurors attempt to analyze such evidence objectively. When the government seeks to admit a defendant’s creative work into evidence in a criminal trial, courts use existing evidentiary rules to balance the work’s probative value against its risk of unfair prejudice. These rules are supposed to prevent unfair prejudice, but various scholars have shown that courts do not always appreciate how unfairly prejudicial art can be. Rap music presents unique challenges because jurors may fail to discern the work’s literal versus symbolic meaning. …

The Consensus Rule: A New Approach To Scientific Evidence, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Founded on good intentions but unrealistic expectations, the dominant Daubert framework for handling expert and scientific evidence should be scrapped. Daubert asks judges and jurors to make substantively expert determinations, a task they are epistemically incompetent to perform as laypersons. As an alternative, this Article proposes a new framework for handling expert evidence. It draws from the social and philosophical literature on expertise and begins with a basic question: How can laypersons make intelligent decisions about expert topics? From there, it builds its evidentiary approach, which ultimately results in an inference rule focused on expert communities. Specifically, when dealing with …

The Threat Of Deepfakes In Litigation: Raising The Authentication Bar To Combat Falsehood, Agnieszka Mcpeak

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Deepfakes are all over the internet—from shape-shifting comedians and incoherent politicians to disturbingly realistic fake pornography. Emerging technology makes it easier than ever to create a convincing deepfake. What used to take significant time and money to develop is now widely available, often for free, thanks to rapid advances in deepfake technology.

Deepfakes threaten individual rights and even democracy. But their impact on litigation should not be overlooked. The US adversarial system of justice is built on a foundation of seeking out the truth to arrive at a just result. The Federal Rules of Evidence serve as an important framework …

Completing The Quantum Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In "Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of Completeness," Professors Daniel Capra and Liesa Richter comprehensively catalog the many shortcomings in current Federal Rule of Evidence 106 and craft a compelling reform proposal. Their proposal admirably solves the identified problems, keeps the rule reasonably succinct, and furthers the accuracy and fairness goals of the rules of evidence. In this Response, we focus on Capra & Richter's proposal to formally recognize a "trumping" power in Rule 106, which would allow an adverse party to offer a completing statement even if it would be "otherwise inadmissible under the rule against hearsay."

Confronting The Biased Algorithm: The Danger Of Admitting Facial Recognition Technology Results In The Courtroom, Gabrielle M. Haddad

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

From unlocking an iPhone to Facebook “tags,” facial recognition technology has become increasingly commonplace in modern society. In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement and call for police reform in the United States, it is important now more than ever to consider the implications of law enforcement’s use of facial recognition technology. A study from the National Institute of Standards and Technology found that facial recognition algorithms generated higher rates of false positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more false identifications—than white faces. Given the embedded bias of this technology and its increased prevalence, the …

Reviving “Dead Letters”: Reimagining Federal Rule Of Evidence 410 As A Conditional Privilege, Peter G. Cornick

Vanderbilt Law Review

Though understudied relative to its fellow specialized relevance rules, Federal Rule of Evidence 410 protects a crucial element of the criminal justice system: plea negotiations. As written, the rule prevents the admission of evidence gathered during plea discussions, which helps assure criminal defendants that their candid discussions with prosecutors will not harm them in any future proceeding. But the Supreme Court has greatly weakened Rule 410, permitting broad waiver of the rule’s protections that run afoul of Congress’s purpose in creating the rule and its plain language. In light of these developments, the Note argues that Rule 410 should be …

Conference On Best Practices For Managing Daubert Questions, Edward K. Cheng, D. J. Capra, Et Al

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

When we are talking about overstatement, is it so apparent that surely the jury could understand that? Or that on cross at trial, would the opposing counsel make that apparent so that the jury would deal with it on its own? Or is it overstatement, in ways that you normally see, in that it becomes opaque and therefore misleading to the jury and the jury would never be able to figure it out?

The Future Of The Confrontation Clause: Semiautonomous And Autonomous Machine Witnesses, Brian Sites

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

How should the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment be interpreted as to machine witnesses? Courts across the country have resisted efforts to cross-examine the human agents who assist machines that generate data used in criminal trials. Such challenges under the Confrontation Clause have been rejected directly and in great number, and the rules of evidence are largely being read to not require the testimony of those who have the best information about the machine's use for the case at hand. This problem arises in an era of machine exceptionalism and widespread use. From increasingly sophisticated forensic lab tools to …

Unraveling Williams V. Illinois, Edward K. Cheng, Cara C. Mannion

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Essay addresses one of the key evidentiary problems facing courts today: the treatment of forensic reports under the Confrontation Clause. Forensics are a staple of modern criminal trials, yet what restrictions the Confrontation Clause places on forensic reports is entirely unclear. The Supreme Court’s latest decision on the issue, Williams v. Illinois, sowed widespread confusion among lower courts and commentators, and during the 2018 Term, Justices Gorsuch and Kagan dissented to the denial of certiorari in Stuart v. Alabama, a case that would have revisited (and hopefully clarified) Williams.

Our Essay dispels the confusion in Williams v. Illinois. …

The Exclusionary Rule In The Age Of Blue Data, Andrew G. Ferguson

Vanderbilt Law Review

In Herring v. United States, Chief Justice John Roberts reframed the Supreme Court's understanding of the exclusionary rule: "As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." The open question remains: How can defendants demonstrate sufficient recurring or systemic negligence to warrant exclusion? The Supreme Court has never answered the question, although the absence of systemic or recurring problems has figured prominently in two recent exclusionary rule decisions. Without the ability to document recurring failures or patterns of police misconduct, courts can dismiss …

Beyond The Witness: Bringing A Process Perspective, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

For centuries, the foundation of the Anglo-American trial has been the witness.' Witnesses report on their personal observations, provide opinions of character, offer scientific explanations, and in the case of parties, narrate their own story. Indeed, even for documentary and other physical evidence, witnesses often provide the conduit through which such evidence reaches the factfinder. Documentary or physical evidence rarely stands on its own. The law of evidence has thus unsurprisingly focused on-or perhaps obsessed over-witnesses. The hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause demand that declarants be available witnesses at trial so that they may be subject to cross-examination.' Expert …

Confidences Worth Keeping: Rebalancing Legitimate Interests In Litigants' Private Information In An Era Of Open-Access Courts, Jeffrey W. Sheehan

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The ideal of the public trial in open court continues to guide decisions about public access to courts and their records, even as cases are increasingly decided "on the papers." This is still the case when those "papers" take the form of electronic documents that can be uploaded, downloaded, copied, and distributed by anyone with an internet connection. A series of opinions from the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reinforcing this ideal of public access to court records and unsealing district court filings offers an opening to reconsider core values that must inform our treatment of private …

Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Symposium issue celebrating his career, Professor Michael Risinger in Leveraging Surprise proposes using "the fundamental emotion of surprise" as a way of measuring belief for purposes of legal proof. More specifically, Professor Risinger argues that we should not conceive of the burden of proof in terms of probabilities such as 51%, 95%, or even "beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, the legal system should reference the threshold using "words of estimative surprise" -asking jurors how surprised they would be if the fact in question were not true. Toward this goal (and being averse to cardinality), he suggests categories such …