Law Commons^™

Kamakahi V. Asrm: The Egg Donor Price Fixing Litigation, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

In April 2011, Lindsay Kamakahi caused an international stir by suing the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), SART-member fertility clinics, and a number of egg donor agencies on behalf of herself and other oocyte donors. The suit challenged the ASRM-SART oocyte donor compensation guidelines, which limit payments to egg donors to $5,000 ($10,000 under special circumstances), as an illegal price-fixing agreement in violation of United States antitrust laws.

Ensuing discussion of the case has touched on familiar debates surrounding coercion, commodification, and exploitation. It has also revealed many misconceptions about oocyte donation, …

Elhauge On Tying: Vindicated By History, Barak D. Richman, Steven W. Usselman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Saving The First Amendment From Itself: Relief From The Sherman Act Against The Rabbinic Cartels, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

America’s rabbis currently structure their employment market with rules that flagrantly violate the Sherman Act. The consequences of these rules, in addition to the predictable economic outcomes of inflated wages for rabbis and restricted consumer freedoms for the congregations that employ them, meaningfully hinder Jewish communities from seeking their preferred spiritual leader. Although the First Amendment cannot combat against this privately-orchestrated (yet paradigmatic) restriction on religious expression, the Sherman Act can. Ironically, however, the rabbinic organizations implementing the restrictive policies claim that the First Amendment immunizes them from Sherman Act scrutiny, thereby claiming the First Amendment empowers them to do …

Concentration In Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems And Better Solutions, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

Health care providers with market power enjoy substantially more pricing freedom than monopolists in other markets, for a reason not generally recognized: US-style health insurance. Consequently, monopolies in health care cause undesirable redistribution of wealth and inefficient allocation of resources, both of which burden consumers at levels beyond those of other monopolists. The unusual costliness of monopoly power in health care markets demands far more policy attention than it has received. For starters, the health sector needs a more aggressive antitrust policy that effectively prevents the creation of new provider market power through mergers, alliances, or government immunity. An immediate …

Amicus Brief Of Antitrust Professors And Scholars, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church And School V. Eeoc, Barak D. Richman, Harry First

Faculty Scholarship

Professional associations of clergy have invoked the ministerial exception to claim immunity from the antitrust laws. In claiming immunity, these clergy feel entitled to construct cartel-like arrangements that, absent such immunity, would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The question presented in this case characterizes the ministerial exception as a bar to most “employment-related lawsuits brought against religious organizations by employees performing religious functions.” Such a characterization leaves open the possibility that “religious organizations” could include professional associations of clergy, in addition to churches, religious schools, or other employers of clergy, and “employment-related lawsuits” …