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2009

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Where Have All The Lenders Gone?: "Loan To Own Transactions" In The Current Credit Market, Stephanie A. Nadler Dec 2009

Where Have All The Lenders Gone?: "Loan To Own Transactions" In The Current Credit Market, Stephanie A. Nadler

Stephanie A Nadler

Credit is not readily available in current markets. While distressed firms are in dire need of capital contributions, traditional lenders are not willing to make risky loans. Distressed firms have turned to hedge funds as lenders for much-needed capital. Thus, hedge funds engage in “loan to own” transactions, a lending technique that has recently drawn much criticism. In a loan to own transaction, the hedge fund makes a loan to a distressed company, while also taking an equity stake in the company. Pursuant to such activity, the hedge fund will generally gain a seat on the board of directors or …


Consumers Want To Be In Europe; Corporations Want To Be In The U.S.: How To Reform Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Agreements To Be Fair To Both Parties, Kelly Parfitt Dec 2009

Consumers Want To Be In Europe; Corporations Want To Be In The U.S.: How To Reform Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Agreements To Be Fair To Both Parties, Kelly Parfitt

Kelly Parfitt

Arbitration is a popular method of resolving legal disputes between businesses. However, in the last few years, corporations have begun putting mandatory consumer arbitration agreements in small print on sales contracts and receipts for consumer goods, credit cards, and mortgages. Consumers are forced to pay fees much higher than court costs, depending on the case. An arbitrator will do hundreds of cases with the same corporations, be familiar with and even in some cases be affiliated with the corporation. This system results in the overwhelming majority of cases being won by corporations. But in the European Union, consumers are given …


Criminal Insider Trading: Prosecution, Legislation, And Justification, Steven Brody Oct 2009

Criminal Insider Trading: Prosecution, Legislation, And Justification, Steven Brody

Steven Brody

Since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, insider trading has been codified as a federal crime. For many years, however, civil cases were rare, and criminal prosecutions resulting in prison terms were nearly unheard of. Yet during the 1980’s, white collar crime—and insider trading in particular—became the subject of more public scrutiny than it had ever previously received. During this period, major developments occurred in the criminalization, prosecution, and sentencing of those who had committed securities fraud. High profile cases of inside traders like Ivan Boesky and Dennis Levine made targets of federal prosecutions household names and …


A Short Comment On The 2009 Report Of The Un Special Representative Of The Secretary-General On The Issue Of Human Rights And Transnational Corporations And Other Business Enterprises, Jernej Letnar Cernic Oct 2009

A Short Comment On The 2009 Report Of The Un Special Representative Of The Secretary-General On The Issue Of Human Rights And Transnational Corporations And Other Business Enterprises, Jernej Letnar Cernic

Jernej Letnar Černič

A short comment on the 2009 report of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and Transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Professor John Ruggie to the United Nations Human Rights Council, “Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” framework” AH/HRC/8/5, 22 April 2009.


Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals, Marco Ventoruzzo Oct 2009

Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals, Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

One of the most crucial, but systematically neglected, comparative differences between corporate law systems in Europe and in the United States, as crucial as often neglected, concerns the regulations governing freeze-out transactions in listed corporations. Freeze-outs can be defined as transactions in which the controlling shareholder exercises a legal right to buy out the shares of the minority, and consequently delists the corporation and brings it private. Beyond this essential definition, the systems diverge profoundly.

This gap exists despite the fact that minority freeze-outs are one of the most debated issues in corporate law, in the public media, in a …


Commercial Bribery And The New International Norms, Don R. Berthiaume Oct 2009

Commercial Bribery And The New International Norms, Don R. Berthiaume

Don R Berthiaume

The United States, through its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and the member nations of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OCED) and Council of Europe (CoE) who have adopted similar legislation have made tremendous strides in hindering corrupt payments to foreign officials relating to business transactions. In response to these enforcement initiatives, many international businesses have taken steps to comply with anti-bribery laws by developing compliance programs and conducting internal investigations and cooperating with law enforcement officials when allegations of corrupt payments arise.


The Future Of Shareholder Democracy, Lisa Fairfax Oct 2009

The Future Of Shareholder Democracy, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article seeks to ascertain the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's rejection in 2007 of a proxy access rule, a rule that would have required corporations to include shareholder-nominated candidates on the ballot. On the one hand, the SEC's rejection appears to be a stunning blow to the shareholders' rights campaign because many shareholders' rights advocates have long considered access to the corporate ballot as the "holy grail" of their campaign for increased shareholder power. On the other hand, some corporate experts maintain that characterizing proxy access as the indispensable ingredient for sufficient shareholder influence fails to appreciate …


Active Or Passive?---Rethinking Directors’ Roles In An Anti-Takeover Process, Hanyu Zhang Sep 2009

Active Or Passive?---Rethinking Directors’ Roles In An Anti-Takeover Process, Hanyu Zhang

Hanyu Zhang

In this article, “takeovers” refer to activities of acquiring shares to obtain the actual control of a listed corporation (the target corporation) by the bidder. And “anti-takeovers” refer to activities of employing defensive tactics to prevent the controlling power of the target corporation being taken away from the original controller.

