Evidence Commons^™

Response Of John Kulewicz To Professor Shanker, John J. Kulewicz

Akron Law Review

A glaring error in Professor Shanker's recent article proves the value of the parol evidence rule at least as effectively as the balance of his scholarly contribution to this journal. In reviewing the arguments of counsel in the Marion PCA v. Cochran case,' Professor Shanker claims that the Court "was led astray by the lawyers" and that" [m]isleading from the [l]awyers" caused the Court to undertake its analysis of the Statute of Frauds.2 He stakes this claim on his apparent belief that counsel did not ask the Court to apply the parol evidence rule to the facts of the case. …

Wiggins V. State: Receiving A Fair Trial Under The Specter Of Aids, Charles Zamora

Akron Law Review

Wiggins v. State presented two unique issues: (1) whether it was proper to authorize courtroom security personnel to use prophylactic apparel while escorting a defendant merely suspected of having acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and (2) the extent to which this handling procedure impacted the jury.

This Note will analyze the Wiggins decision, emphasizing the court's reasoning as it pertains to the following: (1) the guarantee of a fair and impartial jury trial for defendants either having or being suspected of having AIDS; (2) the permissible exercise of discretion by the trial judge in authorizing precautions during the course of the …

Evidentiary Use Of Prior Acquittals: When Analysis Exceeds Reality, Paul Harper

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this note is to assess the basis and propriety of that decision and to highlight some potential problems with the Court's conclusion. Additionally, this casenote will attempt to envision how this holding may affect future prosecutions.

Finally it will offer an alternative model which may more adequately address the tension between the government's legitimate prosecutorial interests and the defendant's interest in finality of judgment.

State V. Jenks Fails To Clarify Appellate Standards Of Evidence Review In Ohio, Kevin L. Leffel

Akron Law Review

The analysis that follows focuses on two points. First, many reviewing courts in Ohio have failed to discern between reversing a conviction because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and reversing because the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. The concepts and associated standards of review are separate and distinct. Jenks failed to clarify the distinction and may actually add to the confusion. Second, the elimination of the circumstantial evidence rule has implications concerning the definition of reasonable doubt in Ohio.