Evidence Commons^™

Re-Examining Hearsay Under The Federal Rules: Some Method For The Madness, Paul S. Milich

Paul Milich

No abstract provided.

When Skeletons Come Out Of The Closet: Implications Of The Bosnian Genocide Decision For Serbia's Eventual Eu Accession, Edina Slomic

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The , James L. Kainen

James L. Kainen

Crawford v. Washington’s historical approach to the confrontation clause establishes that testimonial hearsay inadmissible without confrontation at the founding is similarly inadmissible today, despite whether it fits a subsequently developed hearsay exception. Consequently, the requirement of confrontation depends upon whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay, testimonial, and, if so, whether it was nonetheless admissible without confrontation at the founding. A substantial literature has developed about whether hearsay statements are testimonial or were, like dying declarations, otherwise admissible at the founding. In contrast, this article focuses on the first question – whether statements are hearsay – which scholars have thus far …

Shredded Fish,, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

There are just too many criminal laws and their proliferation has expanded exponentially over the last few decades. This is overcriminalization. In addition, the jurisdiction of federal authorities under general or vague laws has vastly expanded federal criminal prosecution of people and organizations for what otherwise would not be a crime. This is overfederalization and overcriminalization. In this article we will look at the current litigation before the United States Supreme Court that had directly taken on this controversy. The case of Yates v. United States involves briefing by the parties and by amici curae directly invoking and defending the …

Discretion Abused: Reinterpreting The Appellate Standard Of Review For Hearsay, Matthew J. Peterson

Matthew J. Peterson

Matthew J. Peterson, Discretion Abused: Reinterpreting the Appellate Standard of Review for Hearsay

Abstract:

The decision by a federal a court to exclude or admit hearsay can be crucial to the case of either party. Despite this prospective impact, the federal courts of appeal currently defer to district courts’ expertise by reviewing a district court’s decision to admit or exclude hearsay for an abuse of discretion. Such deference often insulates district courts’ incorrect interpretation of the rule against hearsay and the improper application of the exclusions and exceptions to the rule from appellate reversal.

Lowering the standard of review for …

Catalogs, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein

All Faculty Scholarship

It is a virtual axiom in the world of law that legal norms come in two prototypes: rules and standards. The accepted lore suggests that rules should be formulated to regulate recurrent and frequent behaviors, whose contours can be defined with sufficient precision. Standards, by contrast, should be employed to address complex, variegated, behaviors that require the weighing of multiple variables. Rules rely on an ex ante perspective and are therefore considered the domain of the legislator; standards embody a preference for ex post, ad-hoc, analysis and are therefore considered the domain of courts. The rules/standards dichotomy has become a …

Evidence And The Pursuit Of Truth In The Law, Jeffery L. Johnson

Jeffery L Johnson

Lawyers should be much more concerned with the concepts of truth and evidence. The entire profession depends on truth. It is what police detectives, District Attorneys, juries, trial judges, appellate judges, and academic lawyers offering interpretive theories, are all concerned with. But, since truth is seldom apparent on its sleeve, these legal actors are equally dependent on evidence as the only(?) reliable(?) means of determining truth. I defend a commonsensical theory of [good] evidence. I argue that this view, inference to the best explanation, captures most, if not all, of a lawyer’s appeal to evidence. It is far from clear, …

Rationality, Insanity, And The Insanity Defense: Reflections On The Limits Of Reason, Theodore Y. Blumoff

Theodore Y. Blumoff

Individuals who suffer from chronic paranoid ideations live with deeply embedded conspiratorial delusions that are sometimes accompanied by unwanted visual and/or auditory stimuli, sometime neither: just psychotic delusions in which they feel as if they have lost control of their lives – and of course they have, albeit not from the performances of foreign forces. When those perceived forces persevere for even a fairly short period of time, they can dictate the performance of evil deeds that the individual ultimately feels helpless to oppose. What observations and findings from neuroscience make clear is that such individuals do not lack knowledge, …

Tell Us A Story, But Don't Make It A Good One: Resolving The Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories And Federal Rule Of Evidence 403, Cathren Page

Cathren Page

Abstract: Tell Us a Story, But Don’t Make It A Good One: Resolving the Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by Cathren Koehlert-Page Courts need to reword their opinions regarding Rule 403 to address the tension between the advice to tell an emotionally evocative story at trial and the notion that evidence can be excluded if it is too emotional. In the murder mystery Mystic River, Dave Boyle is kidnapped in the beginning. The audience feels empathy for Dave who as an adult becomes one of the main suspects in the murder of his friend Jimmy’s …

The Limits Of Textualism In Interpreting The Confrontation Clause, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Simple Theory Of Complex Valuation, Julia Simon-Kerr, Anthony Casey

Julia Simon-Kerr

Complex valuations of assets, companies, government programs, damages, and the like cannot be done without expertise, yet judges routinely pick an arbitrary value that falls somewhere between the extreme numbers suggested by competing experts. This creates costly uncertainty and undermines the legitimacy of the court. Proposals to remedy this well-­‐‑recognized difficulty have become increasingly convoluted. As a result, no solution has been effectively adopted and the problem persists. This article suggests that the valuation dilemma stems from a misconception of the inquiry involved. Courts have treated valuation as its own special type of inquiry distinct from traditional fact finding. We …