In many jurisdictions, scholars generally regard the existence of the takeover markets to be good because it could, at least, assist maintaining good corporate governance and generating economic welfare. So it is important, in this article, to ask why the target corporation should sometimes fight against takeovers, and who should …


Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights On Jones V. Harris, D. Bruce Johnsen Sep 2009

Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights On Jones V. Harris, D. Bruce Johnsen

D. Bruce Johnsen

Mutual funds stand ready at all times to sell and redeem common stock to the investing public for the net value of their assets under management. In the language of transaction cost economics, they are open-access common pools subject to virtually free investor entry and exit. The Investment Company Act (1940) requires mutual funds to be managed by an outside advisory firm pursuant to a written contract, which normally pays the adviser a small share of net asset value, say, one-half of one percent per year. Following 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act imposing a fiduciary duty on advisers …


Why Japanese Entrepreneurs Don't Give Up Control To Venture Capitalists, Zenichi Shishido Sep 2009

Why Japanese Entrepreneurs Don't Give Up Control To Venture Capitalists, Zenichi Shishido

Zenichi Shishido

The biggest difference in the incentive bargains between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the US and Japan is that American entrepreneurs abandon control while Japanese entrepreneurs do not. Years ago, Black & Gilson tried to explain the difference by the existence and non-existence of liquid IPO markets. Although now there are multiple liquid IPO markets in Japan, Japanese entrepreneurs are still reluctant to abandon control of their companies to venture capitalists. While there must be many complementary reasons, such as different market situations, different social norms, etc., for the difference, I will raise a hypothesis that it can be partly …


The Financial Crisis Of 2009 - Have Reorganization Proceedings In Emerging Markets Gone Bankrupt? Israel As A Case Study, David Hahn Sep 2009

The Financial Crisis Of 2009 - Have Reorganization Proceedings In Emerging Markets Gone Bankrupt? Israel As A Case Study, David Hahn

David Hahn

The financial crisis of 2009 affected markets all over the world, presenting an unprecedented challenge for international regulators. In emerging markets, firms began raising significant amounts of debt through corporate bonds only in recent years. When such markets crashed, and firms could no longer pay bondholders, regulators were forced to adopt innovative policies to cope with the problem. This paper explores the possible regulatory responses to the crisis, by focusing on the actions taken by regulators in Israel. The paper outlines the various mechanisms that have been employed and offered to combat the crisis and highlights their shortcomings. It then …


Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill Sep 2009

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …


Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill Sep 2009

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …


The Illegal Actions Of The Federal Reserve: An Analysis Of How The Nation’S Central Bank Has Acted Outside The Law In Responding To The Current Financial Crisis, Chad Emerson Aug 2009

The Illegal Actions Of The Federal Reserve: An Analysis Of How The Nation’S Central Bank Has Acted Outside The Law In Responding To The Current Financial Crisis, Chad Emerson

Chad Emerson

Abstract

The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve:

An Analysis of How the Nation’s Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law in Responding to the Current Financial Crisis

In the Spring of 2008, the United States Federal Reserve Bank, under the Chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, took emergency measures in an attempt to forestall a national, if not international, economic meltdown. The actual effectiveness of these unprecedented measures has been hotly-debated. Unfortunately, regardless of their efficacy, the Federal Reserve acted outside the scope of its legal authority in taking several of these actions.

This essay will analyze how the Federal Reserve …


Harmonization Of International Legal Structure For Fostering Professional Services: Lessons From Early U.S. Federal-State Relations, Deth Sao Aug 2009

Harmonization Of International Legal Structure For Fostering Professional Services: Lessons From Early U.S. Federal-State Relations, Deth Sao

Deth Sao

In the current global marketplace, liberalization of trade in professional services (“services”) presents one of the biggest challenges and profitable opportunities for the international community. Changes in technology and state privatization polices over the past half century have made services the fastest growing sector in international trade. Despite such a transformation, the potential for further innovation and expansion in the services industries is in jeopardy. In response to public policy and regulatory concerns and political pressures to protect domestic jobs and industries, states have adopted a plethora of state-initiated discriminatory and restrictive policies against trade in services. Because existing international …


Paying To Break Up: The Metamorphosis Of Reverse Termination Fees, Afra Afsharipour Aug 2009

Paying To Break Up: The Metamorphosis Of Reverse Termination Fees, Afra Afsharipour

Afra Afsharipour

Despite our giving lip service to the binding nature of contracts, every law student learns that there are numerous possible “outs” or “walk away rights” associated with any contract. This Article examines one particular walk away right – the reverse termination fee (RTF) – in one particular category of acquisition transactions – strategic transactions.

