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Admissibility Of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws Of ‘Falsifiability’ And ‘Falsification’, Barbara P. Billauer Esq Dec 2015

Admissibility Of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws Of ‘Falsifiability’ And ‘Falsification’, Barbara P. Billauer Esq

barbara p billauer esq

Abstract: The Daubert mantra demands that judges, acting as gatekeepers, prevent para, pseudo or ‘bad’ science from infiltrating the courtroom. To do so, the Judges must first determine what “science” is? And then, what ‘good science’ is? It is submitted that Daubert is seriously polluted with the notions of Karl Popper who sets ‘falsifiability’ and ‘falsification’ as the demarcation line for that determination. This inapt philosophy has intractably infected case law, leading to bad decisions immortalized as stare decisis. Among other problems, is the intolerance of Popper’s system for multiple causation, a key component of toxic- torts. Thus, the ...


Visualizing Dna Proof, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos Aug 2015

Visualizing Dna Proof, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos

Nicholas L Georgakopoulos

DNA proof inherently involves the use of probability theory, which is often counterintuitive. Visual depictions of probability theory, however, can clarify the analysis and make it tractable. A DNA hit from a large database is a notoriously difficult probabi­li­ty theory issue, yet the visuals should enable courts and juries to handle it. The Puckett facts are an example of a general approach: A search in a large DNA database produces a hit for a cold crime from 1972 San Francisco. Probability theory allows us to process the probabilities that someone else in the database, someone not in the ...


Finding The Foregone Conclusions Of Encryption, Timothy A. Wiseman Mar 2014

Finding The Foregone Conclusions Of Encryption, Timothy A. Wiseman

Timothy A Wiseman

Encryption is commonly used to protect private information, for both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Courts have been struggling to determine when, within the bounds of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Courts may compel a defendant in a criminal case to decrypt their data.

This article argues that a broad use of the Forgone Conclusion doctrine would permit the Courts to order a defendant to decrypt their data when the prosecution can show with reasonable particularity the existence and location of the encrypted documents, that they are likely to be incriminating, and that the government can authenticate them without the ...


Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, And The Constitutional Cost Of Collective Surveillance, Jeffrey L. Vagle Feb 2014

Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, And The Constitutional Cost Of Collective Surveillance, Jeffrey L. Vagle

Jeffrey L Vagle

Recent revelations of heretofore secret U.S. government surveillance programs have sparked national conversations about their constitutionality and the delicate balance between security and civil liberties in a constitutional democracy. Among the revealed policies asserted by the National Security Agency (NSA) is a provision found in the “minimization procedures” required under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This provision allows the NSA to collect and keep indefinitely any encrypted information collected from domestic communications—including the communications of U.S. citizens. That is, according to the U.S. government, the mere fact that a U.S ...


Back To The Future: The Constitution Requires Reasonableness And Particularity—Introducing The “Seize But Don’T Search” Doctrine, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean Feb 2014

Back To The Future: The Constitution Requires Reasonableness And Particularity—Introducing The “Seize But Don’T Search” Doctrine, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Adam Lamparello

Issuing one-hundred or fewer opinions per year, the United States Supreme Court cannot keep pace with opinions that match technological advancement. As a result, in Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, the Court needs to announce a broader principle that protects privacy in the digital age. That principle, what we call “seize but don’t search,” recognizes that the constitutional touchstone for all searches is reasonableness.

When do present-day circumstances—the evolution in the Government’s surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the ...