In sophisticated acquisitions involving public companies, the risk that one party may walk away from the transaction is particularly high because there is generally an interim period between the signing of the agreement and the completion of the acquisition. Accordingly, acquisition agreements are peppered with various …


Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill Aug 2009

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …


Bottom-Up: An Alternative Approach For Investigating Corporate Malfeasance, Susan B. Schwab Aug 2009

Bottom-Up: An Alternative Approach For Investigating Corporate Malfeasance, Susan B. Schwab

Susan B. Heyman

At least since the Enron scandal, the government has focused intensive efforts on developing a strategy to investigate and prosecute corporate malfeasance. The prevailing method has been a “top-down” approach: government agents provide companies with incentives to conduct internal investigations, coerce employee cooperation, and disclose privileged information. Although many have expressed concern about violations of constitutional rights and erosions of privilege, the current system faces another critical problem: the top-down strategy will become less effective at unraveling corporate fraud as employees learn that it is not in their interest to cooperate. Further, the approach aims deterrence at the wrong people …


The De Facto And Estoppel Concepts In The Llc Context: Still Birth Or Stunted Growth?, Emeka Duruigbo Aug 2009

The De Facto And Estoppel Concepts In The Llc Context: Still Birth Or Stunted Growth?, Emeka Duruigbo

Emeka Duruigbo

Abstract The limited liability company (“LLC”), within a short period since its entrance into the American legal landscape in 1976, has seen a meteoric rise as the business form of choice for many investors. The lack of complete compliance with the statutory requirements for organizing a business, which has posed problems in older business forms, has also found its way into the LLC arena and is only likely to escalate as the popularity of the LLC continues to grow. The consequence has been exposure of business organizers and subsequent investors to ruinous personal liability for business obligations. In response, some …


Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy And Accountability In How We Vote, Allison Hayward Aug 2009

Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy And Accountability In How We Vote, Allison Hayward

Allison Hayward

The way a group, jurisdiction, or nation votes, and makes decisions binding on their members and citizens, is fundamental and deceptively prosaic. Why do some groups (faculties, Congress, caucuses, HOAs) take public votes in most contexts, accompanied by debate, sometimes heated. Why do others (electorates, labor unions) take private votes (often by ballot cast in a secure setting where “heated debate” is not allowed) in most contexts? Moreover, what should we make of the exceptions to these general forms? This Article will demonstrate that the hybrid mode of voting – non-debated yet non-secret voting such as in contemporary absentee balloting, …


Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime From Task Force To Top Priority, Mary K. Ramirez Aug 2009

Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime From Task Force To Top Priority, Mary K. Ramirez

mary k ramirez

Inadequate law enforcement against corporate criminals appears to have created perverse incentives leading to an economic crisis – this time in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis. Prioritizing Justice proposes institutional reform at the Department of Justice in pursuing corporate crime. Presently, corporate crime is pursued nationally primarily through the DOJ Corporate Fraud Task Force and other task forces, the DOJ Criminal Division Fraud Section, and the individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices. Rather than a collection of ad hoc task forces that seek to coordinate policy among a vast array of offices and agencies, the relentless waves of corporate criminality …


The Supreme Court’S Impact On Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment Of Tellabs, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen Choi Aug 2009

The Supreme Court’S Impact On Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment Of Tellabs, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

Using a sample of securities fraud class actions filed between 2003 and 2007, we study the impact of a widely-followed Supreme Court decision from that period, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). This decision clarified the law with respect to one of the most hotly contested issues in securities litigation: pleading scienter. The Tellabs decision reversed a very lenient Seventh Circuit decision with respect to pleading scienter, but replaced it with a standard that is nonetheless relatively generous to plaintiffs. Looking at opinions resolving motions to dismiss decided before and after that decision, we …


Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill Aug 2009

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …


Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill Aug 2009

Who's Afraid Of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective, Jennifer G. Hill

Jennifer Hill Professor

Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Power? A Comparative Law Perspective Jennifer G. Hill* Abstract US corporate law is undergoing a seismic shift in relation to shareholder power. Although shareholders have traditionally had restricted participatory rights under US corporate law, this paradigm has been challenged in recent times. The shareholder empowerment debate raised shareholder power as a serious subject for corporate law reform. The global financial crisis has given the issue further impetus, and an unprecedented array of reforms and proposals to increase shareholder power are now on the table in the US. There has, however, been great resistance to adjusting the …


Charity Law's Essentials, Dana Brakman Reiser Aug 2009

Charity Law's Essentials, Dana Brakman Reiser

Dana Brakman Reiser

The boundary between charity and business has become a moving target. Social enterprises, philanthropy divisions of for-profit companies (most notably at Google), and legislation creating hybrid nonprofit/for-profit forms all use business models and practices to mold and pursue charitable objectives. This article asserts that charity law must be streamlined in order to respond to these and other dramatic charitable innovations. My new vision of charity law centers around two essential requirements. First, charity law must continue to demand that charities maintain an other-regarding orientation, pursuing benefits for someone other than their own leaders and managers. Second, existing charity law must …


Review Article: The New American Corporate Governance In Context, Fenner L. Stewart Aug 2009

Review Article: The New American Corporate Governance In Context, Fenner L. Stewart

Fenner L. Stewart Jr.

If corporate boards are becoming more than “rubber stamps”, then Stephen Bainbridge and his new book are in the middle of a coup d'état in corporate governance. On the other hand, if this shift is not occurring and boards remain “rubber stamps”, then director primacy is no more than managerialism with a twist. Moreover, if director primacy represents the emergence of a new order for American corporate governance, then the merits of maintaining Delaware’s status quo director primacy must be carefully assessed, because the stakes are changing – maybe for the better and maybe for the worse. This article traces …


Invigorating The Role Of The In-House Legal Advisor As Steward In Ethical Culture And Governance At Client-Business Organizations: From 21st Century Failures To True Calling, Ben G. Pender Aug 2009

Invigorating The Role Of The In-House Legal Advisor As Steward In Ethical Culture And Governance At Client-Business Organizations: From 21st Century Failures To True Calling, Ben G. Pender

Ben G Pender II

Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor as Steward in Ethical Culture and Governance at Client-Business Organizations From 21st Century Failures to True Calling J.D., University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2009 M.A. Sociology, Organizational Effectiveness, Clark Atlanta University, 1996. B.S., Sociology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. All Rights Reserved. © 2009. This Article examines the need to invigorate the role of the in-house legal advisor from ‘mere legal technician’ to simultaneous legal advisory gatekeeper and ethical steward at client-business organizations. This article asserts that the often-acquiescent in-house legal advisor as ‘mere legal technician’ is partially …


Locating Innovation: The Endogeniety Of Technology, Organizational Structure And Financial Contracting, Ronald J. Gilson Aug 2009

Locating Innovation: The Endogeniety Of Technology, Organizational Structure And Financial Contracting, Ronald J. Gilson

Ronald J. Gilson

There is much we do not understand about the “location” of innovation; the confluence, for a particular innovation, of the technology associated with the innovation, the innovating firm’s size and organizational structure, and the financial contracting that supports the innovation. This article develops the theme that these three determinants of the location of innovation are simultaneously determined through examination of examples of innovative activity whose location is characterized by tradeoffs between pursuing the activity in a an established company or in a smaller, earlier stage company, or some combination of the two. It first considers the dilemma faced by an …


On The Role And Regulation Of Private Negotiations In Governance, Joseph W. Yockey Aug 2009

On The Role And Regulation Of Private Negotiations In Governance, Joseph W. Yockey

Joseph W. Yockey

Developments in corporate law continue to give shareholders greater levels of power over public companies. Instead of using their power to seek changes within firms through such traditional means as proxy contests and litigation, shareholders are increasingly relying on private negotiations with directors as a key component of their governance activities. Regulations enacted in response to the recent financial crisis will likely trigger even more widespread use of negotiations in the years to come. In this Article, I analyze the legal and policy implications generated by the use of private negotiations as a means of corporate governance. I make two …


Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, Andrew B. Spalding Aug 2009

Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, Andrew B. Spalding

Andrew B Spalding

Although the purpose of international anti-bribery legislation such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is to deter bribery, empirical evidence demonstrates a more problematic effect. In countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively common, the present enforcement regime goes beyond deterring bribery and actually deters investment. Drawing on literature from political science and economics, this article argues that anti-bribery legislation, as presently enforced, functions as de facto economic sanctions. A detailed analysis of the history of FCPA enforcement shows that these sanctions have most often occurred in emerging markets, where historic opportunities for economic and social development otherwise …